FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

JANVARY

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The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *can do more to guide American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.* The Editors.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

A Western View

By George F. Kennan

IN the public debate that has marked the progress of what is called the cold war, no term has been used more loosely, and at times unscrupulously, than the word "coexistence." In the article under his name, published in the last issue of *Foreign Affairs,* Mr. Khrushchev has given us an interesting definition of what he understands by this term. Peaceful coexistence, he says, signifies in essence the repudiation of war as a means of solving controversial issues. It presupposes an obligation to refrain from every form of violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of another state. It implies renunciation of interference in the internal affairs of other countries. It means that political and economic relations must be put on a basis of complete equality and mutual benefit. It involves, he says, the elimination of the very threat of war. It is something which "should develop into peaceful competition for the purpose of satisfying man's needs in the best possible way."

Not only has Mr. Khrushchev given us this definition but he has made it plain that he considers that the Soviet Union abides by these principles, has abided by them ever since the revolution of the autumn of 1917 and cannot help but abide by them in view of its social foundation; whereas there are still important elements in the Western countries who, in his view, do not abide by these principles, who "believe that war is to their benefit," who want to inflict "capitalism" by violent means on unwilling peoples and whose opposition must be overcome before peaceful coexistence can really be said to prevail.

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II

There could be few propositions more amazing than the assertion that the Soviet state "from its very inception . . . proclaimed peaceful coexistence as the basic principle of its foreign policy," and that the initial Communist leaders in Russia were strong partisans of the view that peaceful coexistence could and should prevail among states with different social systems.

One returns reluctantly to the record of those early years of Soviet power. One can well believe that authoritative circles in Moscow assess somewhat differently today the prospects for violent social revolution in the main industrial countries of the West, and perhaps even its necessity. One can imagine that they have a concept of the obligations of Russian Communists to the workers of those Western countries which is also somewhat different from that which prevailed in Moscow in 1917 and 1918. If this is so, then it would surely be better to let bygones be bygones, rather than permit the problem of coexistence in the present to be complicated by altercation over the attitudes of the past. The years 1917 and 1918 were, after all, a time of tremendous turmoil and tragedy in world affairs. Men acted, everywhere, in the spirit of violence and passion. Many things were done by both Communist and non-Communist sides which today, from the perspective of 40 years, appear clearly regrettable. Surely there could be very few people in the non-Communist world who would wish now to revive the controversies of that day or to associate themselves indiscriminately with the outlooks and prejudices of the period of World War I and its aftermath.

But if reference is to be taken prominently on the Communist side to the attitudes of Soviet leaders in 1917, as proof of the inviolable and inevitable attachment of Russian Communism to such principles as the repudiation of violence as a means of solving controversial political issues, the renunciation of interference in the internal affairs of other countries and the predominance of peaceful competition as between states of different social systems, then the Western scholar cannot refrain from registering his amazement and protest. It is surprising that there should be so little respect for the true history of the Russian revolutionary movement on the part of those who profess today to be its custodians and protagonists that they are willing to pervert it in this way for the sake of their own tactical convenience. One shudders

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to think what Lenin would have said to these preposterous distortions. Do the present leaders of the Russian Communist Party really profess to have forgotten that Lenin regarded himself outstandingly as an *international* socialist leader? Who was it wrote, on October 3, 1918, "The Bolshevik working class of Russia was always internationalist not only in words, but in deeds, in contrast to those villains—the heroes and leaders of the Second International. . . ."? Who was it said, in that same document, "The Russian proletariat will understand that the greatest sacrifices will now soon be demanded of it for the cause of internationalism. . . . Let us prepare ourselves at once. Let us prove that the Russian worker is capable of working much more energetically, and of struggling and dying in a much more self-sacrificing way, when it is a matter not of the Russian revolution alone but of the international workers' revolution. . . ."?[1]

This is, as every good Communist in Russia knows, only a single quotation out of literally thousands that could be adduced to illustrate the devotion of the Bolsheviki in Lenin's time to socialism as an international cause—the devotion, that is, precisely to the duty of interfering in the internal affairs of other countries with the object of altering their system of government and mode of life.

The proposition that the political power dominant in the Soviet Union has always been on the side of coexistence, as defined by Mr. Khrushchev, also calls upon us to forget the long and sinister history of the relationship between Moscow and the foreign Communist Parties in the Stalin era. There is ample documentation to show for what purposes foreign Communist Parties were used during those years, by whom, and by what methods. There are many of us in the West who, again, would be happy to disregard these recollections when it comes to the political discussion of the present day. But it is another thing to suffer insult to one's intelligence; and if people in Moscow wish this unhappy history to be forgotten outside Russia, they must not blandly turn the facts of history upside down and ask that the resulting configuration be accepted as proof of the inevitable commitment of Russian Communism to the principles of coexistence.

Over a hundred years ago a distinguished Western visitor, the Marquis de Custine, wrote from Petrograd that: "Russian despotism does not only count ideas and feelings as nothing, but it

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniya* (Fourth Edition). Moscow: 1952, v. 28, p. 83.

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remakes the facts, it enters the lists against the evident, and triumphs in the struggle."

People cannot hope to triumph in such a cause today. The very cultivation of these distortions, seeking as it does the obfuscation of public understanding of the historical development of the relations between the Soviet Union and the West, is itself a grievous disservice to any truly hopeful form of coexistence.

These statements of mine are not to be taken as implying a disposition to believe that the attachment of Mr. Khrushchev and certain of his colleagues to the principles of coexistence, as he has now defined them, is insincere and conceals sinister motives. This does not necessarily follow. The purpose is merely to point out that people in Moscow are not likely to strengthen belief outside Russia in the sincerity of their attachment to liberal and tolerant principles of international life by distorting the history of the Lenin or Stalin eras or by pleading that such an attachment flows inevitably from the nature of the social and political system prevailing in the Soviet Union. It is possible to conceive that the Soviet attitude in such questions may have changed; it is not possible to accept the proposition that it did not need to change in order to meet the requirements of peaceful coexistence, as Mr. Khrushchev has defined them.

III

In the statement of the Soviet view of coexistence, much stress has been laid on the attachment of people in the West to capitalism and on their alleged desire to see it triumph as a world system.

The Westerner of this day experiences a certain bewilderment when he hears the term "capitalism" used in this way. What is it that is meant by this expression? One notices that whatever the reality may be which it purports to symbolize, it is one which in Russian Communist eyes has not changed appreciably since the Russian Social Democratic Party came into being at the turn of the century. If there is any recognition in official Soviet thought of the fact that changes in the economic practices and institutions of non-Communist countries over this past half-century have been such as to affect in any way the elements of the classic Marxist view of Western capitalism, I am not aware of the place where this has found expression. Contemporary Soviet ideological material seems to suggest that there exists outside the Communist orbit a static and basic condition—a set of practices known as

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"capitalism" and expressed primarily in the private ownership of the means of production—which has undergone no essential alteration over the past 50 years, or indeed since the lifetime of Karl Marx; which continues to be the dominant reality of Western society; belief in which constitutes the essence of all non-Communist political philosophy; and to which the Western governments and "ruling circles," in particular, remain, as a matter of pride and tenacious self-interest, profoundly committed. It would presumably be to "capitalism" in this sense that Mr. Khrushchev was referring when he wrote that many readers of *Foreign Affairs* would perhaps think that capitalism will ultimately triumph.

It is hardly necessary to emphasize how far this seems, to many of us outside Russia, from the reality of this day. The principles of free economic enterprise and private ownership of the means of production have indeed had a prominent part to play in the economies of non-Communist countries everywhere over this past half-century. But in no two countries has this part been quite the same. Elements of public and social control have come in, everywhere, to challenge and modify the operation of these principles. The resulting balance between private control on the one hand and social or public control on the other now varies greatly from country to country. There is today not *one* social and economic system prevailing outside the Communist orbit: there are almost as many such systems as there are countries; and many of them are closer to what Marx conceived as socialism than they are to the laissez faire capitalism of his day. In each of them, furthermore, the balance between private and social influences is everywhere in a state of flux and evolution which makes it quite impossible to predict from the aspect it assumes today what aspect it is going to assume tomorrow.

This means that in the non-Communist world, where it is customary to attempt to relate the meaning of words to objective phenomena, the term "capitalism" no longer has any generic and useful meaning. It is only in Russia, where theoretical concept can still be spared the test of relevance to objective reality, that a meaning for this term still exists. Not only this, but there are numbers of issues of public life which today appear to most people in the non-Communist world as having a higher importance, from the standpoint of their general effect on the human condition, than the issues of the ownership of the means of production

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and the distribution of wealth with which the Marxist doctrine was preoccupied.

How absurd, in the light of these facts, to picture Western non-Communists as the passionate protagonists and devotees of something called "capitalism," and to suggest that there are influential people in the West who desire to bring upon the earth the miseries of another world war in the hope of being able to inflict the capitalist system on great masses of people who do not desire it. The question of who owns the machines is not the one that today dominates the thoughts and discussions of Western society and Western "ruling circles;" it is primarily the question of human freedom—of the right of people to choose and alter their own social and political systems as they like, to select those who shall govern them within the framework of those systems, and to enjoy, within that same framework, the civil liberties which relieve them of the fear of arbitrary injustice, permit them to practice freedom of the mind and enable them to walk with their heads up.

I am aware that Communists have long professed to see no value in either the parliamentary or judicial institutions of the liberal West. The classical Communist position has dismissed these institutions as frauds perpetrated on the helpless workers by the monopolists who exploit them. Is it too much to hope that people in the Communist world will now manifest their interest in coexistence by abandoning cynical and ridiculous extremism, in the face of which the whole development of British and American society over these last centuries becomes historically unintelligible?

That these liberal institutions are imperfect, most Englishmen or Americans would, I think, readily concede; but the overwhelming majority of us believe them to embody something that lies close to the essence of human dignity, as we have learned to see it, and something which is one of the most precious attainments of civilized man. It is to this, not to the system governing ownership and control of the industries of our country, that our deepest pride and loyalties relate. If, by the fair operation of these parliamentary institutions, and with preservation of all basic civil liberties, the arrangements governing ownership or control of the means of production should be drastically changed (and some already have been), most of us would view this as no final tragedy and would not see ourselves as defeated. But if it were the other way round, and if such changes had to be purchased at the

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price of the sacrifice of the rights and privileges which our parliamentary and judicial institutions now generally, if imperfectly, provide—then, and only then, would we consider ourselves to have suffered an irreparable defeat—only then would it seem to us that what was most essential had been lost.

We decline, therefore, to be depicted as the passionate protagonists of something called "capitalism" waging an ideological competition with the protagonists of something called "socialism." Least of all can we in America accept the charge of wishing to impose something called capitalism on other peoples. Several European countries have changed their social and economic institutions over the course of recent decades in ways that carry them very far from those prevailing in the United States. In this, they have not encountered the slightest opposition or hindrance from the American side. The basic ideological issue, as seen in the United States today, is not capitalism versus socialism but freedom versus its opposite. The disagreement between Moscow and the "leading circles" of the non-Communist world is not really a disagreement about which form of social system is most productive; it is rather a disagreement about what is most important, in the first place, in the lives of peoples.

IV

The fact that an ideological disagreement of this nature exists is in itself no reason why peaceful coexistence, as Mr. Khrushchev defines it, should not prevail. There is nothing new in the prolonged peaceful residence, side by side, of ideologically antagonistic systems. Many of the present peaceful relationships of international life, outside the Communist orbit, have evolved from ones which were originally relationships of profound ideological antagonism. There was, for that matter, no ideological affinity but rather a sharp ideological conflict between the Tsarist system in Russia and the world of American political thought. This did not prevent the two powers from existing in the same world, without hostilities, for more than a hundred years.

There are no doubt individuals scattered here and there throughout the Western countries who find intolerable this present antagonism of outlook as between the Soviet Government and the Western peoples and who cannot see how it can be either resolved or endured by means short of a world war. If one searches, one can even find, for quotation, public utterances of this view.

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But it would be generally agreed, I think, that these people are few and not very influential. The general attitude throughout the West would unquestionably be—and this goes for governments as well as for individuals—that while the social and political system now dominant in Russia is one that may not commend itself to us, its existence and prevalence there is not our responsibility; it is not our business to change it; it constitutes in itself no reason why a relationship of peaceful coexistence should not prevail.

The cold war, let it be said most emphatically, does not exist because people in the West object to the Russian people having socialism or any other system they wish. If, in fact, it were only a matter of ideologies, and only a matter of the relationship between the West and Russia proper, there would be no reason why the Soviet demand for "peaceful coexistence" should not be accepted without reservation.

But the Soviet Union is not only an ideological phenomenon. It is also a great power, physically and militarily. Even if the prevailing ideology in Russia were not antagonistic to the concepts prevailing elsewhere, the behavior of the government of that country in its international relations, and particularly any considerable expansion of its power at the expense of the freedom of other peoples, would still be a matter of most serious interest to the world at large.

And it is, let us recall, precisely such an expansion that we have witnessed in recent years. So far as Europe is concerned, this expansion had its origin in the advance of Soviet armies into Eastern and Central Europe in 1945. This advance was not only accepted at the time—it was generally welcomed in the West as a very important part of the final phase of the struggle against Hitler. But it has had a consequence which few people in the West foresaw in 1945 and which fewer still desired: the quasi-permanent advancement of the effective boundaries of Moscow's political and military authority to the very center of Europe.

The discussion of the question of coexistence on the Communist side is cast in terms which take no account of this situation and which ask us, by implication, either to ignore it or to pretend that it does not exist. The problem, we are told, is to "liquidate the consequences of the Second World War;" but this particular consequence, we are left to infer, is one which is neither to be liquidated nor to be spoken about.

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Is this a realistic demand? One cannot agree that it is. The position of preëminence which the U.S.S.R. enjoys among the countries of the Communist bloc is not a secret. The Communist leaders of various countries do not ignore it when they themselves assemble to discuss international affairs. What people in the West should or should not do to change or affect this situation is another problem; but to demand that a situation which is perfectly well recognized *within* the Communist world as a significant factor in world affairs should be effectively ignored when it comes to the discussion of coexistence between East and West is surely neither reasonable nor helpful. The fact is that this extension of Russia's political and military power into the heart of Europe represents a major alteration in the world strategic and political balance, and one that was never discussed as such with Western statesmen, much less agreed to by them.

It is not just the *fact* of this situation which is of importance to the Western peoples; there is also the question as to *how* it came into existence and *how* it is being maintained. The truth is that it did not come into existence because the majority of the people in the region affected became convinced that Communism, as Mr. Khrushchev has put it, was "the more progressive and equitable system." This peaceful competition for the minds of men which the Communists today ask us to accept as the concomitant and condition of peaceful coexistence had precious little to do with the means by which socialist governments, on the pattern approved by Moscow, were established in the countries of Eastern Europe in 1944 and 1945 or with the means by which their rule was subsequently consolidated there. In the view of the West, formed on the strength of overwhelming historical evidence, these régimes were imposed by the skillful manipulations of highly disciplined Communist minorities, trained and inspired by Moscow, and supported by the presence or close proximity of units of the Soviet armed forces. They have been maintained in power by similar means.

It is not the intention here to attempt to judge these happenings from a moral standpoint. I do not mean to challenge the proposition that Russia has political interests in Eastern Europe and that these deserve the respect of Western governments as a matter of elementary political realism. Nor do I wish to deny that the present situation, whatever we may think of its origin, represents today a heavy commitment of the Soviet Government,

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which the latter cannot reasonably be asked to alter in any abrupt or drastic manner dangerous to its own political security.

There are, as Mr. Khrushchev knows, people in the West who have not despaired of finding ways to reconcile Soviet interests in this area both with the interests of the Western powers and of the respective peoples, and who have done what they could to pave the way for reasonable and moderate solutions of these difficulties. But the efforts of such people are bound to remain fruitless if the Soviet Government continues to give the impression that, having quietly pocketed this region, it is now saying to the West: "Coexistence begins at this point, and any curiosity on your part about the fate of these peoples will be a violation of it."

It was indicated above that the existence of the Soviet brand of socialism in *Russia itself* may well be regarded in the West as Russia's own business and need not be a barrier to peaceful coexistence. The Soviet régime is, after all, an indigenous régime throughout the greater part of the area of the Soviet Union. The processes in which it had its origin were not democratic ones in the Western sense, but they were deeply Russian ones, reflecting some very basic realities of the Russian political life of that day. It is indeed not the business of Americans to interfere with such a régime.

But when it comes to the governments of the Communist bloc in Eastern and Central Europe, then the problem is inevitably more complicated. These governments are not, in the main, truly indigenous. All this is of course relative; for seldom, if ever, is there *no* area of identity between the interests and sentiments of a people and the régime, however despotic, that governs it. But these régimes represent, in Western eyes, the fruits of a species of conquest and subjugation which was not less real for the fact that it did not generally involve hostile military invasion in the usual sense. And the thought inevitably presents itself: if such a thing could be done to *these* peoples, by means short of overt military aggression, and if we are now asked to accept it as something not to be discussed in connection with peaceful coexistence, to how many other peoples could this also be done, within the very framework of coexistence we are being asked to adopt?

The fact is (and it is one we have had impressed upon us in painful ways over these past four decades) that there are more ways than outright military aggression or formal political intervention by which the fate of smaller peoples may be brought

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under subjection to the will of larger ones, and more devices than those of the classic nineteenth century colonialism by which peoples can be kept in that state. There does exist, after all, such a thing as the science of insurrection—the science of the seizure of power by conspiratorial minorities, of the conquest of the vital centers of power, of the control of the streets, of the manipulation of civil conflict. Who would deny that this science had a part, and a very basic one, in the Communist thinking and training of an earlier day? Revolutions may not be "made to order;" but that they normally flow only from the spontaneous impulses of the masses and are never influenced by the organizational and military activities of political "vanguards" is something that would scarcely be reconcilable with Communist doctrine of an earlier day, and something we certainly cannot be asked, in the light of historical evidence, to accept.

Mr. Khrushchev gives the impression that all this is not an important part of *his* thinking today. It would be wrong to assume automatically that there is no sincerity in this claim. (He has a point when he says that we should not look for the double bottom in *every* suitcase.) But even if this should be true in his particular case, it would scarcely be true of all of his present associates in the Secretariat and Presidium of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; nor is there any reason to believe it to be true of the leaders of Russia's principal associate in the family of nations: Communist China.

Again, one must stress the fact that the historical record cannot be suddenly ignored. If the capitalist countries have, in Mr. Khrushchev's view, a past record to be explained away (he accuses us of having organized "senseless crusades" against Soviet Russia), so does Soviet Russia. In particular, it will be a long time before the foreign policies and methods of Joseph Stalin cease to be a determining factor in the consciousness of the West. In one sense, we are all, like Mr. Khrushchev himself, Stalin's pupils. It is from him that we learned a great deal of what we know about such things as ruthlessness and consistency and deception in international politics. Mr. Khrushchev must not now ask us to forget too quickly—certainly not more quickly than some of his own Russian and Chinese associates—the lessons we have learned from this eminent political teacher.

These reflections have an important bearing on the words "peace" and "peaceful" which are used so frequently on the

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Communist side in connection with the problem of coexistence. What is it that is meant by these terms?

The word "peace" has no meaning outside of the concrete conditions by which it is marked. Peace is not the mere absence of overt hostilities. We have peace today, in that sense. There is "peace," for that matter, in any well-disciplined prison. Peace is not an abstraction. Lenin understood this well. Thus he wrote in 1915: "The slogan of peace may be advanced either in connection with specific conditions of peace, or without any conditions at all —by way of struggle, that is, not for any specific peace but for peace in general (Frieden ohne weiters). It is clear that in the latter case we have to do not only with a slogan which is not a socialist one but is in general a senseless one, devoid of content."[2]

What content are we then to assign to the term "peace" in Communist usage? Is it unreasonable to ask Lenin's pupils to make this plain and to specify, when they use this term, precisely what sort of peace they are talking about: peace in whose interests? on what conditions? at what cost?

There is one kind of peace that is compatible with the true security of peoples; and this is one which is based on the principles of genuine national freedom. There is another kind of peace which represents the silence that reigns where the instruments of coercion are simply too formidable to be challenged by those against whom they are aimed.

The bandying about of the word peace as an abstraction evades, once more, the fact that there are ways in which peoples can be oppressed which do not necessarily involve at any given time the visible exertion of force across international frontiers—that sometimes the mere threat of force is enough. And it evades the fact that there have been instances, as in Hungary in 1956, where the Soviet attachment to "peace" did not inhibit the use of Soviet armed forces to determine the political situation in a neighboring country. Is it seriously supposed that people outside Russia can overlook these facts when the question of "peaceful" coexistence is discussed?

V

Much is made, in Communist discussion of coexistence, of the military dispositions of the Western countries, particularly the United States. The United States Government is reproached for

[2] *Ibid.*, v. 21, p. 262.

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maintaining bases in various parts of the world; for being unwilling to agree to a total abolition and renunciation of atomic weapons and to a final ban on nuclear tests; for failure to match unilateral measures of reduction of conventional armaments which the Soviet Government claims (without very adequate proof) to have taken; for rearming the Germans within the framework of NATO, etc. All these facets of behavior on the part of the United States Government are cited as inconsistent with a true disposition to abide by the principle of peaceful coexistence.

The writer of these lines has had his own differences with the military policies of the Western coalition in recent years. These policies have suffered, in his opinion, from several distortions. They have often reflected a certain mis-estimation of the true nature of the problem with which they were designed to deal. They seem sometimes to have been predicated on a view of Soviet intentions which, to anyone familiar with the history and psychology of Soviet power, can only appear crude and one-sided, drawn rather from the memories of past adversaries than from a dispassionate study of Russian-Communist principles and tactics. They have at times involved one-sided and unsound commitments to individual categories of weapons. They seem sometimes to have reflected an exaggerated confidence in the device of military alliance as a sort of panacea for all political ills, as though there were no dangers other than those of direct military aggression. They have on more than one occasion led to military dispositions which, however defensive in motivation, could well appear to a possible opponent as the reflection of an intention to initiate hostilities at some stage or other.

All this is true; yet none of it taken separately nor all of it taken together justifies the extreme interpretation Moscow has placed upon it. The Soviet leaders seem either unwilling or unable to take any proper account of the true measure of the shock wrought to the Western public by their exploitation, for purposes of political aggrandizement, of their military position in Eastern and Central Europe in the period 1945 to 1948; by their failure to match the demobilization of the Western armies; by the political attack launched by the Communists in Western Europe in the years 1947 and 1948; by the imposition of the Berlin blockade, and above all by the launching of the Korean War. To people in the West these actions seemed to reflect a hostility no less menacing in intent than would have been threats of overt military aggres-

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sion by Soviet forces. Coming as they did on the heels of the Second World War, affecting as they did nerves already frayed and minds already prone to anxiety as a result of these fresh experiences, it is not surprising that they produced on a great many people in the West the impression that the security of Western Europe, having just withstood one fearful challenge, was now confronted by another one of scarcely smaller dimensions. Neither is it surprising that peoples' reaction to this impression should have been the intensive effort to re-create, within the framework of a Western alliance, something of the armed force which had been so hastily and trustingly demobilized in the immediate aftermath of the war. The history of Europe has been such that danger to the nation, within the period of historical memory, has generally been associated with the movement of armies over land frontiers. It is probably only natural that the peoples of the Continent should be obsessed with the *manie d'invasion* and should look to the creation of defensive military power as a means of protection even against pressures which are actually much more subtle and refined than those of regular military action.

In the questions raised from the Soviet side about the military rivalry there is room for discussion and room for compromise. But no useful purpose will be served by the willful misinterpretation and distortion of this subject in which people in Moscow stubbornly persist. The suggestion that there is a sizable or serious body of people in the West who, in the immediate aftermath of the horrors of 1939–1945, wish for new orgies of bloodshed and slaughter is too absurd to be entertained for a moment. The suggestion, in particular, that Chancellor Adenauer would be one of these people is so patently absurd, so wildly remote from the entire fabric of political realities in Germany today, and so mischievous in its obvious intent and implications, that its continued reiteration in Moscow is a grievous discouragement to those who hope for better understanding.

Mr. Khrushchev is right in viewing the weapons race of this day as inconsistent with any satisfactory form of coexistence. But the prospects for bettering this situation will not be promising so long as Moscow persists in viewing the military policies pursued in the Western coalition in recent years as solely the products of the lust of Western financiers and manufacturers thirsting for another war in the hopes of greater profits, and refuses to recognize that these policies, however misconceived or

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overdrawn, represent in large measure the natural and predictable reactions of great peoples to a situation which Moscow itself did much to create.

VI

A further component of the demand which is made from the Communist side in the name of peaceful coexistence relates to what Mr. Khrushchev has called an "increase in extensive and absolutely unrestricted international trade." Ideological differences, it is argued, should not be an obstacle to the development of trade. Without such trade, international life cannot be expected to develop normally.

This is, from the Western standpoint, an odd and somewhat puzzling requirement. If trade between the Soviet Union and non-Communist countries were of such a nature as to bring with it the normal incidental advantages of economic contact—extensive reciprocal travel and residence of businessmen in the other country, the establishment of close personal contacts and associations, the intermingling, in short, not only of the economic life but also of the people of two countries at least in a certain limited area of activity—then one would be able to see some relevance of the question of trade to the question of peaceful coexistence. But the Soviet Government, as is known, maintains a monopoly of foreign trade, conducts most of its transactions abroad, denies generally to foreign businessmen the privilege of residing and doing business on Soviet soil and takes most elaborate and unusual measures of precaution to see that Soviet citizens do not form permanent relationships of personal confidence or friendship with any foreigners whatsoever, whether through business contacts or otherwise.

In these circumstances, one might suppose, the virtues of increased international trade would of necessity be confined to the direct benefits such trade might bring to the economies of the respective partners. That there are such benefits to be obtained, at least in modest measure, cannot be disputed. But Mr. Khrushchev has himself denied that these benefits are of any vital significance to the Soviet Union. "In our economic development," he writes, "we rely wholly on the internal forces of our country, on our own resources and possibilities. . . . Irrespective of whether or not we shall trade with Western countries . . . the implementation of our economic plans . . . will not in the least be impeded."

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In the case of the United States, it is hard to believe that trade with Russia could have a much greater significance than it has for the Russians. Except in time of war, trade between Russia and the United States has never assumed very large dimensions, either in the Tsarist or the Soviet period. The things which Russia normally has to sell are not such as to have any very sensational implications for the American economy; and the same would be true of the possibilities presented by the purchasing programs of the Soviet Foreign Trade Monopoly, to date.

In addition to this, the Western governments have to consider not just the possible advantages of trade with a foreign trade monopoly but also its possible dangers. Such trade is controlled and shaped at the Soviet end by a great government which has political as well as economic interests to pursue. This being so, one cannot look to a mere mutual economic advantageousness, as one does in the case of trade between countries with a free enterprise system, to provide the guarantee of stability. This is particularly the case when the government in question goes out of its way to emphasize how little dependent it is on this trade, how well it can get along without it. The non-Communist governments have always to reckon with the possibility that exchanges carefully built up over the course of the years and involving important commitments on the part of Western firms may be suddenly terminated by a switch in the purchasing policy of the other party, for reasons into which considerations of economic advantage do not enter at all. These things have happened in the past. Even if they had not happened in the past, there would be no guarantee that they could not happen in the future. This precariousness, arising from the absence on one side of the normal balance wheel of international trade—commercial self-interest—does not mean that trade with the Soviet Union is never safe or desirable; but it does place definite limitations on its possibilities.

One can well imagine that the emphasis laid on this factor by Mr. Khrushchev and other Soviet spokesmen rests on the fact that the expression of a desire for expanded trade relations has often (and particularly in Soviet diplomatic history) constituted the prelude to a political rapprochement or entente between two powers. But it would be difficult to persuade Americans to accept this view of the significance of commercial policy. In the American tradition, trade is a means of meeting real economic needs, not of expressing political feelings.

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There have been in recent years, in the American position on questions of East-West trade, certain features which have been widely regarded by people in countries allied with the United States, and by some Americans, as distortions: as the expression of an undue timidity in the face of domestic criticism or of an exaggerated conception of the effect of such trade on Soviet military preparations. If a reëxamination of these attitudes would have, in Soviet eyes, a significance which would really be helpful in relaxing international tensions, then the suggestion is one that should not be lightly dismissed in Washington.

But even if this reëxamination were undertaken, we would still be faced with the fact that the existence in Moscow of a governmental monopoly of foreign trade creates a set of conditions for trade quite different from those to which people in the West are accustomed. This does not exclude the possibility of commercial exchanges; it does not even exclude the possibility of a considerable increase of Soviet-American trade over its present levels. It does place a ceiling on what can, from the Western standpoint, reasonably be expected. And this ceiling is such that it is difficult to see how foreign trade could enter very importantly into the problem of peaceful coexistence.

VII

One last reflection. Again, the values to which it relates are relative ones; but the difficulties which lie at the heart of the tensions between the Communist and non-Communist worlds will never be overcome if relative distinctions are to be ignored.

The reference here is to the concept of truth that prevails in Moscow (not to mention Peking) as opposed to that which prevails in most other parts of the globe.

We are all accustomed to hearing not only from the Communist propaganda machine but from the lips of senior Soviet statesmen propositions which are either so patently absurd or so flatly in contradiction to known facts that no child could believe them. If we were to take seriously what comes to us from the Soviet side we should have to believe, for example, that Russia has been governed for over 40 years by a group of men who differ so profoundly from all mortals who have existed before or elsewhere that they have—over this entire period—never made a mistake, never analyzed a problem incorrectly, never been guided by any sentiments other than those of most selfless dedication to the

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welfare of others. This we are asked to believe despite the fact that at one time or another over the course of these years numbers of these people, theretofore a part of this supposedly all-wise leadership, have been suddenly denounced by their associates as treacherous criminals and dealt with accordingly. Simultaneously we are asked to accept the thesis that with one or two possible exceptions the Western countries have been led—through an equally remarkable coincidence—exclusively by people who were unmitigated villains: either bloodthirsty, greedy capitalists or the spineless stooges of such capitalists. One could go on citing such examples at any length. One has only to think of the bland distortions of the historical record that enter constantly into the Soviet statements on foreign policy: the claims with respect to such matters as the outbreak of the Korean War, the origin of the difficulties in Southeast Asia, the nature of the Soviet action in Hungary, etc.

A characteristic but particularly serious extrapolation of this irresponsible attitude toward objective fact will be found in the anti-American campaign of recent years. While this campaign reached its apotheosis before Stalin's death, it did not, unfortunately, cease entirely with that event. The Western public generally is little aware of the fantastic distortion of the image of the United States which has been purveyed to the Soviet public, and particularly to the Soviet intelligentsia, over the course of the past ten years by those who control the informational media of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. An image of America continues to be cultivated in which even those Americans who are critically inclined towards many manifestations of American life would not recognize the country they know—an image in which the real faults of American civilization find as little recognition as its real virtues.

Propaganda is propaganda; but surely, like everything else in life, it has its limits. What are we to conclude from the propagation of these fantastic misapprehensions about the United States? —that the Soviet leaders really believe them? or that, knowing them to be misapprehensions, they nevertheless find it in order that Soviet citizens should be encouraged to accept them as true? Either variant would have most questionable implications from the standpoint of the prospects for peaceful coexistence.

Nor is it much comfort to people in the West to be assured that if only tensions would be reduced and military preparations

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relaxed this stream of deliberate detraction would dry up as miraculously and suddenly as it once burst forth. People in the United States have much to correct in their civilization, but little to hide. They are as little interested in being artificially spared by others in the critical appraisal of American life as they are in being artificially disparaged. Let this appraisal be as critical and as skeptical as it will, provided only that it is honest.

Can one ignore, in the discussion of the problem of coexistence, the implications of this attitude toward objective reality—an attitude that characterizes not just the professional Soviet propagandist but the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as a whole, and the statesmanship which that Party inspires? It will always be difficult to know how much confidence can be placed in people who appear to be deliberately deceiving either themselves or others. Is it too much to ask the Soviet leaders to drop today this Byzantine dogmatism of political thought and utterance, for which a case might have been made in the early days of the revolutionary militancy of the Party, when it was still fighting for its ascendancy in Russia, but which is out of place on the part of a great government which asks for acceptance as a mature and responsible force in world affairs? Scarcely anyone, surely, is deceived today by these absurd extremisms. But there are many people in the non-Communist world to whom these recurring evidences of irresponsibility in the attitude toward truth are a constant source of misgiving about the prospects of any sound and enduring coexistence between Communist and non-Communist worlds. What can be the value of specific understandings, these people ask, if the underlying assumptions and beliefs are so grotesquely different? If the Soviet leaders really think us to be as evil as they depict us to their own people, how can they seriously believe in the possibility of coexisting peacefully with us? If, on the other hand, they are deliberately misleading their own people, how can we, on our side, have confidence in them?

The demand that must be made on Moscow is not in any sense a demand for the uncritical acceptance of other points of view. What we would like would be to see in the statements of Soviet leaders, and in the propaganda material produced under their direction, at least a reasonable effort to reconcile the picture they paint of world realities with the objective evidence they have before them. So long as the leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union continue to hold that truth is what it is useful to

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the interests of the Party that people should believe, regardless of how preposterous or absurd this may be in the light of objective evidence—so long as they continue to deny the very existence of an objective reality and, accordingly, any obligation on their part to understand and respect it—even those people in other parts of the world who might most earnestly wish for coexistence as Mr. Khrushchev has defined it will have to put restraints on their hopes and expectations. The road to peaceful coexistence lies, admittedly, through many gates; but one of these is the abandonment by Russian Communists of the absurd contention that theirs is a party which has always had a perfect understanding of the human predicament and has never made a mistake.

VIII

If Moscow is sincere in the quest for peaceful coexistence, and if to this end it is prepared to envisage a *general* revision, on both sides, of the attitudes and practices that have produced, or have been produced by, this dangerous state of world affairs known as the cold war, there will then be no lack of people in the countries outside the Communist orbit prepared to lend their influence to this process, and if need be, at considerable personal cost; for it is not in Russia alone that the extent of the danger is apparent. But if it is conceived in Moscow that the adjustment has all to be made on the Western side, there will be little that anyone on this side of the line can usefully do to advance coexistence beyond its present uncertain status.

Could we not, all of us, now put aside the pretense of total righteousness and admit to a measure of responsibility for the tangled processes of history that have brought the world to its present dangerous state? And could we not, having once admitted this, drop the argument about whose responsibility is greatest and address ourselves at long last, earnestly and without recrimination, to the elimination of the central and most intolerable elements of the danger?

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PUTTING FIRST THINGS FIRST

A Democratic View

By Adlai E. Stevenson

PEACE is the most imperative business in the world today. It is the world's most universal desire and most powerful force. The mass of humanity seems to understand better than its rulers the idiocy of war and its mortal danger to the human race. Everywhere I travel the people appear to know that all their aspirations for freedom and dignity and a better life are going to be destroyed if mankind ever fights a modern war.

The United States has been the source of the most revolutionary and glorious concepts of human and political freedom. It had been my hope that in this revolutionary century the United States, which first split the atom, would be the tireless, fearless, indomitable leader of the cause of freedom from war. And I still think that to seize that role and pursue it with passion should be the top priority of American foreign policy.

Why haven't we really *led* the postwar world since the Korean War? Why are many Americans fearful that we have lost our sense of national purpose? Why is there confusion about intellectual and moral values? Why is there a slackness about public problems and a wholesale retreat to the joys of private life? Why is balancing the budget a greater national concern than exertion, self-denial and hard work? Have we confused prosperity with security? Why is there a growing uneasiness over the contrast between a society like that of the Soviets which believes in its destiny and our own which seems to regard itself as fulfilled?

Personally, I think the trouble is not in the nation's energy, its will, or its nerve; and if wealth and comfort have softened us I am sure we are not yet beyond repair! The root of the trouble lies in this: the nation faces a series of massive changes in the world scene; they call for new ways of looking at the world; for new policies; for increased efforts. But since Korea our political leadership has not clearly and insistently acknowledged this fact. American policy has thus moved further and further away from the reality that surrounds us. Unchallenged by the realities, Americans have turned their energies and idealism to second-order business.

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The main lines of American military and foreign policy are still those of 1947–1952. Although Messrs. Dulles and Eisenhower "crusaded" for a policy of "liberation" and denounced "containment" as "immoral," in operation their policy was to construct a chain of military alliances around Communism and to attempt to restrain the spread of Soviet power wherever it threatened. Oddly enough, Mr. Dulles' faith that Communism would disintegrate from its own internal contradictions resembled Lenin's conviction that capitalism would do the same.

But to win such an endurance contest we must have superior endurance. Yet instead of making massive efforts to improve or preserve the balance and to encourage attrition or benign change on the Soviet side, we emphasized conservative policies and fell behind on all fronts, while the Soviet Union, and other industrial areas, forged ahead at a rapid pace.

In short, while our Government adopted the Dulles foreign policy it did nothing to make it effective. Indeed, it was not long ago that Vice President Nixon saw something disloyal in my warnings about the Soviet rate of economic growth. (It is now double that of the United States!)

So for the most part the response of the United States to the great changes of this century has been only negative and defensive. An Administration which has defined its over-riding task as keeping the budget down has dealt with them more with rhetoric than action. And unwillingness to acknowledge reality has led to a progressive erosion of the American stature on the world scene. (Sometimes I thank God for the Russians—their rapid progress may even make economic growth, risk and adventure essential, if not respectable, here.)

But it is not my purpose to indict the small aims and large fears of the Eisenhower-Dulles era. Things had to change, and I applaud Secretary Herter for the recent signs of more enterprise and flexibility in the conduct of our foreign policy. I hope, however, that we Americans do not mistake the President's ceremonial travels for negotiation and settlement.

What are some of the realities we must face in this age of many revolutions? The old colonial order has all but vanished. New nations—and new imperialisms—strive to fill the vacuum in a vast political revolution. Most of these new nations seek to bring their economies through the sound barrier of modernization in a few decades. This is the economic revolution. But they do so against

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the background of exploding population which will double the inhabitants of underdeveloped areas in the next generation. This is the biological revolution. Meanwhile, supersonic flight, atomic energy and the missile have opened up two opposite possibilities of equal magnitude—the exploration of planetary space, and self-extermination within the space of this planet. This is the scientific revolution.

What lies ahead of us in this bewildering century is invisible but it may be even more significant. In the past the North Atlantic nations dominated the world. But they could not control themselves, and after their great world wars the power and influence of Europe declined; Russia and the United States suddenly emerged as the two dominant powers. Already the brief day of two-power domination is passing and new centers of power are rising from old ashes in Asia. By the end of the century China and India will be industrialized, and China's population will be close to a billion. Then, as Europe becomes more unified, it too will reëmerge as a great center of power. And who can doubt that regional unification is going to take place in Latin America and emerging Africa?

So, this is not the beginning of the American Century, or anyone else's. It behooves us to face the reality that we Americans are not going to be alone at the center of the stage very long—and that modesty is always becoming. But if our tradition does not require us to be the world's boss, it does require us to keep alive and vigorous the great traditions of political freedom and legal order which underlie Western society.

To guide us through these uncharted seas, to comprehend and direct the prodigious forces now shaping the new world, is going to make heavy demands on our resources of wisdom, leadership, self-discipline and magnanimity. I would say that this reality belongs at the top of the list, because it has not yet been proved that democracy and the processes of persuasion can match the efficiency of central planning and dictatorship.

Multiple and universal change is thus the setting for policy in this age. Another reality we have been slow to admit is the present advantage this gives to the Communists. They did not invent the world's revolutions. All of these were—wittingly or unwittingly—launched in the West. But Communism, in itself a philosophy of change, exploits them world-wide. It uses all the anti-imperialist jargon and proclaims the brotherhood of—Communist—mankind. To our everlasting shame it has led the way through

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the frontiers of space and even pinned the Soviet colors on the moon. It proposes its own sweeping totalitarian planning as the only way out of economic stagnation, and the Soviet example of how to modernize and grow strong quickly has a powerful appeal to backward countries.

Mr. Khrushchev states his purpose plainly. He says, let's throw down our arms and we will beat you at peaceful competitive coexistence. He says that Russia will outstrip the United States in production and that one by one the neutrals will fall in line, while the Communist system spreads around the globe—and finally surrounds and isolates capitalism's last refuge in the United States. The Soviet planners expect that, as in China, the non-Communist régimes in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and parts of Latin America will be unable to solve the problems of modernization and economic growth and will turn to the Communist alternative, encouraged no doubt by Communist trade, aid and penetration.

This, I am convinced, is the route to world power which the Soviets now regard as the safest and surest. And I was impressed by Khrushchev's confidence, shown both in his country and ours, that history is working with him and that the system under which Russia became so strong so quickly is the system which other countries must follow. We refused to believe that Hitler meant what he said, to our sorrow. We should not do ourselves the same injury again.

To me the two most dangerous realities we now face are the multiplication of nuclear weapons and the disparity in living standards between the rich nations and the poor. So I suggest we must meet the crises of our time in four major areas: First, we must end the growing gap between wealth and poverty. In doing so, we must create new supra-national patterns and institutions of coöperation. Thirdly, as long as nuclear weapons exist, the danger of their *use* exists. We must work for a disarmed world under law and organized police power—the only final answer to the threat of annihilating war. And lastly we must extend as far as lies in our power the concept of an open world. For it is in our acceptance of variety and differences, harmonized but not suppressed, that we in our turn work not only with the trend of history but in accord with the ingrained diversity of mankind. Our faith is that in the long contest the totalitarians will gradually be converted to our way of thinking rather than we to theirs. Our goal is not just to win a cold *war* but to persuade a cold *world*.

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These are, of course, statements of high generality. We turn them into policy only by specific application and negotiation. Some aims we can pursue with like-minded nations, and we should proceed with them at once. Others depend on Communist assent and may take years of stoic negotiation.

The beginning of wisdom in the West, I think, is to have our own creative policy—not just a negative policy to stop the Communists, but one that reflects our own vision of a viable world society and our own understanding of the revolutions through which we live. The voluntary ending of colonialism by most of the Western colonial powers, the Marshall Plan, Europe's moves toward unity and the various programs of economic aid, are creative innovations already to the West's postwar credit.

Once we know what we want, what our aims are, then we shall have to pursue them by every means with the same resolution and sacrifice that the Communists pursue theirs. It will not be easy to agree on them in view of the divisions among the Western powers, combined with the fact that Russia controls Eastern Germany and therefore the possibility of German unification. I suspect the hardest task will be to pursue our aims resolutely in common with our partners. For in "peacetime" democracies are at a particular disadvantage. Immediate domestic concerns take precedence over distant national goals. Too many selfish, thoughtless people prefer the easy option, and too many ambitious politicians prefer office to duty. But we cannot live by tail fins, TV and a "sound dollar" alone. Somehow we must lift our sights to the level of the tasks. I will try to suggest some of them.

II. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The average annual income in the United States is more than $2,000 as against less than $100 for a third of the world's population. And the worst thing about this disparity is that the rich nations are getting richer and the poor poorer. Happily, there is, at long last, a growing realization here and among our friends that these are the decisive areas and that we must assist the underdeveloped peoples to advance to self-sustaining growth while preserving their independence and some hope of evolving a political democracy. Without an alternative to Communist methods of development, we face grim prospects indeed in poor countries where literacy is low, hunger high and the gap between resources and population widening.

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Five conditions of success are, I think, clear. We shall be engaged on this program for at least 40 years. We shall require a professional staff, with the languages and skills needed in this whole new field of activity. Informed opinion tells us that at least $5 billion a year is needed—from all sources, public and private, domestic and foreign. We shall have to coördinate all aspects of the effort with other nations—not only investment but opportunities for trade, international liquidity and so forth. To get the maximum results the developed nations must all coöperate. The time has certainly come for other countries to share more of the common burden of assistance. In such circumstances the United States cannot expect to have full control of the use of all its expenditures for development purposes.

These five conditions are not yet fully understood, let alone accepted. There is still more than a hint that if the Communists would behave, the economic development program could be cancelled. Partly as a result, our staffing policies are haphazard, our linguistic programs inadequate, and we are acquiring so many competing agencies, both national and international, that policies tend to be tangled and obstructed at the base and overlapping and bewildering in the field.

I regret that the Administration rejected the recommendation of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last winter for a soft loan fund of about a billion and a half dollars for about five years. With Europe prosperous and dollars flowing to that area, Europe should mobilize an equivalent sum. With something like $3 billion a year available for public investment, with the West's great resources of skill and experience, and working with the World Bank, the Monetary Fund and the new International Development Association, we should be able to plan an effective, concerted attack upon all aspects of backwardness—lack of capital, lack of skills, low reserves, single-crop exports and fluctuating world prices.

It is difficult to establish priorities, but I believe there is general agreement that the whole political future of free Asia may depend on the success of India's great experiment. Certainly, too, the need is obvious for more rapid modernization and economic coöperation in Latin America. And the vision of a common market for the Western Hemisphere is even more exciting if it points toward economic federation in the whole non-Communist world.

For years I have urged that the United States put economic

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development on the same level of urgency as national defense, and press other advanced countries to join in a concerted effort. That in actuality we have no such joint program for world investment and growth springs in part from another weakness—our failure to develop an organic Atlantic community with common institutions and purposes. The ghost that has haunted every NATO conference for ten years is the ghost of the Emperor without clothes. "The wise men," committees, resolutions—all have spoken of NATO's positive tasks. We still have to find them. Worse, even the present measure of unity is being fretted away.

III. THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY

Beneath the surface there are dangerous cross-purposes within our alliance. They are not to be overcome by ceremonial travels and by hasty diplomacy in preparation for meetings with Mr. Khrushchev.

The reconciliation of France and Germany is an historic achievement of postwar diplomacy. The Common Market is a creative effort to pass beyond narrow nationalism in the search for economic and social well-being and finally political union. But the price is high if France by moving closer to Germany moves away from Britain, and if the Common Market of the Six nations and the Free Trade Association of the Seven between them divide Europe into rival trading groups behind rising economic barriers which embitter not only commerce but politics as well. Nor do the divisions affect Europe alone. The frictions will be spread to Africa as a last divisive legacy of colonialism.

I believe it is a profound interest of American policy to see these nascent divisions overcome. We should urge the Six and the Seven to return to negotiation to mitigate tariff discrimination and liberalize trade. The United States and Canada should also coöperate systematically with the Six and the Seven to enlarge and use our influence vigorously to help solve in common the tough problems of commercial policy, including such questions as the stabilization of commodity prices in which the industrialized countries must of necessity take the lead. The last three or four years have demonstrated how even our own trade is becoming dependent upon European prosperity and how policies on each side of the Atlantic vitally influence the rest of the community. The unfavorable American balance of payments and fears for American reserves are already leading to a new isolationism, to creeping pro-

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tectionism, to reduced foreign aid and to further divisions in our unity and strength. The Administration's "Buy American" policy in our lending will have negligible effects on our exports, and it repudiates the liberal trade and payments policy which we have been urging on our allies at the very moment they are adopting it.

Nor can we safely confront the Communist challenge with inferior military deterrent capability. If we fall too far behind or reduce our military strength—without equivalent Soviet concessions—we may find Mr. Khrushchev's interest in negotiation has diminished. We must not tempt the Russians with weakness. The possibility that they could destroy our retaliatory power at a single blow must never appear to them to be realistic. Even then, the only *safe* assumption for us to make is that the Soviet Union may use force, as in Hungary or East Germany, wherever there is no risk of general war. As I said to Mr. Khrushchev, equality of strength and equality of risk are the only starting points for disarmament discussions.

In maintaining the military balance pending a reversal of this senseless and bankrupting arms race, Western Europe also should play an expanded role and assume a larger burden. The coöperative control and use of atomic weapons may now be the best way to prevent the divisive, costly and inefficient duplication of nuclear capabilities. Each one of the European nations cannot develop defenses capable of countering the Soviet threat, and should not try. I think we must take a hard, fresh look at our common military problems. I don't see why we cannot distribute the nuclear, the naval and the conventional burdens more economically and efficiently. The objective should be an interdependent military system in which each nation's role would be geared to its full technological and economic capabilities.

Let us, then, recognize the fact of our economic, military and political interdependence formally. An Atlantic Council with real powers could formulate joint policies for sharing our responsibilities and bringing about the genuine and equal partnership between the United States and Western Europe which our successes in the past—notably the Marshall Plan—make feasible and the greatest challenge we have ever known now makes necessary.

I believe a North Atlantic Conference should be held to outline new common policies for defense, disarmament, space exploration, monetary reserves, tariffs and a larger economic sphere, and aid to the underdeveloped areas, giving, I hope, new terms of reference

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to NATO and to other organizations. I think Europe should take the initiative toward creating some such new organization to deal with our great and growing problems and to promote more systematic Western coöperation.

Meanwhile, if our partners, including Japan, are to mitigate the harmful political pressures building up in the United States, a number of steps—toward which, I am glad to say, some progress has already been made—should be taken promptly.

Discrimination against dollar imports from the United States and all quantitative restrictions should be eliminated.

I have long urged that the nations whose economies the United States has helped to restore should assume a much larger share of the burden of aiding the underdeveloped countries.

The heavy task of maintaining large forces overseas aggravates America's balance of payments deficit; our European allies should now assume greater responsibility for the defense of the West.

While our balance of payments deficit may be a short-range problem, the liquidity shortage of the trading nations is not, and the West should move to correct this deficiency promptly.

A working coöperative Atlantic system would do more than enhance the basic strength of the West. It would demonstrate to other areas—to Latin America, for instance, or to free Africa—methods by which political autonomy can be combined with supra-national coöperation. In any case, the alternative is to see the centrifugal forces which are always at work between separate national entities pull us ever further apart. One thing is sure—we cannot deal with the Communist challenge divided and in disarray.

IV. ARMS CONTROL

Most of all, a stronger Atlantic community will show the way to disarmament and peace. The implications of war and of the nuclear stalemate are as visible in Moscow as in Washington. After talks with Mr. Khrushchev in Russia and America, I have the feeling that some fixed Communist attitudes are changing; some, at least, of the Russian leaders seem to have concluded that the "capitalist" countries do not conform in all respects to the Marxist blueprint of misery and despair. Mr. Khrushchev has even changed his mind about the established Communist conviction that the United States could not cut arms spending without bringing on a depression. (I confess I get indignant when I lis-

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ten to some of my fellow Americans who seem less confident than Khrushchev is about our economy's resilience, especially when we have so many neglected tasks at home to which we could turn our energies and resources.)

The more the Communists see of the realities of Western society, the better for truth and so the better for us. Knowing something of the frightening darkness in which most Russians have to live, I favor the widest extension of exchange programs and cultural contacts. I would like to see the United States take the initiative in bringing Western and Soviet teams together in joint work. The principle of the Geophysical Year should be extended to a joint international Geophysical Commission. Other fields are Antarctic exploration and control, oceanography, medical and atomic energy research, exploration of outer space and even joint operations in certain areas of economic aid. Such communion of scholars and technicians could do more than awaken Communists to the reality of Western life and to the possibilities of an open world society. They could be forerunners of supra-national cooperation and organs of international control.

There is no difficulty in finding reasons why peace is so precious to the Russians after the desolation and destruction of two world wars. In addition, they now have much to lose, and their taste for the good life is rapidly developing. It is said that the Soviet defense effort takes about 25 percent of the national income as against 10 percent in this country. So for them another weighty reason for reducing the arms burden is to release more manpower and resources to improve the living conditions of the long-suffering Russian people and to strengthen the Soviet potential for economic competition and the paramount struggle for the uncommitted countries.

I am confident that some, at least, of the Russian leaders are anxious to halt testing and development of nuclear weapons before the danger becomes even more uncontrollable. But I wish I could be more sanguine that the Soviet Union was equally ready for the kind of inspection and control that would make possible any general arms reduction, let alone total disarmament. I suspect the conversion of the Soviet Union from a closed to an open society is still a long way off. But we should not hastily and cynically dismiss Mr. Khrushchev's disarmament proposals as propaganda and insincere. The question is not whether Communists are sincere but whether they are serious.

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The root of East-West tension is fear. Whether it is rational or irrational, justified or not, hardly matters. It exists, and the peoples, especially Americans and Russians, have been indoctrinated with this fear of one another—these devil images—for years. Arms are a symptom of the fears and tensions between nations. Therefore, the argument goes, disarmament is impossible until political settlements have been reached and confidence restored.

I disagree. I believe the nuclear arms race with weapons of mass destruction is a new element and in itself a cause of tension. Of course, as I have said, we must try everlastingly to improve relations by exchanges, negotiations, common projects, trade and agreements when possible. But fear will not vanish until the arms race is arrested. We will have to proceed on all these matters simultaneously. As Mr. Selwyn Lloyd of Great Britain said in presenting the British plan for comprehensive disarmament which preceded Mr. Khrushchev's: "If we get political settlements it will make agreement on disarmament easier; and if we get an agreement on disarmament, it will make political settlement easier."

From what he said to me, I think Mr. Khrushchev agrees too. And I am much encouraged by evidence from many quarters that the Russians are genuinely worried about the political and technical dangers and cost to the U.S.S.R. of continuing the arms race indefinitely. Moreover, the United Nations disarmament resolution, agreed to, *mirabile dictu,* by the United States and the Soviet Union, recognizes that disarmament itself will promote trust between nations and declares that disarmament is the most important question facing the world today.

In short, it looks as though controlled disarmament was back at the top of the world's agenda where it belongs. I am sorry that the United States did not take and hold the lead as I urged in the 1956 presidential campaign. The recent proposal by some of our leaders that the United States resume underground nuclear tests, just when the first break in the arms deadlock seems possible, shocked me. I can think of few better ways to chill the prospects, deface our peaceful image and underscore the Communist propaganda that they are the peacemakers and we the warmongers. We should extend our test suspension so long as negotiations continue in good faith and Russia maintains a similar suspension. The good faith of the negotiations is decisive, because indefinite suspension amounts to a test ban without inspection.

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Whether Mr. Khrushchev and his associates in the Kremlin really mean business depends on agreement to two main principles: a) that conventional and nuclear disarmament must go hand in hand, so that the balance of security between nations is not upset, and b) that progress at each stage must be subject to effective international control.

If universal and total disarmament should ever take place, a third need will arise: a supra-national force of some kind, as I have insisted to Mr. Khrushchev, in order that the sheer weight of such powers as Russia and America—or China—may not intimidate smaller neighbors. The composition, control and use of such a force, of course, present a host of further questions.

Meanwhile, pending the disarmament millennium, we must, as I have said, make good the deficiencies in our defenses to keep at least an equality of strength with the Russians. And I think it would be naïve to assume that they are yet ready to embark on the kind of positive coöperation in other respects which would establish real collective security. The conspiratorial tradition is very old and deep rooted in Communist thinking, and when they talk of "peaceful competition," for example, I suspect that most Communists would include under that label political subversion, coups d'état, and even revolution under Communist Party leadership.

Nevertheless, I think we may be approaching the time when the arms race with Russia can be arrested. Once a revolutionary régime leaves behind its adolescent fanaticism, risk and cost become powerful considerations. I believe they exercise genuine influence in Moscow today and that we should do what we can to encourage the trend.

V. CHINA

In Peking, however, I doubt if cost and risk are decisive factors. At this stage, pressure from "foreign devils," real or contrived, provides excuses for the austerity and brutal repression involved in the massive modernization. In this mood, China might conceivably be ready to risk a war which could involve its more prosperous Communist neighbor in disaster. Today, Moscow can still perhaps limit Chinese aggressiveness by control over its military aid. But as China develops, the influence will dwindle. Has Russia therefore an interest in establishing some form of control now while her influence is still sizable? We do not know, but we must

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try to find out. And if we are going to make any important progress on disarmament, Russia will have to accept responsibility for bringing China in.

While there is little prospect of reasonable dealing with Red China at this time, it is apparent that Asians have become disillusioned and distrustful because of her imperialistic attacks on her neighbors and disregard for the "five principles of coexistence." I see hope in the fact that Mr. Khrushchev used Peking as his sounding board when he warned Communists not to use force against capitalism. I see further hope in his proposal—ignored by Peking—for an atom-free zone in the Far East. And even at this late date I suggest we explore with him the possibility of pacification in the area based upon a broad settlement of issues—including Formosa—by negotiation, not force.

On the Communist side, the concessions would include the extension to China of any system of international inspection of disarmament, ending the threat of force against Formosa and subversion in Indochina, a peaceful frontier settlement with India, free elections under United Nations supervision in Korea, and acceptance of the right of the inhabitants of Formosa to determine their own destiny by plebiscite supervised by the United Nations. On our side, concessions would presumably include an end to the American embargo on China's admission to the United Nations (not to be confused with diplomatic recognition), the evacuation of Quemoy and Matsu and the inclusion of Korea and Japan in the atom-free zone and area of controlled disarmament.

Perhaps neither the Russians nor we ourselves are yet prepared to talk in such concrete terms. Yet it is clear that no general control of disarmament has any value unless it includes China, and it is difficult to see how China can accept international control when it is not, formally, a member of international society. Moreover, as a member of the United Nations, Communist China, with a quarter of the world's population, would be more accountable to world opinion than as an outcast.

In the long run, the degree to which Russia is willing and able to moderate China's imperialistic designs will be a major factor in world peace. And it is likely that in its diplomacy as in its internal development Moscow is reaching the point where Mr. Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence with the West must grow into positive coöperation. The Russian door to the West must be pushed wider open—or slammed shut again.

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VI. EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST

The areas of the world where the interests and security of the great powers collide are the areas of tension where negotiation must be concentrated if it is to be effective. I do not believe that local military blocs, directed against the Communists, always provide the answer. If we seek military clients, Russia can play that game, too, and more cynically. Moreover, she is not embarrassed by ties to the former colonial overlords. I do not mean that endangered countries should be left unprotected. The Eisenhower Doctrine is hardly more than a restatement of our commitment under the United Nations Charter and the Truman Doctrine to come to the aid of a victim of direct aggression. If the Soviets were directly to invade Iran—though it is not likely—American intervention would be unavoidable. And that is precisely why it is not likely. But Iran is no more secure because of military links with Pakistan, and the fate of Iraq shows how easily an unpopular alliance can be exploited to undermine a pro-Western régime.

I believe that we must look rather to disarmament and nonalignment, to political and economic collaboration, in the areas where great-power interests collide, as in the Middle East. We still have a little time, for atomic weapons are as yet in the possession of only three powers. Ten years from now, who knows how many local dictators may have them—to the detriment not only of our security but of Russia's as well. Here may be another common interest to explore. We might examine the possibility of an atom-free zone for the Middle East. We might also reconsider an earlier suggestion of an embargo on arms shipments into the Middle East—a plan which the Soviets have endorsed.

Neither Russia nor the Western nations have gained much from their recent policies of intervention in the Middle East. I suggest we now give organized non-intervention a trial. Some international problems are never solved; they just wear out. And the Arab-Israeli conflict may wear out before it is worked out. But meanwhile the United States should call upon the Soviet Union and everyone in the United Nations again and again to use their influence to harmonize relations between the Arab states and Israel and end this prolonged and useless hostility.

In the immediate future, however, the critical point of tension lies in Europe and Germany. There we have a perilous deadlock from which neither side can disengage without grave risk. On our

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side the fear is paramount that any withdrawal either from the exposed enclave of West Berlin or from West Germany would prove the first step in a general retreat from "positions of strength" in Europe. The end of the process could denude the Continent of American forces and undermine the defenses against a Russian advance to the Channel.

But the Soviets have comparable fears. The withdrawal of their troops to Russia would imperil the insecure Communist governments friendly to Russia and lead to the resurgence of a powerful and potentially hostile Germany. After suffering two shattering invasions in a generation, Russia's deep-seated fear of a rearmed Germany should not be hard for us to understand.

Russia's risk is probably greater than ours. After 15 years of Communism, East Germany and Eastern Europe are still probably hostile to Russia. On our side, Communism has steadily lost ground. A Europe free to choose its destiny would not be Communist, and could be very anti-Russian. For this reason I believe we in the West play from strength in Europe.

I agree with Dr. Adenauer that the key to settlement in divided Europe lies in controlled general disarmament. The only satisfactory settlement for divided Berlin will be the unification of divided Germany. The road to unification lies through a reduction of fear in Russia and the West. And fear will subside only when there is progress toward disarmament with adequate controls. I doubt if we can reach more than provisional settlements or postponements of the problems of divided Europe until then.

With summit conferences soon to take place, I think it would be improper and useless for me to discuss proposals that have been made for an atom-free zone in Central Europe, scaling down of Berlin garrisons and occupation armies, security guarantees, and the other detailed components of possible interim solutions.

VII. A SENSE OF PURPOSE

In all of these great issues of international policy—whether they concern a world investment program for the underdeveloped countries, or methods of closer association with Europe, or the creation of communities of common work and interest with the Soviets, or the whole long arduous search for controlled disarmament—the first priority for the West is to recover the initiative. Out of a perpetually defensive attitude no lasting gains can come. Surely the West, which has been preëminently the challenger in

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human affairs since the dawn of the modern age, should not let the initiative slip from its hands.

Today, let us be clear, we do not have the initiative. Having caught up with us in weapons, it is the Soviet Union that is shouting about disarmament and peaceful competition; and it is the Soviet Union, strong and self-confident, that is now usurping the role of leader in the efforts toward peace. Mr. Khrushchev is the challenger—from outer space to inner Berlin. We react to his policies and conduct the world's dialogue on his terms. Between hasty improvisations and snap decisions we seem largely to have lost our own sense of direction.

We are ourselves to blame for this. The truth is that nations cannot demonstrate a sense of purpose abroad when they have lost it at home. There is an intimate connection between the temper of our domestic leadership and the effectiveness of American influence in the world at large. President Wilson gave a profound new direction to international thinking because he was a pioneer of the New Freedom at home. President Franklin Roosevelt's universal prestige as a liberal force in the world was deeply rooted in the New Deal, and this was the tradition carried on by President Truman in such great ventures as the Marshall Plan and the Point Four program. The link is no less vital today. If we cannot recover an aspiring, forward-looking, creative attitude to the problems of our own community, there is little hope of our recovering a dynamic leadership in the world at large. By our default as much as by his design, Mr. Khrushchev is enabled to continue dictating the terms of the world's dialogue.

I see little sign of any challenging approach in positive terms to our problems at the present time. In the most radical and revolutionary epoch of man's history, the dominant concerns of our leadership have been almost wholly defensive. We have not been urged and spurred on by the positive opportunities of world-building and nation-building inherent in our position as the most fabulously endowed people mankind has ever seen. On the contrary, our foreign policy has been dominated by fear of Communism, our domestic policy by fear of inflation. Economic assistance programs have been "sold" to the American people chiefly as a means of checking the Communists, never as our creative part in extending our technological revolution to the rest of mankind. The spur to our exploration of the solar system has not been our restless desire to extend the boundaries of human knowledge. It

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has been the irritation of seeing the Russians hit the moon first. Our interest in greater excellence in research and education flared up not because we want every free citizen to exercise to the full his innate talents and capacities, but because the Russians are producing more scientists and technologists than the West.

Even where we accept the Soviet challenge—as I assume we do in defense, science and education—our sense of urgency is not yet sufficient to over-ride our obsessive fear that, in some way, in spite of having a gross national product of almost $500 billion and a per capita income almost twice as high as any other country's, we are staring bankruptcy in the face. How otherwise can we explain the fact that, with over twice the Soviet Union's national income, we have let them outpace us in arms, in space research, in proportional spending on education? How else are we to explain why our leaders see their most urgent task not in telling us the realities of our world and the duties and opportunities that lie ahead for a great and confident nation, but in warning us of all the insidious ways in which it can "spend itself" into penury?

The time has come to put an end to this unnatural timidity. There are other ways of securing a "sound dollar" than by stunting our national growth or—much worse—stunting our aspirations and our confidence in the great aims of our own society. Let us not measure our essential security, our standards of education and our public needs by "what we can afford." This is a static concept. What we could afford with a national income of $250 billion is not the same as our capacity today with nearly double the figure. Nor does it measure what we could afford if our rate of growth were purposefully increased.

Let us rather assess our needs—our need to maintain equality of strength, in missiles and men, until controlled disarmament takes its place, our need to double our spending on education, our need for wider research, our need for decent and gracious cities where segregation and delinquency give ground in the wake of redevelopment and renewal, our need to conserve our national resources—above all, water, the most basic of them all.

All these needs—domestic, foreign and military—will cost more money, at least until we can make some progress with disarmament. But keeping the budget down is not as imperative as keeping our heads up. It is worth noting that before the Korean War thoughtful men solemnly declared that if the military budget rose above $15 billion capitalism, democracy and the American way of

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life were doomed. Then came the war. The military budget was tripled. And now, once again, the present level of spending is being defended with the same ideological fervor.

I think our needs could be covered by existing tax rates at higher levels of economic growth. But I am sure that if our political leadership defines the tasks with clarity and conviction, we will approve what is necessary to fulfill our national purpose whatever the sacrifice—higher taxation in years when the private economy is running at full stretch, for instance, budgetary deficits in times of slack, restraint upon wages and profits to slow down inflationary pressure, less emphasis on sectional interests, more on the common good. The recompense will be to see American society once more the pace-setter in human affairs, to see freedom once more the great challenger on the human scene.

For this, surely, is the crux. An attitude of unadventurous conservatism cannot stand for long as the creative image of freedom. I tremble for our future—and for the world's future—if growth, thrust, initiative and the vast new frontiers of science are felt to be the prerogative of Communist discipline and drive—if "the shot heard round the world" has been silenced by the shot round the moon.

Freedom is not an ideal, it is not even a protection, if it means nothing more than freedom to stagnate, to live without dreams, to have no greater aim than a second car and another television set—and this in a world where half our fellow men have less than enough to eat. Today not rhetoric but sober fact bids us believe that our present combination of complacency and apprehension, of little aims and large fears, has within it the seed of destruction, first for our own community, and then for the larger hope that, as science and technology bring the nations inescapably together, freedom, not tyranny, will be the organizing principle of the society of man.

I end where I began. I believe the United States is ready for a new awakening and the achievement of greater goals. Within it are the moral and material elements of new purpose and new policy. It is the task of leadership to marshal our will and point the way. We had better start soon for time is wasting.

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CAN THE UNITED NATIONS ENFORCE PEACE?

By Sir Leslie Munro

ON September 4 of this year the Laotian Government, in a message to the Secretary-General, requested the assistance of the United Nations and "in particular . . . that an emergency force to halt aggression and to prevent its spreading should be dispatched with greatest possible speed." In the debate in the Security Council on September 7, 1959, Sir Pierson Dixon, on behalf of the United Kingdom, said that his Government had for some time favored the creation of a stand-by force which would be available to the United Nations. "But," he said, "the fact is that no such force exists."

Sir Pierson could have gone further. If Laos becomes the victim of aggression, it hardly seems likely that the United Nations will save her, given the fact that the world organization has no stand-by force, even one which by its simple presence might deter military activity. It will be only SEATO, or more probably its principal party, the United States, that can or will come to the aid of this distressed country. In other words, the chief bulwark of endangered states today is not the United Nations but either a great power or a regional organization.

In the context of this article I do not need to discuss the merits of the Laotian complaint. But Sir Pierson Dixon's observations lend point to Mr. Lester Pearson's questions, posed in an article in this review,[1] on the problem of the establishment of a United Nations force available to cope with an emergency:

> Are we to go on from crisis to crisis improvising in haste? Or can we now pool our experience and our resources, so that the next time we, the governments and peoples whom the United Nations represents, will be ready and prepared to act?

The purpose of this article is to urge that in a troubled and divided world the time for improvising in haste is past, and that we need now to grapple with the question of establishing an effective United Nations force readily available in an emergency.

For the events of the past year serve to reëmphasize the need for a permanent force at the disposal of the Assembly of the United Nations. In view of the veto, the Security Council will

[1] "Force for U.N.," by Lester B. Pearson, *Foreign Affairs*, April 1957.

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have no such force. The impasse over Berlin, the confused situation in Laos, the aggressions by Communist China on the Indian-Tibetan border and Mr. Khrushchev's proposals before the Assembly for complete disarmament all point to the need for an urgent reassessment of the problems involved in the establishment of a permanent force. Present difficulties, stemming from powerful and interested opposition, should not prevent an early reëxamination by the United Nations of a proposal for a stand-by United Nations Peace Force, which had the blessing of President Eisenhower in August 1958. The President made this proposal to an emergency session of the Assembly after United States forces had landed in Lebanon and United Kingdom forces in Jordan, each at the request of the respective local governments; and in each case the forces were fully combatant. The President said that recent events clearly demonstrated that his suggestion was a matter for urgent and positive action. Nor is he alone. Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, in the Assembly's general debate on September 17, said that he had always favored the idea of a United Nations force. But he added:

> I have realized that it is a topic upon which one must carry with one a consensus of world opinion. The realities impose upon us the necessity to hasten slowly. I understand the limitations. It could not be a fighting force. It could only be put into position by a decision of the United Nations. Its deployment would depend upon the agreement of the countries concerned. I also acknowledge the practical difficulties. To contemplate such a force in practical being would raise great problems of administration and cost. What, however, I do favor—and I hope that serious consideration will be given to it by the Governments of Member States—is the earmarking by Member States of personnel, either as individuals or in contingents, who could be quickly made available. I also favor the setting up of a small planning section in the Secretariat to work out in advance plans for dealing with the problems resulting from a decision to assemble such a force for a particular purpose. Last year I said that I thought that international public opinion by and large was ready for some initiative of this sort. I hope that during this Assembly some indication will be given of the views of other governments upon what I have been saying.

It is clear that Mr. Lloyd is contemplating, not a United Nations force in being at a given place, but a force which could be rapidly assembled and dispatched as a result of agreements to contribute to it by member governments of the United Nations. Mr. Lloyd seems to have adopted the proposal of Mr. Lester Pearson in the article I have mentioned, when Mr. Pearson suggested that "member governments, excluding the permanent

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members of the Security Council, should be invited to signify a willingness in principle to contribute contingents to the United Nations for purposes that are essentially non-combatant, such as, for example, the supervision of agreed cease-fires and comparable peace supervisory functions." Mr. Pearson suggested that the states which should agree to contribute to a stand-by force would normally include the non-permanent members of the Security Council. I agree that all states, other than the permanent Council members, should be asked to contribute to the stand-by force.

The disarmament proposals of Mr. Khrushchev and Soviet opposition to a permanent or stand-by force at the disposal of the Assembly, whether in Berlin or elsewhere, reveal an attitude consistent with past reluctance of the Soviet Government to accept an adequate system of controls and inspection and its refusal to agree to a permanent force at the disposition of the Security Council. But, apart from these points, does Mr. Khrushchev seriously believe that following total disarmament "only strictly limited contingents of police (militia) agreed for each country, armed with small arms and intended exclusively to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens" would be adequate, even if they were made available, to deal with the world's danger spots in Europe, North Africa, the Middle East and Asia? Yet in his speech to the Assembly on September 18, 1959, he spoke of police for internal purposes as the only armed men to be left in the world. His proposal for an international control body comprising all states so that "no one should violate their obligation" appears too vague to deal with our present problems. Only a starry-eyed optimist could contemplate the absence in the foreseeable future of substantial armed forces to keep the peace in Europe, North Africa, between Israel and the Arab States, between China and India and the states of Southeast Asia, between China and Formosa and, although here there are some grounds for optimism, between India and Pakistan. If there is to be total disarmament by nations, a substantial international force would still need to be at the immediate disposition of the United Nations.

In the Gaza Strip and the area of Sharm el-Sheikh the United Nations Emergency Force has been stationed since 1956. The establishment of this force, whose presence has preserved peace where there had been none for centuries, is probably the most beneficent act performed by the authority of the United Nations

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and by the unselfishness of the contributing members, whether in men or money. For not everybody has paid. During my Presidency of the Twelfth Assembly, the Communist bloc, with Chile and Ecuador, voted against the resolution passed on November 22, 1957, whereby the expenses of U.N.E.F. "shall be borne by the Members of the United Nations in accordance with the scale of assessments adopted by the General Assembly for the financial years 1957 and 1958, respectively." This was a resolution, in my opinion, having binding effect and is one of the few instances where the Assembly acts with legislative competence for all its members. Nevertheless, the Communist bloc has so far defaulted on all assessments for the cost of U.N.E.F. Other governments have not yet met their assessments. But with customary generosity, the United States in particular, whose regular assessment for U.N.E.F. in the current year was $4,943,146, has made a voluntary contribution as well of $3,500,000. Without contributions of this nature, U.N.E.F. could not continue to exist. It is a sad commentary on the history of collective measures for the preservation of peace that voluntary contributions are necessary to keep U.N.E.F. in being.

I hope that U.N.E.F. is where it is to stay. One shudders to contemplate the consequences of its departure. It says much for the wisdom of the Egyptian Government that it willingly consents to the continued presence of the force. One of its principal and most valuable components is an Indian contingent composed of 1,171 men. In spite of this, the Indian Government is firmly opposed to the establishment of a United Nations force always available to meet an emergency like the Suez crisis.

In his speech in the Assembly on October 6, 1959, Mr. Krishna Menon said that his Government was "not at present prepared to participate in a standing force of the United Nations as such and we do not think it is a practical proposition. We are surprised to find that some countries have proposed that certain units should be allocated and demarcated for United Nations purposes. But if they are so allocated, what do they do when the United Nations does not want them? Therefore, it is not possible, in a defense force of any country, to have troops allocated and demarcated in this way." Mr. Menon went on to say that with the present state of development in the world, in the absence of world law, and of the universality of the United Nations, and in view of the fact that the United Nations, subject to group poli-

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tics, could not take objective decisions, his government did not think it right to place at the disposal of such an organization forces which might be moved without the consent of the people concerned.

At this point it is proper to say that I have not heard any delegate propose that a United Nations stand-by force should be disposed of by the Assembly without the consent of the contributing members, without the consent of a two-thirds majority of the Assembly and without the consent of the government into whose territories the force would be moved. Moreover, if the United Nations did not require from time to time forces allocated to it, such forces would often have plenty to do on their own borders, as perhaps Mr. Menon would, on consideration, admit.

With my references to Mr. Eisenhower, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, Mr. Lester Pearson and Mr. Menon, the issues on the question of a United Nations force are defined, subject to the Secretary-General's approach to the subject. I have myself suggested that a substantial force, made up of contributions from members other than those permanently on the Security Council, should be stationed at some strategic point and be available at the request of a member on its territory at the direction of the Assembly. World opinion may not be ready for this and it does not seem that for the present members would go beyond the proposals made by Mr. Lloyd and Mr. Pearson. Perhaps we have to suffer more before we learn to be provident.

Those who criticize Mr. Pearson's proposals appear to forget that the Uniting for Peace Resolution, passed by the Assembly on November 3, 1950, in effect sanctions the establishment of a stand-by force and that it was by virtue of this resolution that the Assembly was competent to establish U.N.E.F. In 1950 the West was well aware that the Security Council was able to intervene in Korea only because at the crucial meeting the Soviet Union absented itself. Its veto could have prevented any action by the Council. Consequently the Assembly established the Uniting for Peace procedure. Its terms merit enunciation.

The Assembly in 1950 resolved that if the Security Council, because of the lack of unanimity of its permanent members, failed to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appeared to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, then the Assembly should consider the matter imme-

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diately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to members for collective measures. These measures were to include, in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression, the use of armed force, when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security. If the Assembly were not in session at the time, then it could meet in special emergency session within 24 hours from the time it was requested to do so. Such session would be called if requested by the Security Council on the vote of any seven members, or by a majority of the members of the United Nations. This procedure was not used until 1956, following the Suez and Hungarian crises. The Soviet Union questioned the legality of these provisions but found it convenient to vote for their implementation in the Suez crisis.

Another provision of the Uniting for Peace Resolution tends to be forgotten. That resolution established a Peace Observation Commission. Each year the Commission meets for the purpose of electing its officers. For many years this Commission, as I know from having been its Vice-Chairman, has done nothing else and may at the present time be described as moribund. Pursuant to an Assembly resolution of December 7, 1951, the Commission established a Balkan Sub-Commission, which dispatched observers to the frontier areas of Greece in compliance with the request of the Greek Government. According to a United Kingdom delegate, the observers were successful despite the refusal of Bulgaria and Albania to admit them to their territories.

So far as I know, the Commission has performed no other task. Its members are China, Czechoslovakia, France, Honduras, India, Iraq, Israel, New Zealand, Pakistan, Sweden, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States and Uruguay. This is surely a comprehensive list and should ensure that the Commission can perform the tasks entrusted to it by the Uniting for Peace Resolution.

The resolution provides that the Commission can "observe and report in any area where there exists international tension the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security." The Security Council may utilize the Commission in accordance with its authority under the Charter.

Why, then, is the Commission not used? Mr. Pearson, in the article to which I have referred, suggests that the work of a Peace Supervision Force could be furthered by a revitalized Peace Ob-

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servation Commission given real responsibility to investigate disputes. "In a sense, a Peace Supervision Force would be an extension in space of the Peace Observation Commission and the subordinate bodies it was expected to produce."

Yet it is curious that no member of the Security Council suggested the use of the Commission in the Laotian item. Reference to the Commission would have caused some little delay but not so much, surely, as to be serious. The Uniting for Peace procedures are too important thus to be bypassed.

I now come to the attitude of Mr. Dag Hammarskjold, the Secretary-General, to whose devoted and skillful labors the establishment of U.N.E.F. owes so much. As the head of the Secretariat, which is one of the principal organs of the United Nations, his approach is and has been of great significance. I think that the Secretary-General has best expressed his philosophy in a speech he delivered at Copenhagen on May 2, 1959:

> Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter authorizes, in certain circumstances, the Security Council to use military force to maintain peace. It is important to realize what this means. This is not collective security of a kind which a defensive alliance can provide. The Charter expressly permits the formation of such alliances, but the United Nations itself is something else again. The possibilities of the Organization to use military force are limited to acts of coercion in the name of the world community against a nation which violates the peace. Such an action requires unanimity of the Great Powers. This unanimity has a twofold significance. Without it a military police action lacks the foundation necessary to be fully effective. And without it the United Nations would also, in contrast to the fundamental idea on which it is built, be capable of transformation into an instrument of military force in a conflict between the Great Powers—with all that this might mean for the other member states. The rule of unanimity with the right to form defensive alliances defines the position of the Organization. It has never been meant as an organ of collective security of the alliance type, but it is aimed at a universal system for the maintenance of peace which may have, as a natural complement, defensive alliances.

In the same speech Mr. Hammarskjold said that "practical considerations alone prevent even the kind of quasi-military arrangements which are possible under Chapter VII, and which fall within the competence of the General Assembly, from being used except to a very limited extent if at all." The Secretary-General proceeded to ask whether "the United Nations at present is so organized constitutionally that there is any organ which would be entrusted with that kind of policy decision back of a potentially fighting force."

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In these reflections I think that the Secretary-General does himself an injustice. I have every reason to remember the Suez crisis because on behalf of my government I supported the action of the United Kingdom and France. That has never prevented my admiring the ingenuity and the sleepless pertinacity of Mr. Hammarskjold, in conjunction with Mr. Pearson, as they, with other skillful aid, established U.N.E.F. What I would like Mr. Hammarskjold to do is to devote his immense skill and experience to the establishment of a stand-by force. I fully realize his difficulties, more particularly because of the opposition of the Soviet Union and India. If politics be the art of the possible, the Secretary-General may wish to rest himself on the application of this maxim to the international field. Yet there is nothing physically impossible in the nuclear and spatial age. I incline to the view that we in politics and diplomacy must catch up with the scientists and equal in political ideas and practice their astounding achievements.

The extract from the Secretary-General's Copenhagen speech requires study in the light of the Suez crisis. While it is true that Sir Anthony Eden, after the launching of the Suez venture, had expressed the hope that the United Nations would finally take over the responsibilities assumed by the Anglo-French forces, pressures in the Assembly undoubtedly contributed to the early withdrawal of these forces. Any diplomat who participated in the Suez debates, as I did, was well aware of the constant and enormous pressures exerted on the United Kingdom, both within and without the United Nations, first to desist from the operation and secondly to withdraw. The effect of financial pressures was scarcely less in its severity on a democratic government than the threat of military measures. The United Nations was certainly used as an instrument of political force against two great powers which eventually gave way to the weight of world public opinion. If this was an example of the rule of unanimity of the great powers, it was one produced under constraint. Nor was U.N.E.F. created with the consent of the Soviet Union, which abstained on the vote. Hence I do not consider that there are insuperable difficulties in the creation by the Assembly of a stand-by force even though one great power may dissent. Nor do I consider that there is any adequate reason why a stand-by force should not be more effectively armed for purposes of defense than U.N.E.F.

The Secretary-General on October 9, 1958, issued a report en-

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titled "Summary Study of the Experience derived from the Establishment and Operation of U.N.E.F." This document is the foundation and, I believe, the guide of Mr. Hammarskjold's thinking on the subject of a United Nations force for the future. He believes that U.N.E.F. is of an ad hoc and temporary character. I can say what he cannot say—that I hope that U.N.E.F. will stay where it is until there is a substantive solution of the problems of the Middle East.

Although the Secretary-General says that U.N.E.F. entered Egypt only with the consent of the Egyptian Government and can stay in the Gaza Strip and the area of Sharm el-Sheikh only so long as the Egyptian Government agrees, he affirms that a decision by the Egyptian Government to ask the force to leave would require discussion with the United Nations. The wisdom of the Egyptian Government would not incline it otherwise.

The Secretary-General concludes that U.N.E.F. is much more than an observer corps but much less than an army having military objectives. It can fire only in self-defense and can never take the initiative in the use of arms. Mr. Hammarskjold is at pains to say that U.N.E.F. is not to be used to enforce any specific political solution or to influence the political balance decisive to such a solution. But the fact is that U.N.E.F. does exercise a political influence because it is preserving the peace in the Gaza Strip and in the Straits of Tiran. An international force must and should produce political consequences.

Mr. Eisenhower's proposals in August 1958 to create a permanent peace force have not borne fruit. During the thirteenth session, following the President's proposals, nothing was done toward the creation of a permanent peace force. The Secretary-General, after an able memorandum delivered on November 5, 1958, dismissed the subject by saying that there was neither reason nor excuse for the United Nations to be unprepared to meet any new emergency requiring similar treatment. In these circumstances he felt that there was no need for the Assembly to take any action for the present.

And so the whole matter lies buried. But is it buried? The situation in Laos has disturbed the funeral ceremonies. And so have the observations of Mr. Selwyn Lloyd.

I have always considered that there is a place for the United Nations in the solution of the problem of West Berlin. Senator Mansfield has lent the weight of his support to this view. At

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the moment it appears that neither Mr. Adenauer nor General de Gaulle is ready to negotiate. Mr. Eisenhower and Mr. Macmillan, while firmly adhering to the principles that West Berlin must continue a free democracy and that American, British and French forces must remain there, are nevertheless willing to negotiate. One solution, in addition to the Canadian proposal for the acceptance of a U.N. presence on the lines of communication in the city, would be some reduction in the Western forces in Berlin and their replacement, to the extent of the reduction, by a United Nations force. Indeed, when Lord Montgomery visited Moscow in April 1959 he suggested to Mr. Khrushchev that the Secretary-General should investigate the Berlin problem and that a United Nations force consisting of troops from neutral nations could be introduced gradually into Berlin "and the forces of the Western nations could be scaled down at some later date, as mutual confidence developed." According to the Field Marshal, Mr. Khrushchev agreed, although subsequent Soviet statements suggest that the Russian leader has changed his mind.

However, there is no reason why proposals such as those of Senator Mansfield and of others like Lord Montgomery should not be pressed on Mr. Khrushchev. The signing of the Austrian peace treaty proves that persistence with the Russians can earn its reward. If Mr. Khrushchev believes, as he recently wrote in an article in this review,[2] in the right of the inhabitants of West Berlin to preserve their existing way of life, he should surely agree to the establishment of a United Nations force in that city. The West Berliners are entitled to this method of protection.

History since the establishment of the United Nations has recorded crisis after crisis in which an international force could have played a salutary part. The United Nations intervened in Korea but, as has been pointed out, the United Nations character of that action was as much symbolic as it was real. Intervention during the Suez crisis was of an ad hoc character but has produced invaluable lessons for the future. Surely we should profit by them and proceed to create a permanent mechanism by which units of the armed forces of member countries could be endowed with the authority of the United Nations and made available at short notice for supervisory police duties. If the United Nations fails to do this, it is in danger of failing to fulfill its basic purpose of preserving the peace.

[2] "On Peaceful Coexistence," by Nikita S. Khrushchev, *Foreign Affairs*, October 1959.

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THE SPECIAL ENVOY

By Henry M. Wriston

AMONG all the instruments available to the President in his conduct of foreign relations, none is more flexible than the use of personal representatives. He is free to employ officials of the government or private citizens. He may give them such rank and title as seem appropriate to the tasks; these designations may be ambassador, commissioner, agent, delegate; or he may assign no title at all. He may send his agents to any place on earth that he thinks desirable and give them instructions either by word of mouth, or in writing, or through the Department of State, or in any other manner that seems to him fitted to the occasion. Some have been exceedingly formal; others completely informal. Many agents have borne commissions like those of Government officers, ensuring them diplomatic rights, dignities and immunities. Because of these circumstances many have mistakenly considered themselves officers. Others have had mere letters of introduction and have enjoyed no diplomatic privileges. Some have gone with no written credentials whatsoever, their errand described only verbally. Their functions have varied in importance from the trivial to the vital.

Their missions may be secret, no one whatever being informed of them. They may be open and accompanied by a blare of publicity. Neither their private character nor public attention affects the position of the representative. The President may meet their expenses and pay them such sums as he regards as reasonable. In this matter there is no check upon him except the availability of funds which has never proved an insoluble problem. In short, he is as nearly completely untrammelled as in any phase of his executive authority.

The special envoy is not an American institution but a universal practice. Particular interest in the employment of this type of agent by the United States arises from the constitutional provision that the President "shall nominate, and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls." Yet in a single year the President has appointed over 25 persons, with the rank of ambassador, without placing any of their names before the Senate or asking its advice and consent before appointment.

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The resolution of this apparent contradiction rests upon precedent, accumulated practice and legal distinctions. Like many executive interpretations of the Constitution, the initial precedent was set by George Washington. When he became President we had no representative at the Court of St. James's; John Adams, our minister, had come home after being treated with studied incivility. There was no British minister here. It was essential to establish working relations without further impairing our prestige. In these circumstances, Washington sent Gouverneur Morris as a "private agent." He bore no commission, only a letter on "the authority and credit" of which he was to converse with the British officials with a view to establishing normal diplomatic relations. This appointment, made in October 1789, was not reported to the Congress until a presidential message on February 14, 1791. There was no vocal protest, though the sour journal of William Maclay indicated storms that were to follow. Referring to Morris, Maclay noted: "He has acted in a strange kind of capacity, half pimp, half envoy, or perhaps more properly a kind of political eavesdropper about the British Court for sometime past."

This employment of Morris was a very thin edge of the wedge. But in dealing with the Barbary States, a title—"consul"—was conferred on an agent and a regular commission was issued to him. Moreover, full power to negotiate a treaty was granted, with the extraordinary privilege of naming a substitute; yet no nomination went to the Senate. Here were two very significant additional precedents, the use of the title of a constitutional officer, and the initiation of a treaty by an agent without the advice and consent of the Senate. For a century and a quarter thereafter precedents accumulated. The number of special missions has now run into the thousands.

The range of matters committed to special missions has expanded enormously since the United States became so deeply involved in so many ways in so many parts of the world. The number in any one administration has been to some extent dependent upon the special circumstances of the time. To an even greater degree occasions for their use stem from the habits of thought and work of the President and his deputy for foreign affairs, the Secretary of State. The President is always in charge of foreign relations, whether he chooses to act directly or through channels, whether he relies upon his Secretary of State or has greater confidence in people outside his immediate official family.

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Along the historical path accumulating instances did not go unchallenged. A long series of congressional debates discussed this use of the President's power; some were of a high order of excellence. Occasionally, Presidents retreated; at other times they asserted their power more vigorously. For example, Woodrow Wilson specifically directed the Secretary of State to disobey a law which he regarded as legislative trespass upon his executive authority in this matter. Ultimately the Congress acquiesced and for over 25 years, now, while there has been some sharp sniping at individuals, there has been no such classic discussion as marked earlier eras.

This indicates that there is now general consensus about the legal status of agents. The basic fact is that the President's personal representative is not an officer of the Government. This remains true even when he performs duties normally performed by officers. Indeed, he may be superior to officers and have regular officers of the Government working under his direction and control. His rank and title—say that of ambassador—may be the rank and title of an officer, but this fact does not confer office upon him. At times this insistence that a man performing official duties, with officials to help him, is not an officer skirts the borders of legal fiction. But it has proved so useful that it has been perpetuated. There are now so many precedents for so many situations that it has come to be fully accepted that the agent has an employment, not an office.

The second basis for the unofficial status of an agent is that his duties are temporary. The word "temporary" has more flexibility than the ordinary use of the word would indicate. For example, the late Myron C. Taylor was appointed personal representative of the President to the Vatican and accredited to His Holiness the Pope in December 1939. He continued to discharge his responsibilities in that assignment for about seven years. It was virtually a full-time employment, with the rank and title of ambassador, and he had a staff regularly assigned to assist him just as did every other ambassador. Because, however, the post was not authorized by Congress and no nomination was sent to the Senate, it was "temporary" despite its continuance year after year. When Mr. Taylor ceased to be the President's personal representative, there was no vacancy, and when no successor was appointed that was deemed clear enough evidence that the employment had been temporary. The appointment of Eric Johnston to the Middle East

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with the rank of ambassador continued for some years. It was different from Mr. Taylor's in that it was not full-time and did not carry accreditation to a single state; yet it clearly strained the word "temporary" beyond the usual connotation of the word.

The precise boundaries between the circumstances when, on the one hand, a personal representative is employed and, on the other hand, an official is named are shadowy and difficult to draw. For example, the late Norman Davis performed a whole series of very important missions over a considerable period of time; he was often referred to as "ambassador-at-large." Yet on many of those occasions he was a presidential agent, not an officer. On the other hand, when Philip Jessup was named ambassador-at-large in 1949 to perform many of the same sorts of duties, his nomination was sent to the Senate and he was an officer. John Foster Dulles, though he had wide discretion and large responsibility as in fact deputy to the Secretary of State for negotiating the Japanese peace treaty, was not an officer. It is clear that the choice of the one or the other of two methods is a presidential prerogative.

The difference between a presidential agent and an officer is closely analogous to the distinction between an executive agreement and a treaty. No one has ever yet succeeded in drawing a clear, sharp line. Many executive agreements have dealt with the same subjects with which treaties have dealt; many executive agreements have been more important in our international affairs than many treaties have been. It can be shown from the record that on several occasions executive agreements were resorted to not for intrinsic reasons but specifically to avoid the difficulties, complexities and embarrassments that are occasionally produced by the treaty process as defined in the Constitution. In the same manner the President has used a personal representative to do what he would normally ask a regular officer to do when he hesitated to nominate the man to the Senate lest it produce complications. In this century there has more often been a legislative challenge to the use of executive agreements—the "Bricker Amendment" is a conspicuous example—than to the employment of personal representatives. The use of the one means or the other —both with executive agreements and personal representatives— is to be found in the motives or convenience of the President. Neither is always clear from the record.

This development of an almost perfectly free hand in means and methods is merely one facet of the growing power of the Presi-

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dent in foreign relations. That dominancy was demonstrated in Woodrow Wilson's description of his status when signing the Treaty of Versailles: "The Honorable Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States, *acting in his own name and by his own proper authority.*" In a sense every man who signs a treaty is a presidential agent, for no officer save the President, not even the Secretary of State, can affix his signature by reason of his official position; it requires a separate "full power" from the President.

II

There are two fundamentally different types of special envoys. One group is composed of persons employed to perform duties which, for one reason or another, it is inappropriate or inconvenient for regular officers to perform. While they carry the designation "personal representative of the President," it is a technical credential rather than a vivid description of their status. The other group is much smaller; it consists of persons who not only in form, but in fact, represent the President personally. In some instances the relationship has been so intimate that the envoy was almost an alter ego.

The use of such very personal representatives reflects the working habits of the President. President Eisenhower, for instance, moves through channels. When he engages in direct correspondence with other chiefs of state or heads of governments, there is the fullest coöperation and coördination with his official family. Even when he employs his brother, as he has on several occasions, it is with particular care not to trespass upon normal lines of communication.

Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt stand at the other extreme in the use of distinctively personal agents. It was well known that Mr. Wilson was not close to any of his Secretaries of State, and that this was particularly so in the case of William Jennings Bryan. He established a working partnership with Colonel Edward M. House. On one occasion a correspondent asked President Wilson how far Colonel House could speak for him, and got this reply: "Mr. House is my second personality. He is my independent self. His thoughts and mine are one."[1] Such intimacy has been equalled only by the relationship between Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry Hopkins.

[1] Arthur D. Howden Smith, "Mr. House of Texas." New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1940, p. 96.

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When war broke out in Europe in 1914, there were special reasons for a personal representative. The reorganization of the Government had been sweeping. The new Secretary of State was appointed for domestic political reasons and his aptitude for the office was slight. He used the patronage system in filling diplomatic posts, making some good and some very bad appointments. The average period of service of our ambassadors and ministers abroad was then less than a year; no chief of mission was a professional. Mr. Bryan was not operating the Department of State effectively; its career staff was given little scope. Mr. House sought to fill the vacuum created by this set of circumstances. He did it without any formal commission or title or personal rank. Indeed it was not until his third mission abroad that he accepted payment of his expenses. His "instructions" were verbal, or typed by the President on his own typewriter, sometimes with no carbon copy, and with no consultation with the Secretary of State.

Despite this informality, Mr. House was accepted as the President's spokesman in London, Berlin and Paris. He dealt with the Kaiser and even had a secret code with which to communicate privately with Sir Edward Grey. He corresponded with American ambassadors without clearing his or their communications with the State Department. One of his biographers speaks candidly of his "quiet usurpation" of many of the prerogatives of the Secretary of State who, immersed in his own concerns, seems not to have resented the intrusion. House went over the head of Ambassador Walter Hines Page in London continually and with the full approval of the President.

The relationship between President Roosevelt and Harry Hopkins was in some respects similar, but in others quite different. Hopkins was not a roving statesman like House, working at large concepts or plans which he hoped to insinuate into the President's mind. Robert Sherwood speaks of him as seeking to be "a catalyst" or "marriage broker," and "to prove to Roosevelt that it was possible to be utterly at ease with Churchill." He sought also to do something to make a better and more relaxed relationship between Roosevelt and Stalin, though he never expected to make either "utterly at ease" with the other.

Hopkins had neither rank nor title. In an almost offhand manner, he proposed his first mission to Britain. The President's acceptance of the suggestion was equally casual. A letter from the President embodied this authorizing phrase: "I am asking you to

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proceed at your early convenience to Great Britain, there to act as my personal representative."[2] While in London, Hopkins suggested his first mission to Russia. A cable to Stalin from the Acting Secretary of State asked, on behalf of the President, that Hopkins be treated with the "identical confidence you would feel if you were talking directly to me." Everywhere he went he was accorded extraordinary privileges. Ambassador Steinhardt reported: "He was received promptly by Stalin, who granted him very extended interviews and discussed with a frankness unparalleled in my knowledge in recent Soviet history the subject of his mission and the Soviet position."[3]

Though Secretary Hull strongly disapproved of President Roosevelt's habit of sending special envoys, he made an exception in the case of Hopkins. In his memoirs, he wrote: "Although Hopkins' work was now on an international scale, I never had any friction, much less clashes, with him. . . . To the best of my knowledge, he did not undertake to interfere with any important policies of the State Department . . . our agreeable working relations thus continued to the end."[4]

This lack of friction rested to some extent upon personalities. Hopkins was so unassuming in manner that he disarmed resentment not only on the part of the Secretary, but also the ambassadors. The harmony also depended upon accepted nuances which were sometimes so subtle as to be distinctions without difference. For example, after long private consultations with Stalin, Hopkins reported, "I told him my mission was not a diplomatic one in the sense that I did not propose any formal understanding of any kind or character." Such a definition reduces the scope of "diplomacy" beyond normal recognition. There is no question that he dealt with matters of high policy. He said, for example, of one of his missions to Britain, "Our main proposal here should take the heat off Russia's diplomatic demands upon England." Moreover, he mingled freely in extremely sensitive discussions about the future of India. The President was pressing for self-government there, and Louis Johnson (another Presidential envoy) was working with Sir Stafford Cripps in India, whereas Hopkins was dealing with Churchill. This was far from a military matter, and if it was not technically "diplomatic," it certainly was high politics.

[2] Robert E. Sherwood, "Roosevelt and Hopkins." New York: Harper, 1948, p. 232.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 346.
[4] "The Memoirs of Cordell Hull." New York: Macmillan, 1948, v. 2, p. 923.

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Both House and Hopkins bring out one phase of the President's relationship to foreign affairs which seldom appears with like clarity in the work of the regular establishment, namely, the significance of individual idiosyncrasies and personal rivalries, of mutual trust or suspicion, among statesmen. In most discussions of diplomacy stress is laid upon "the national interest," "public opinion" and other large and generalized concepts; the extraordinarily human aspects of international dealings are pretty well concealed. A real personal representative exposes intensely human characteristics and the vital role they often play in international relations. They supply sharply etched pictures of the isolation of the head of a government, clear evidence of how difficult it is to get candid counsel, hints of his relationships with his own official associates, and of his personal prejudices. At times the pettiness that shapes some significant episode is deeply shocking.

There have been a number of men who have gone on many special missions. Among them were Hugh Gibson, Norman Davis, John Foster Dulles (before he was Secretary of State), Milton Eisenhower, Myron Taylor, Robert Murphy, among others. Some of these had wide authority, such as that assigned Mr. Dulles in 1950 to advise the Secretary of State on "broad problems" and "specific courses of action" in "Europe, the Far East and other areas of the world." Yet, despite their repeated employment and the importance of their assignments, no other personal representative of the President has ever matched the distinctive roles of Colonel House or Harry Hopkins.

III

One reason for the great expansion in the number of personal representatives arises from the progressively more direct participation of the President in international relations. This is essentially a product of the twentieth century. True, Washington sent Gouverneur Morris, but that was because his Secretary of State, Jefferson, was not yet functioning. Other episodes in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries could be adduced, but they would be rare, and, for the most part, not significant, and certainly not typical. Theodore Roosevelt altered the custom. He corresponded directly with the Kaiser, with the Mikado and with the Tsar. His relationship to the revolution in Panama was more direct than that of his Secretary of State, so much so that he later boasted, "I took Panama." Woodrow Wilson carried activity still further

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by going beyond correspondence to travel abroad and engage directly in negotiations.

This raised a new problem, namely, the status of those who accompanied the President to the Peace Conference in Paris. They were named by the President alone; he had much advice but reached his own decisions. Each member of the mission was given a commission as "commissioner plenipotentiary" which was mistakenly described as an "office." The secretary of the commission was accorded the rank of "minister plenipotentiary," though his British opposite held the rank of ambassador. In addition, there was a large staff of experts, advisors, administrators, intelligence agents and others. All were presidential agents. This constituted an important and sweeping precedent.

President Franklin Roosevelt highlighted this status of his companions. At the Atlantic Conference he did not take the Secretary of State, but Under Secretary Welles. Nor did the President take Cordell Hull to Casablanca, Cairo or Tehran, though the British Foreign Secretary accompanied his chief in each instance. Mr. Hull invited attention to that fact and suggested that he should be in the President's party. The suggestion was explicitly negated; Hull recorded that he "learned from other sources than the President what had occurred"[5] at those meetings. Even more striking as a demonstration that those who accompanied the President did so as his agents, not as officials, was the invitation to Mr. Morgenthau to attend the second Quebec Conference in September 1944. The purpose was to present proposals for postwar Germany, which were out of harmony with the views of the Departments of State and War. This was particularly galling to Mr. Hull who complained that the Secretary of the Treasury "often interfered in foreign affairs, and sometimes took steps directly at variance with those of the State Department."[6] In this instance, Mr. Hull felt Mr. Morgenthau achieved his goal by "monetary weapons which he brandished." Both Secretaries Hull and Stimson protested vigorously.

James Byrnes' trip to Yalta was determined in a casual, almost offhand manner. Only later, when he became Secretary of State, did he learn of a "top secret" protocol by which the Soviets were to take over the Kurile Islands. The key document had been kept in a White House safe and not communicated to the State Depart-

[5] "Memoirs," *op. cit.*, v. 2, p. 1110.
[6] *Ibid.*, v. 2, p. 1379.

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ment. Nothing could have demonstrated more dramatically the freedom of the President in his choice of instruments for his policies.

IV

The first Vice President used for diplomatic purposes was Henry A. Wallace. The initiative for his trip to Latin America in 1943 was his own; it did not originate with the President, much less the Secretary of State. The next year, Mr. Wallace proposed to go to China. Mr. Hull was strongly opposed: "I never at any time favored excursions into foreign affairs by Wallace, especially through trips abroad. . . . A network of questions and conditions existed . . . which necessarily had to be handled with extreme care and delicacy. I was convinced that no person outside the State Department and the White House could break into these affairs without serious risk." The Secretary tried to dissuade Mr. Wallace. Failing, he expressed his view to the President who, however, had already given his permission. On the trip the Vice President performed a number of ceremonial courtesies, made some gifts, then conferred with President Chiang and issued a joint communiqué with him at the end of his visit. The Secretary of State remarked acidly that the journey "was without beneficial effect."[7]

The travels of Vice President Nixon followed the Wallace precedent in some respects, but sharply differed in others. His journeys had the full sanction of the Secretary of State. His staff included foreign service officers as aides, not chaperons. In scope, significance and number his trips far exceeded those of Mr. Wallace. A world tour in 1953 took him into most parts of non-Communist Asia. In 1955 he went to the Caribbean, seeking especially the improvement of relations between Costa Rica and Nicaragua. The next year he journeyed to Brazil to the inauguration of President Kubitschek; he also went to Manila in July for the celebration of the tenth anniversary of Philippine independence, and proceeded to South Vietnam, Taiwan, Thailand and Pakistan. Late in the same year he was in Austria. During 1957 he visited Morocco, Ghana, Liberia, Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan, Libya and Tunisia, as well as Italy, and made a comprehensive report. The year 1958 saw his dramatic visit to Latin America, which had important influences upon policy. He also visited London.

Inevitably, so much travel abroad led to questions regarding his

[7] "Memoirs," *op. cit.*, v. 2, p. 1585.

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status. In a press conference on July 22, 1959, the President made it clear: "He has a position of his own. He is not a subordinate of the President, and he is not a part of the diplomatic processes and machinery of this country. He cannot be sent out on a special mission, except as he agrees to go as a special agent of the President." All his authority to perform acts which bear upon United States policy arises from his status as an agent of the President. Naturally, because of his exalted office, he carries no other rank or title.

When any official is made a personal representative of the President, whether he is given a special title or not depends upon the nature of his task, and his position in the Government. The usual practice is not to give the Secretary of State or the Under Secretary or the Deputy Under Secretary additional titles. This, however, is a matter of precedent and convenience; when the President is minded to do so, he can depart from that practice, as he has in specific instances.

V

It was many years before the employment of Senators and Congressmen as agents of the President was attempted. In all the early discussions of the status of agents, members of the legislative branch were in the position of critics of the Executive. Since they were not directly involved, their own status did not come under discussion or review.

Just at the time that his Secretary of State, John Hay, was denouncing the Senate as the graveyard of treaties, President McKinley was seeking to soften relationships with the legislative branch. He appointed both Senators and Representatives as presidential agents. The result was the opposite of his hope and expectation. Members of his own party in the Senate denounced the practice. In particular, Senator George F. Hoar of Massachusetts declared: "The suggestion that these gentlemen are not officers seems to me the merest cavil. They exercise an authority, they are clothed with a dignity equal to that of the highest and most important diplomatic officers, and far superior to that of most of the civil officers of the country. To say that the President cannot appoint a Senator or Representative postmaster in a country village . . . and then permit the President to send him abroad; to enable him to maintain the distinction and enjoy the pleasure of a season at a foreign capital as a representative of the United States, with

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all his expenses paid, and a large compensation added, determined solely by the executive will; and to hold that the framers of the Constitution would for a moment have tolerated that seems to me utterly preposterous."

In addition to this challenge to their legal status, he stressed a further point: "If the practice continues, it will go far, in my judgment, to destroy the dignity and independence of the Senate." Senators so appointed tacitly agreed to "obey the commands of the Executive;" "they then come back to their seats and carry on as Senators the policy which they have adopted in command of another power, without any consultation with their associates or learning their associates' opinion."[8] By law Senators had forbidden themselves to serve as counsel in any case in which the United States was interested; Hoar and others felt that a presidential appointment was analogous to that service, and whatever the legal status, the practice was ethically improper.

Senators, however, did not like to censure themselves; so without formal action it was agreed that one of their number would read the President a curtain lecture. Senator Hoar called on President McKinley and reported the general view that such appointments were improper. The President was equal to the Senators in delicacy. He understood the point being raised; he had come to be acutely aware of it in recent months. While he made no commitment, he gave the impression that he would not make further appointments of that kind. As a matter of fact, he did not; nor did his successors for some time.

Times and circumstances change, and after those who participated in this declaration of conscience were out of the Senate, the new crop felt differently. No Senator was appointed to the Peace Commission after the First World War, whereas three Senators had served on the commission to negotiate peace with Spain after the war of 1898. There were clear evidences of dissatisfaction. The failure to name a Senator handicapped the Treaty of Versailles when it was brought up for advice and consent.

This was a clear enough hint. When the Disarmament Conference of 1921–1922 was organized, President Harding appointed Senators Lodge and Underwood members of the commission. Not only did they accept the appointment; they were happy to have the rank of ambassador. No word of criticism was uttered in the Senate. The presence of two very powerful Senators on the negoti-

[8] George F. Hoar, "Autobiography of Seventy Years." New York: Scribners, 1903, v. 2, p. 50.

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ating team helped the subsequent acceptance of the treaties by the Senate. The success of that experience led to the custom of appointing Senators to participate in many negotiations. In particular, there are always Senators on the delegation to the Assembly of the United Nations, and the law providing for the appointment of representatives clearly assumes such appointments.

Senatorial complacency did not dispose of Senator Hoar's other objection—that Senators could not independently review treaties after they had participated in their negotiation under executive instructions. The practical resolution of this difficulty offers a striking instance of historical irony. For nothing is clearer than that the first Senators in the Administration of President Washington desired and expected to participate in negotiations. A series of historical accidents rather than deliberate constitutional interpretation defeated their expectation. Of course they did not anticipate that in participating in negotiations they would be acting under instruction of the Executive, but rather as a council and in their own right.

It is sometimes cited as a mark of the expanding power of the President that Senators have acted under his instructions. Indeed the law governing representation in the United Nations, after referring to service by Senators and members of the House, explicitly directs: "The representatives . . . shall, at all times, act in accordance with the instructions of the President . . . and such representatives shall, in accordance with such instructions, cast any and all votes. . . ."[9] Here was made explicit what Senator Hoar and others had feared was implicit. However, the reality is not identical with the form. For example, Senators Lodge and Underwood influenced markedly the course of the negotiations in which they participated; their advice was taken very seriously by the Secretary. The delegation to the San Francisco conferences to establish the United Nations contained two especially influential Senators, Vandenberg and Connally, who virtually exercised a veto power. When they advised that the Senate was not likely to consent to some provision, it was dropped or modified to suit their view of what the Senate would accept. There is now a large enough body of experience to make it clear that Senators who serve as negotiators have a large influence in shaping their own instructions.

When they are in disagreement with policy, they have been

[9] *United Nations Participation Act of 1945* (Public Law 264—79th Congress).

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known to express their own views, rather than follow the Executive. In 1946 Senator Chavez of New Mexico was a delegate at a Western Hemisphere meeting of the International Labor Organization. He was well aware that it was settled policy to pay citizens of the United States working in the Canal Zone higher wages than the Latin Americans who were there employed—a double standard established when the Canal was built. Senator Chavez denounced American policy as discriminatory. Having taken this position, he left the conference; the other delegates were hard put to maintain the official position which was subsequently modified.

In January 1946 the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations to provide for the creation of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission was to meet in London. Before going to Moscow for negotiations in advance of the London session, Secretary Byrnes had a meeting with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Committee on Atomic Energy. Differences of opinion between the Secretary and the Senators were not fully resolved. Secretary Byrnes then negotiated an understanding in Moscow, but before he could return from the Soviet Union and explain what had occurred, the rest of the delegation to London, which included two Senators, left Washington. Senator Vandenberg made it clear that he was not going to alter his position, with which Senator Connally, also a delegate, was in accord. Newspapers made much of a "split" in the American delegation. Secretary Byrnes went to London, conferred for four hours with the Senators, and reached an agreement with them. In effect their "instructions" were what they would agree to.

The wheel of history had come virtually full turn. Acting through its representative members—as it does also in most other matters—the twentieth century Senate was playing the role of council in advising in advance of negotiations and during them, as well as consenting when the final treaty had been signed. The frustration of eighteenth century hopes and expectations was to some extent, at least, repaired.

Because they do not participate in advising and consenting to the ratification of treaties, the employment of members of the House never offered the same problems as the use of Senators. None the less, at the time President McKinley was being warned not to employ Senators, the House also became concerned over appointments of its members. The Judiciary Committee was directed to ascertain whether any member of the House had ac-

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cepted "any office under the United States," and "whether the acceptance . . . has vacated the seat of the member." The most sensitive cases were not presidential agents but appointments to commissions established by law, the nominations of whom had been sent to the Senate. Moreover, they had taken "oaths of office," and were commissioned for two years. None the less, the conclusion was that the employments were "merely transient, occasional or incidental in nature" and therefore not offices. This was drawing an exceedingly fine line indeed. In any event, it left House members who served as presidential agents well on the safe side. The issue has not been seriously considered during this century, and members of the House have been employed repeatedly.

The relationship of the House of Representatives to foreign affairs shows elements of historical irony like that which marks the role of Senators. In the earliest days of the Republic the House sought to use its power to initiate appropriations as a means of exercising an independent judgment in foreign affairs. The attempt was repulsed and the control vested with the President and Senate. With the passage of time, however, foreign relations and domestic matters became more and more inextricably interwoven. Inevitably the power of the House to affect foreign relations became very important. There has grown up a strong tendency, therefore, to use members of the House as presidential agents in the hope of favorable action on legislation and appropriations.

The legal status of Senators and Representatives having been determined and sensitive consciences having been quieted, some problems still remained. How should appointments be distributed between the majority and the minority? Generally positions are distributed equally between the parties. In designating Senators and Representatives, may the President disregard seniority? He does so at his peril. In any specific instance, what committee should be represented? Should it be the subject matter committee —such as the Committee on Labor, the Committee on Agriculture—or should appointees be drawn from the committees dealing specifically with foreign relations? The working rule is that the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate or the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House is usually selected for the United Nations meetings, such as the one for the organization of the United Nations at San Francisco, as well as subsequent meetings of the Assembly. For other occasions, the specialized committees are used. At the Bretton Woods Conference, for example, it was mem-

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bers of the Committee on Banking and Currency who were appointed; and for the Food and Agriculture Organization conferences, members of the Committee on Agriculture. These actions rest upon precedent, but in time precedent may become as binding as a written rule.

VI

The use of special envoys has increased so much that a definitive classification of the occasions that call for their employment is impossible. Nevertheless some characteristic situations can be identified.

Ceremonial occasions are frequent. Our tradition of "republican simplicity," epitomized in Marcy's famous "black coat circular" which prohibited uniforms for our diplomats, made the United States hesitate to send ceremonial envoys. The long delay before Congress authorized the appointment of ambassadors, in 1893, made protocol difficulties because the personal representative of the President could not have the highest rank. It was said, "Our envoy was not only dressed like a waiter, protocol gave him hardly more consideration."

Nevertheless, exceptions did occur. In gratitude for the attitude of Russia during the Civil War, Congress adopted congratulatory resolutions on the escape from assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1866. A special envoy was sent to convey the address to the Tsar. No protocol difficulties arose because no other nation sent an envoy at the same moment. In 1883, a special envoy was sent to the coronation of Alexander III; despite emphasis that such missions were "unusual in our intercourse with other countries," he was snubbed by not being invited to the ceremony. Before 1893 there were only three other ceremonial missions. Two went to Hawaii, one for a coronation, the other for a fiftieth birthday. The third mission was to the Bolivar centennial in Venezuela. The political motivation shows clearly.

After ambassadors were authorized, special envoys with ambassadorial rank were used freely and protocol difficulties disappeared. With the passage of time, the acceptance of the United States as a great power, the multiplication of embassies, and the proliferation of ceremonial occasions, such special missions have suffered a decline in prestige. Appointments, for the most part, originate with the protocol officer in the Department of State.

Closely allied to ceremonial missions are delegations to interna-

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tional expositions, fairs and athletic contests. Noted athletes were sent, for example, as "personal representatives of the President," to the Olympic games in Melbourne. One of the President's brothers represented him at the dedication of a mountain in Canada bearing his name. Former President Hoover performed the same function at the Brussels fair in 1958.

A second general group of agents are those sent to a whole area, rather than a single nation. There were early precedents. In 1832 a New Hampshire sea captain toured the Far East and Southeast Asia as a six-dollar-a-day diplomat with instructions to make treaties with all and sundry. His "full powers" had blank spaces for the names and titles "appertaining to their Majesties" which were not known in the State Department.

In the twentieth century two areas in particular have seen this kind of envoy—Latin America and the Near East. One of the earliest missions of John Foster Dulles was to Central America in 1917. During the present Administration, the names of Milton Eisenhower, Eric Johnston, James P. Richards, Loy Henderson and Mr. Nixon are associated with such area missions, each of which attracted wide attention. Their experiences show how difficult it is for a presidential envoy to do his work quietly. When a special representative visits a sensitive region speculation tends to run riot. This does not imply that such missions are unwise but does indicate limitations upon their usefulness.

A third group of special envoys results from the growing complexity of international relations. Between 20 and 30 government agencies have people operating abroad. As a practical matter, it is impossible for all of them to work through the Department of State. Yet the United States should speak abroad, if not with one voice, at least with a harmony of voices. In order to deal with situations that straddle the interests of a number of departments, the President is sometimes virtually forced to appoint personal representatives to look at matters not from the point of view of one agency but of the total interest of the United States.

International conferences have become the most prolific sources of special envoys. The United States now participates in about 350 such meetings each year. While laws, treaties and international instruments of one sort or other stipulate some kinds of appointments, the designation of persons for international discussions is peculiarly a presidential prerogative. President Wilson specifically directed the Secretary of State to ignore as "utterly

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futile" a law which he regarded as a trespass upon his authority in this matter.

Because of the numbers involved, President Truman, in 1948, formally delegated to the Secretary of State authority to designate the representatives to most international conferences. The President reserved the right to name them when for any reason he thought it wise. As a matter of practice a good deal of the Secretary's authority in this matter is actually exercised by the Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs.

Other characteristic occasions for the use of a special envoy are in dealing with a non-sovereign or unrecognized state, an unrecognized government or in reopening ruptured relations. Thus special missions went to India in 1942 before independence, to Martinique in the same year during the Vichy régime in France. In 1944 a special mission to Bolivia made a long report on the situation in that nation; it led to recognition of the government by the United States and by the other American states.

After the Korean armistice a political conference was to be convoked. Arthur H. Dean was delegated to make the arrangements. He was to act not only on behalf of the United States, but also, because of authorizations filed with the Secretary of State, on behalf of the other nations whose forces had participated in the fighting. This was perhaps a unique instance of a special envoy negotiating on behalf of so large a group of states. But in other respects it was, if not typical, very close to normal procedure in the effort to liquidate war politically after the fighting had ended.

Another large group of special envoys are those who deal with technical matters where a high degree of expertness is required, particularly on subjects so difficult that a regular diplomat could not be adequately briefed. Fiscal and economic questions, as well as scientific issues, supply instances. Other envoys have been sent to supervise elections, such as those in Greece in 1946 or the Sudan in 1953.

Sometimes a special envoy is authorized to replace a regular officer. The famous "Paramount" Blount got that soubriquet because President Cleveland sent him to Hawaii with powers "paramount" to those of the minister. President Wilson, faced with scandalous behavior by a regular minister, sent a commission; the minister was directed to "confer with them on important matters," which meant he was to do as they said. He was later recalled. Usually there is an effort to disguise such situations, but it seldom

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succeeds. The very circumspection, not to say circumlocution, with which such special missions are launched rouses suspicion. Then the mere presence of a special envoy produces speculation. Whatever the facts, the position of the regular officer deteriorates. If he resigns, it will be said he "quit under fire;" if he does not, officials in the government to which he is accredited lose confidence in his authority. Almost always his position becomes impossible.

This highlights one reason that regular officers, with very few exceptions, resent the appearance of any special envoy. No matter how clear the explanation, there is always some feeling that the mere presence of an "outsider" reflects some inadequacy upon the part of the ambassador. Charles Francis Adams, when in London during the Civil War, expressed his resentment at having a "whole cabinet" of special representatives about him, some of whom did not keep him informed. Admiral Standley, as Ambassador to Russia, 1942–1943, has made public his feelings. "For long months, I saw Special Representative after Big Dignitary come to Russia, leapfrog over my top-hatted head. . . . I also watched the situation deteriorate." He complained that he was "behind an opaque curtain of lack of information." He was particularly bitter because some special envoys had "instructions not to show the Ambassador anything, not to tell him about the nature or progress of negotiations." These complaints are particularly bitter because wartime produces an extraordinary number of missions; he was in an enormously difficult post; and both his own Chief of State and the one to which he was accredited believed, as he said, "in personal diplomacy, either directly or through his own 'personal foreign office.' "[10]

The candor and acerbity of these observations are unusual, but the feelings they reveal are not. Nevertheless, the use of special envoys is essential; the fact that every administration in our history has employed them is evidence enough. That their use has sometimes been excessive is beyond question, that some have been swollen with pride and arrogance is plain upon the record. What is even more clear, however, is that the institution has, on the whole, justified itself.

[10] William H. Standley and Arthur A. Ageton, "Admiral Ambassador to Russia." Chicago: Regnery, 1955, p. 194 *et seq.*

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THOUGHTS ALONG THE CHINA BORDER

Will Neutrality Be Enough?

By Hamilton Fish Armstrong

AROUND the immense southern rim of Red China, from Afghanistan at the western end of the Himalayas to South Vietnam on the Pacific, and further still to the great island groups of Indonesia and the Philippines, stretches a crescent of nations, all but a few of them newly come to statehood and all in an early stage of economic development. Most of them show a friendly face toward their huge neighbor; only two or three venture to be openly hostile, defiant even. But all share a common feeling for her: fear.

From antique times the Chinese have been pressing southward, at first under the Han and other early dynasties, often in irresistible hordes under a leader like Kublai Khan, in later days family by family, industrious merchants and money-changers, building a state within a state. Now Communist China reveals that she is methodically setting out again along the old roads—Indochina, Tibet, the Himalayan borderlands. With fellow-travellers all over Southeast Asia warning that Chinese domination is inevitable, the influential Chinese minorities in several states are making their peace with the Peking régime, partly from pride that it has restored China to greatness but more as a hedge against the possibility that it may be the winner.

But non-Communist Asia has more than China's geographical ambitions to worry about. Indians are comparing Chinese material progress with their own and asking themselves whether their socialist democracy can stand up against, and win out over, totalitarian compulsion. Other Asian nations ask it too. The achievements of Chinese Communism in public works and production are advertised all through Asia, but the human costs are not comprehended, even since the forcible introduction of the communal system. This gives added ground for apprehension: political leaders realize what an appeal Communism can have for their own populations simply because when the known is disappointing enough any unknown becomes attractive.

Paradoxically, it is this fear which has accounted for the relative weakness of the American position in South and Southeast Asia.

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Red China is feared—but we are not. The fear may be pushed into the background by acute domestic difficulties or by the flare-up of some neighborhood feud, but it is never absent.

There is concern about the United States, too, of course, but on lesser and more confused counts. The things we do or fail to do, our national characteristics real or fancied, awaken popular resentments, doubts, sometimes even acceptance. People flock to our movies, wear our sports clothes, copy our slang—and criticize them; our zeal in the cold war worries some and is admired by others; the scope of our economic aid can never fulfill expectations but occasionally it awakens something like appreciation. Many national leaders weave an uncertain way among the conflicting ideas as to what America is "really" like, what she "really" wants; but all of them know in their minds and hearts, even if their words reveal it only in private conversation, that the existence and free development of their nations along lines of their own choosing are not menaced by any possible aggressive or subversive design against them by the United States. Their confidence that we will never use force against them frees them to act on their fear that if China is given a pretext she may; specifically, that she will retaliate if they coöperate too closely with us. The one factor has worked on the other to debilitate our influence. Our allies in SEATO are exceptions, and so are South Vietnam and perhaps one or two other small states; but most of the South and Southeast Asian countries, counting on our indulgence, have thought that the safe course was to proclaim neutrality but interpret it so as to give no shadow of excuse for interference by their watchful neighbor.

The disadvantage of being a grand almoner who does not awaken fear is hard to overcome. We cannot trade on the anxiety that we might end our disbursements; we may reduce or modify them, but everyone knows as well as we do ourselves that we cannot abandon our aid programs in the underdeveloped countries without leaving them a prey to the Communists, and that this we will not do. Coercion is out of the question. In the colonial era these peoples were conquered by force and held in dependence; Europeans developed their resources, but mainly for their own benefit. We feel no temptation to exploit them even if we could. Our avowed and actual aim at the present time is to secure that nations graduating from colonial status shall have enough time and a fair chance to develop the inner strength to become and remain truly and wholly independent.

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It would be a mistake to conclude that because our policies have not been completely successful they should be scrapped and opposites tried. "Gently does it." In the past year, Communist China has been showing her hand more and more clearly, and among all her non-Communist neighbors the climate of opinion has stiffened against her. The Tibetan massacre last spring came as the rudest sort of shock to peoples who had been assured that the *Panchsheel* principles of live and let live would be a real curb on Chinese expansion. But even earlier the contrast between Communist profession and practice had begun to cause confusion. Hungary had shocked many of the intelligentsia, especially in India; but Hungary was far away, and the doings of Soviet tanks in the streets of Budapest were not recorded photographically in Asia as they were in the West and were forgotten there even sooner. In talking last spring with one of the most conspicuously neutralist leaders in Southeast Asia, I mentioned the fate of Imre Nagy to indicate the uncertainties of political life in a Soviet satellite. He turned the conversation abruptly. "Why," he asked me, "are Nasser and Kassem speaking so harshly about each other? Aren't they both good nationalists?" I said that when nationalism tries to use Communism for its own purposes it gets tangled in contradictions, and in this case both of his "good nationalists" had discovered they were being used instead of using. His face darkened when I spoke of how leaders who rely for power on blaring radios, hysterical newspapers and street mobs may suddenly find the same instruments being turned against them by foreign agents supplied with plenty of money and backed by even more high-powered broadcasting stations.

Closer home had been Mao's exercise in free speech in 1957. Asian fellow-travellers were wondering how it was to be interpreted when suddenly it ended in the decapitation of the thousands of Chinese flowers that had sprung up in unorthodox colors. This was disconcerting, for they had hoped vaguely that as Chinese Marxism evolved it might leave some dignified role to be played by non-Party "progressives."

While Asian neutralists were still in a state of shock over the Chinese behavior in Tibet came the outbreak in Laos, aimed at installing a Communist régime there in the guise of the Pathet Lao. The project seems to have been nurtured in North Vietnam, probably with the aim of establishing a border enclave preliminary to taking over the whole country. Since Ho Chi Minh was

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visiting the Soviet Union and China at the time (he conferred with Premier Khrushchev on July 2 and stopped in Peking on his way home), the most trustful observers were hard put to it to suppose he had acted on his own.

Simultaneously with the forward movement in Laos, the abuse which China had been heaping on India for giving asylum to the Dalai Lama and several thousand Tibetan refugees was switched into something concrete and more menacing. Prime Minister Nehru had paid little attention, publicly at any rate, to maps printed in Peking which showed large parts of Indian territory as belonging to China. Now Chinese troops moved suddenly to make good the cartographic claim. Indian border patrols were attacked and the news leaked out that Indian territory had been occupied in the Ladakh area of Kashmir and in the Northeast Frontier Agency. Indian protests were first ignored, then roughly rejected. In the ensuing dialogue between Nehru and Premier Chou En-lai, in the debates in the Indian Parliament and in Peking radio announcements the word "aggression" was used by both sides. Though the desolate territories involved are unimportant in themselves, they offered Peking an opportunity to inflict a blow on Indian pride and prestige, perhaps also to remind Mr. Khrushchev that China is a power not to be ignored in discussions in Washington, Geneva, Paris or anywhere else.

The moment was propitious. The Congress Party was having an unpleasant time with the Kerala Communists, there were Communist-inspired riots in Calcutta and high Indian officers were suspicious of their civilian chief, Mr. Krishna Menon. It was not in the cards that these events would immediately resolve the contradictions in Indian foreign policy. India was in no position to force a showdown and at the moment had no alternative policy to Prime Minister Nehru's long-held conception that peace and security are divisible. Mr. Nehru's attraction toward neutrality as such was not, he asserted, lessened. Yet his repulsion from the forces that had brought its effectiveness into doubt and his leadership into question must surely have increased. Gradually, as the extent of China's pretensions became known, and as her soldiers began killing Indian border patrols to show she was in earnest, he found himself hard pressed to strengthen India's position and assert India's rights by expedients which no one would have dared so much as mention a year earlier.

Elsewhere in South and Southeast Asia governments that had

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put their trust in a super-scrupulous observance of neutrality allowed themselves now for the first time to speculate about its efficacy. Even supposing it did keep China from accusing them of taking sides in the cold war, was this in itself going to be enough to ensure their safety? Fear of China became more intense. Some officials reacted by trying to think what more they could do to placate her. Others felt the solution would be to "play neutrality straight." Others, again, began wondering where they could recruit new strength to combat what they saw as a plain threat to their future security.

The net of these various developments should not be interpreted as indicating that South and Southeast Asia are about to "turn to the West." An abyss of time and circumstance, of contrary custom and experience, separates them from our scientific and mechanical age. Intractable factors of climate and expanding population will handicap the best efforts to bridge it. So will the advance of scientific achievement in industrialized countries, one result of which is to reduce the share of the non-industrialized countries in world trade. Actually, despite the immense Western expenditures on economic aid in the backward areas, the disparity between their standard of living and ours is widening instead of narrowing. Most of them must postpone, perhaps for generations, their dream of approximating the envied plenty of the West, not just in consumer luxuries but in the necessities of decent living.

How will they behave when they realize they cannot move forward at better than a snail's pace? Will they show a rare degree of reasonableness and patience? Or will there be social upheavals and rash political experiments? Can they avoid saddling themselves with despotisms, domestic or foreign, from which there then will be no escape? Let us imagine the best. Let us suppose they resist demagogues and foreign agitators, avoid political chaos and harden their morale to the point of accepting bit-by-bit improvement instead of demanding the whole luscious life set before them in American movies. At that, we have to assume that their feelings for us in the West will at the very best be mixed, often tinged with jealousy, criticism and even outright hostility. Under the optimum conditions, the most we probably can hope to accomplish is to stretch out the margin of time in which, released from intolerable economic pressures or foreign threats, they can experiment with the mechanics of self-government and try to find a footing on the treacherous soil of independence.

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Here is where the choice of means comes in. In the category of economic aid the alternatives are not sharply defined. Opinions differ as to amounts, allocations and administrative methods as well as between those who favor the national or the international approach; but it seems accepted that substantial economic aid from the West, free from political strings and continued for a long period, is indispensable if the new Asian states are to have a chance of remaining independent. Our effort to increase their security against outside aggression carries more important political connotations. Broadly, the choice here is between offers of help outright and offers of help with what seems a catch to it. In no case, of course, are we excluded from the possibility of using force as required. We must have force at our disposal, and we must have it in forms and at places where we can use it effectively, either when we are appealed to for help and feel we must give it or when we are left with no other choice in protecting vital national interests. This is as true in South and Southeast Asia as in any other part of the globe. But the manner in which we propose to act may have—is having—serious consequences. The error, it seems to me, is in offering to give military help to the weak on a quid pro quo basis. Some accept it on those terms and for the time being become our allies, officially or tacitly. But the majority have so far rejected any formal alliance with the West, whether proposed unilaterally or collectively. As a result the region is divided; new suspicions inflame old national antagonisms; and thus although individual states may be heartened and strengthened, the region as a whole does not develop a sense of identity of over-all interest and a common will to help protect it.

Is it not possible for us to devise a policy which unites instead of divides and which at the same time does not arouse fears that it will heighten Red China's enmity or increase the risk that she may retaliate? The difficulties evidently are very great. But the present situation is unsatisfactory enough to suggest that we at least consider ways of bettering it.

II

It is hazardous to generalize about policy in a scene so vast. Here are the highest mountains in the world, rivers fifteen and twenty-five hundred miles long, rice paddies that produce a large part of what for half the world is the staff of life, desert wastelands, humid jungles, savage aborigines, soft and placid folk, orderly

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modern cities, rubber, oil and tin that the mechanized nations cannot well do without, competing religions, some of them fanatical, and inheritances from half a dozen colonial powers superimposed on a kaleidoscope of native cultural patterns.

If amid all this diversity we look for a common factor which directly concerns us, we find it in the method by which we have offered to help the Asian states defend their independence in the period while they are developing inner strengths of their own and learning more about the strangers who are their neighbors. American military policy not only affects the attitudes of the individual states toward us; in most cases it helps determine their attitudes toward each other.

The United States came to Southeast Asia as a political force as a result of its major role in liberating the islands and many other parts of the region from the Japanese conquest. The confusions and difficulties which followed need not be described here. In many places the Japanese had been welcomed, at first at any rate, as liberators from the old colonial rulers. Our favorable attitude toward the independence movements which were fighting against reversion to colonial status was considered most unfriendly by the Dutch, the French and to some degree the British. The resentment of the French became particularly marked when we took over unwanted burdens in Indochina following the long-drawn French agony and final failure there. It was at this point that we decided that only a collective effort could halt the southward flow of the Chinese glacier. The result was the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty signed at Manila on September 8, 1954.

SEATO, as the operating organization is called, was intended to strengthen, protect and unify the nations of a region of high strategic, economic and psychological importance. It has performed a part of its expected function, but at the expense of another part that was not considered vital at the start but has now become essential if the region is to develop homogeneity and strength as a whole. To SEATO's credit (though not to its credit alone), in the five years after the Manila Conference no overt hostile move was made against any of the states of the region. Communist China bombarded the offshore islands in the Formosa Strait and completed the conquest of Tibet, the fine language of *Panchsheel* notwithstanding. But in the area proper, the nearest approach to international aggression and war has come from North Vietnam's complicity in the Pathet Lao rebellion in Laos and the Chinese

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violation of India's Himalayan frontiers. Neither was a clear case of flagrant aggression, the only sort of aggression with which SEATO is equipped to deal. The existence of a regional defense system has doubtless contributed to keeping the peace in at least the formal sense, though probably it was the American commitment which made its role influential. On the other hand, SEATO's character as a mixed organization of Western powers and a minority of the Asian states has produced painful side-effects. Like the side-effects of antibiotics, they may dictate a change in treatment for the long pull.

It was not originally expected, of course, that SEATO would have to operate under the handicap of being a regional organization which only three of the states of the region joined while five did not. Observers have often deplored this basic weakness. It has become more and more plain as time passes. The three Asian members are the Philippines on the east, Thailand in the center, and far to the west, pushing the regional concept to an extreme, Pakistan. Four Asian states—India, Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia—refused from the first to have anything to do with the organization except scold it from afar. When Malaya gained independence in August 1957 it also announced that it would hold aloof, although retaining a close friendship with Britain. Participation by South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia was considered to be ruled out by the terms of the Geneva agreements of July 21, 1954, which put an end to the hostilities in Indochina.[1] In any realistic sense, then, SEATO's strength consists almost wholly of what is injected by the five outside powers, the United States, Britain, France, Australia and New Zealand.

The four Asian states which rejected membership in 1954 divided their criticism equally between their neighbors that joined and the Western nations that invited them in. Prime Minister Nehru spoke for the "outsiders" in asserting that SEATO smells of colonialism since it gives white nations a hand in Asian affairs; he also charged that by implication it is directed against all nonmember states, neutral as well as Communist. Secretary Dulles several times emphasized that SEATO was aimed against no government or people but exclusively against aggression as such. He pointed to the Pacific Charter signed in conjunction with the

[1] However, a special protocol adopted at Manila assured the three states protection like that which SEATO provided for member states, but without involving reciprocal obligations on their part. They also retained some claim on French assistance, though whether they would invoke it is questionable.

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Manila treaty as expressly committing the member states to the principles of equal rights and self-determination. And in fact, even if SEATO were what Nehru accused it of being, it still would not be a very effective instrument for achieving sinister purposes. It is not so closely organized as NATO, for instance, and lacks NATO's provisions for instantaneous action. In any serious sense, India and other non-members can hardly claim that SEATO as such is a menace to them but only that it strengthens its Asian members individually as compared to them.

It is an unfortunate fact about regional pacts that they must have edges. The disadvantage is offset if most of the states of the region belong, if they share the same ideas about the dangers confronting them and if they contribute substantially toward the common defense. The few states of Western Europe that decided not to join NATO may experience occasional disadvantages in having stuck to neutrality, since NATO planning can affect the whole Continent. But none of them feels menaced by NATO armaments or fears that a neighbor's membership will free it to commit aggression.

This is not the case in the vast area where SEATO attempts to operate. The non-member nations continue to feel, whatever reassurances we offer, that in some manner and to some extent it is aimed at them, or at least that membership in it may make a neighbor feel free to run risks in its relations with them that otherwise it would not dare assume. Certainly India and Afghanistan would have mistrusted Pakistan less in recent years if it had not belonged to an organization lined up on one side in the cold war and if it had not been receiving heavy armaments in such quantity. And similar reasoning contributed to increasing Cambodia's hostility toward her neighbor Thailand.

Indian, Afghan and Cambodian relations with the United States have suffered as well. India says (and may believe) that our arms policy forced her to divert resources from desperately needed economic development into military expenditures, thereby compelling her to turn to us or the Soviet Union for more financial and economic aid. She also claims that membership in SEATO has encouraged Pakistan to be intransigent in the Kashmir dispute; and she has matched Pakistan's intransigence with her own. India's orientation will influence the whole course of events in Asia; advantages which we buy in one place come high if they are paid for at the cost of some part of Indian friendship and trust.

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Afghanistan's reaction to our preferential treatment of Pakistan has gone further than India's. As in other neutral states, the Afghan leaders want to profit from their middle position to play us and the Communists off against each other and get maximum economic assistance from both. This is natural enough and we accept it. But it is disturbing when neutralist leaders assume that aid from one source is the same as aid from another—that equivalent debts in rubles or dollars, for instance, entail the same kind of obligations and the same political (and other) consequences. In that case they may accept loans and credits from a neighbor on terms that by simple arithmetic must in time give him a monopoly of their trade, a stranglehold on their economy. If that happens, their prized neutrality becomes meaningless and their personal bravery of no avail. Hitler showed in the Danubian states before the war how a trade monopoly can be used to blackmail and control a weak neighbor, and Khrushchev a year ago took similar means to change the government in Finland.

Our arguments against policies that seem to us decidedly risky would be more effective if our claim to be disinterested was more convincing. It is not convincing in many parts of Asia today. Twice on recent visits to Kabul I have been asked to explain what advantages the United States saw in "upsetting the military balance" in the area by giving Pakistan top-heavy military aid. Did we imagine she could stand up against a Soviet attack no matter how heavily we armed her, and if not, wasn't this proof that the arms were wanted in order to coerce the Afghan Government? This was always the roundabout answer to suggestions that Afghanistan might be taking a dangerous course in opening her doors so widely to her northern neighbor. Nearly half of her foreign trade is now tied to the Soviet bloc by her need to service her debt to the Soviets; and in addition she has accepted Soviet equipment for her army, has invited Soviet officers to reorganize it and is being provided with a jet air force of both fighters and bombers. This is her way of offsetting the military advantages which she thinks Pakistan has acquired by membership in SEATO. One wonders whether other means might not have been found to strengthen Pakistan's security without creating such a sense of insecurity in a neighboring state which has always been jealous of its independence and proud of its ability to defend it.

Far to the east, again, toward the other end of the southern rim of China, SEATO also seems to have aggravated old nationalist

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rivalries. The territorial and other disputes which create bad blood between Cambodia and both Thailand and South Vietnam reach back into a deep past when this region was the seat of successive empires which while they lasted imposed their rule on neighboring peoples and built temples and palaces that still rise from the jungle in splendid and astounding ruin. The present Cambodian leader, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, looks on Bangkok, the capital of Thailand (as on Saigon, the capital of South Vietnam), as a center of permanent conspiracy against his dynasty and his life. Thailand is a member of SEATO and Bangkok is SEATO's headquarters. Hence, without repudiating whatever protection the SEATO protocol is supposed to give his country, the Prince mistrusts SEATO thoroughly and certainly does not rely on it to save him from an attack by either of his stronger neighbors. He asks why, since we are a leading member of the pact, we cannot persuade Thailand from (as he believes) encouraging plots against his régime. And indeed, there have been at least two recent plots in which the participants fled or tried to flee to Bangkok. Because we are allied with Thailand, Prince Sihanouk is not convinced that our policy in Southeast Asia is impartial and he suspects the sincerity of our political advice. His mistrust is increased by the fact that we have especially close relations with his neighbor to the east, South Vietnam, also a traditional enemy and also, he is convinced, bent on destroying him.

The dangers which Prince Sihanouk sees in this nutcracker situation have made him consider accepting Red China's offer to reorganize and equip the Cambodian army, replacing the rather ineffective measures taken in that regard by a French military mission with considerable material help from the United States. The present Cambodian army is about 30,000, not well trained; the South Vietnam army is about 150,000, well trained by an American military mission. If Prince Sihanouk invited in the Chinese, he would, of course, be choosing the greater of two evils. But for him it is the less immediate one. He is anti-Communist, since he realizes that royal dynasties and the Buddhist faith cannot survive long with Communism. When he assured me of this, but added that "first dangers come first," I felt the conversation might have been taking place in Kabul, where the immediate threat seems to come from the south and the problem of Russia is something to be managed later. If he ever actually did agree to let the Communist Chinese organize his army (as Afghanistan is

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allowing the Soviets), he would, besides putting his own country in jeopardy, open back doors to Communist infiltration in South Vietnam, Thailand and Laos. Our effort to stimulate recovery and political consolidation throughout the area would collapse.

We must not forget that President Diem is governing South Vietnam under constant threats to its independence from the Communist forces on the country's northern frontier and from domestic Communist elements acting with them. His need for aid and our right to supply it are not in doubt. The only question is whether our aid has enabled less reputable elements in the régime to threaten Cambodia as a consequence of the strength we have given the South Vietnam army to deal with aggression from the north; and, as a corollary, whether we show sufficient energy in pressing President Diem to prevent this.

It is perfectly clear that even if SEATO did not exist there would be more than enough historic claims and counter-claims to keep the region from all at once presenting a picture of harmonious coöperation and solidarity. The point at issue, however, is whether the existing system of alliances may not have retarded the settlement of some local conflicts and stimulated new ones. Going further, we may speculate whether in the long run a more stable premise on which to base our policy would not be to try to make all of the states our friends without asking any of them to be our allies. In realistic terms, it is doubtful whether we need as military allies any of the states that joined us in SEATO. Any great war in which we became involved would be fought principally in other theatres than South and Southeast Asia and for purposes to which the nations there would probably make only peripheral contributions, given the lightning speed of nuclear operations. And in a local war what we would need, and what if they were attacked they would hasten to supply, would be freedom of movement and perhaps the coöperation of some guerrillas.

Since the Asian nations that joined us in SEATO did so mainly because they thought it added to their security, our problem is to find an occasion to replace that form of security with one which does not antagonize the others. What we should look for, it seems to me, is a relationship in which our help in time of need will not depend on our previous commitment to certain allies which promise in turn to give us aid, but will be given in response to a collective appeal by independent states which have not been asked to abandon their reliance on non-alignment, non-involvement,

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basic neutrality or however it is they choose to describe their position outside the immediate stresses of the cold war. The development of some such relationship would have been a completely vain hope yesterday, and it may still seem like one today; but it may not be out of the question tomorrow. China may force her neighbors against their will to consider defensive expedients which formerly they would have rejected out of hand. Our planning should take the new possibilities into account and our policies should aim to facilitate their realization. It would be a great step forward if our readiness to bring military assistance to the Asian states to deal with aggression could be freed from charges that it is self-serving, "colonialistic" and aimed at involving them in advance in the cold war.

The straightforward procedure, of course, would be for the states of South and Southeast Asia to band together eventually in a defensive pact wholly their own. Members of the United Nations could—and the United States certainly should—pledge to support this sort of an organization in the event it required and requested outside help in a crisis. A legal basis for the arrangement exists in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and the Uniting for Peace Resolution of November 3, 1950. It would not be legal considerations, however, which would trouble neutralist leaders. From the start they have gone on the theory that all pacts are by nature aggressive, the invention and tool of imperialistic powers, and it will be a wrench to adjust to any other concept. But Peking may spur them to take a fresh look. If so, they may see that since they do not either individually or collectively have the capacity to act "imperialistically" there could be nothing remotely aggressive or unfriendly toward any outside power in joining to resist foreign subversion and discourage foreign aggression. At present each neutralist state in Asia stands alone; and, in accordance with its own interpretation of duties under the U.N. Charter, each can count on receiving in an emergency exactly what it has promised to give other neutrals in like circumstances—polite condolences.

The principal factor in any coöperative project would, of course, be India, the largest of the neutral states, the one with the greatest prestige and most articulate leadership. Prime Minister Nehru has never given any sign that he feels at all responsible for the security or eventual fate of India's neighbors. India inherited from Britain special relationships with Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim; and recently Mr. Nehru reasserted them vigorously. But for South and

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Southeast Asia as a whole he has shown concern only in terms of the now defunct *Panchsheel* declaration. His choices seem now to be narrowing down to two. One is to stand by passively while the Communists set the stage for extending their power over one member after another of the Asian community; he might adopt this role in the belief that although India herself avoids any participation in positive actions, even in the United Nations, the Western nations will somehow or other be willing and able in the end to save the day at their own risk and cost. The other course is to move in positive terms to unite the whole region and put it in a position to receive help should ever it need and ask it. A necessary preliminary would be for India and Pakistan, the two strongest nations of the sub-continent, to compose their differences in the face of the common danger. General Ayub has shown a statesmanlike disposition to encourage this development.

A third alternative, for the Asian neutrals to join Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines in SEATO, seems to be ruled out in realistic terms as things stand at present. True, the Soviet review, *International Affairs,* noted sorrowfully in its October issue that certain "Burmese papers have made an about-face in their political orientation;" and one of Mr. Nehru's latest statements, that he is "rather allergic to military alliances," is milder than anything else on record. But although the neutralist leaders made their charges that SEATO was "colonialist" and potentially aggressive in days when freewheeling held more attractions than it does now, they have been conjuring up the bogey of new white domination for so long, and have so consistently depicted SEATO as a step in that direction, that to seek membership in it now would be most difficult. Unless Red China pushes things to a crisis, any broad movement in Asia for joint consultation on problems of defense will have to be initiated there and will be composed of Asian nations only.

The Asian nations neighboring Red China would find many advantages in an organization that was entirely in their own hands. They might expect that American military aid would be distributed in an equitable manner among the member states in accordance with their varying defensive needs; regional defense would be strengthened without equipping one nation to settle scores on its own account with another. The decision as to whether an appeal for outside help was necessary would be in the first instance their own. Individual members would not incur the charge that

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they were "tools of the Western imperialists." The pact could not be labelled "aggressive" because although it would be strong numerically and politically, in the United Nations and elsewhere, it would rely on force only indirectly. Certain states that have looked to the United States for support against an immediate danger could continue to do so, but not because they had signed military treaties which pledged them to coöperate in wider measures than those for their own self-defense. (The Philippines and the United States, for example, have long had a special relationship; both presumably would wish to continue it indefinitely.) Above all, Communist China would lose her greatest present advantage, the ability to nibble first here, then there—Indochina, Tibet, Laos, Ladakh—without arousing any effective reaction in the rest of Asia and perhaps without providing the incentive for Western intervention that would come from a clear Asian declaration of need and a united Asian appeal for help.

The ideas and reasoning that might lead in this direction are, for Asia, revolutionary. They will take time to mature—if, indeed, they ever do. Our political and strategic concepts should nevertheless begin to make room for such a development. And in a positive sense we should create opportunities to promote economic and cultural coöperation within the region as a stimulus to political coöperation.

In large measure the neutralist states of Asia have been enabled thus far to steer what seemed to them a safe course between the protagonists of the cold war because of the presumed readiness of the United States and other Western countries to support them in some moment of mortal danger. This fact many Asian statesmen deny, at least in public; but unpalatable though it may be, a fact it remains. How efficacious the support would actually be were it ever asked and given would not depend on any prior commitment of the endangered nations but on our own state of readiness—in mobile forces and the proper types of weapons and means of delivery, and also, it should not be forgotten, in political understanding and morale based on the knowledge that we were giving help to people who had been willing to organize to receive it. Our readiness to enter SEATO demonstrated that we would make great efforts and take great risks in order to see that peoples in Asia had time and opportunity to develop their new states to the full extent of their capacities on the basis of true independence. If now they showed themselves ready as independent entities to

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emphasize coöperative action among themselves, and if as a result our policy were free to take forms that would directly encourage them to come together instead of tending to keep them apart, a new check would be given to Red China's evident plan to pick off her victims in isolation, one by one.

III

Most visitors to Southeast Asia, competent to report on such things or not, return with strong ideas about American aid programs there—often critical and sometimes correct. Even "The Ugly American," strictly one-sided and therefore essentially unfair as much of it is, brings home in awful detail the fact that political appointees can sometimes make disastrous ambassadors (there happen to be none in our service in Southeast Asia at present) and that even a touring Senator can be hoodwinked. Actually, not much that is new can be added to the list of general criticisms of our aid programs and suggested cures. Everyone admits that they should be more "flexible," "prompt," "imaginative," "sensitive" and other attractive adjectives. It is the specifics that are lacking. In the nature of things, these must come mainly from inside the International Coöperation Administration itself, released by Congress from its bureaucratic strait jacket and enlightened by reports of the recent Draper Commission and parallel undertakings of the World Bank and other agencies.

The traveller hears some unorthodox suggestions for improving our programs and methods. Thus a leader in a certain small country where he has since become Prime Minister told me he could not understand the American obsession with speed—speed, as he called it, "regardless." "Our country needs roads," he said, "but in a primitive society it is also important to give the people a sense of participation in the work of national development and to spread wages and other benefits. You want to strengthen us socially and politically against Communism. Well, think less about labor saving and more about labor making." His country's case was not typical; in other countries I.C.A. employs local labor in quantity. And in any event the suggestion would not apply to industrial developments utilizing imported machinery and requiring technicians and trained workmen. But it may be healthy for us to hear that the American example of speed and efficiency is not necessarily our most precious gift to backward peoples.

Much has been said and written about the merits of long-range

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versus short-term aid projects. The former are called "fundamental" and are assumed to be the more proper American way of doing things; the latter are called "eye-catchers" or "impact projects" and are often considered superficial, undignified and unworthy of our lofty aims. When the Russians present a complete hospital or a steel mill or pave a street it is criticized as an "eye-catcher," a sort of bribe, and it is compared unfavorably to our presumably more beneficial undertakings. Many long-range projects are highly important and useful, or will be if the local economy develops as expected and if there is political stability; and they are justified as contributing toward those results. Nevertheless, the magnitude of a project may raise the question whether the country concerned can develop the capacity to run, use and support it, and the time span involved makes one wonder what the conditions in the area will be when it is completed and who will be the ultimate beneficiary.

A case in point is the scheme for irrigating the Helmand Valley, a vast desert area in southern Afghanistan, undertaken by an American engineering company at the Afghan Government's own urgent request and with U. S. Export-Import Bank assistance. The non-engineering problems were not sufficiently taken into account; in recent years the carrying costs have been eating up about a third of the Afghan Government's total annual income; and the project is still not completed. The expenditure of such staggeringly large sums on a single enterprise has multiplied Afghanistan's need for other foreign assistance, specifically for the loans that, as already noted, may result in mortgaging the country to Moscow. Now one such case history does not prove that we should not undertake projects to improve the economy of underdeveloped countries at the base. It does emphasize that although all projects contain unforeseen pitfalls, those that will take many years to complete and require very large and continuing contributions from the local government are particularly risky.

Hostile propagandists industriously spread rumors that all American assistance serves some ulterior purpose. Any new road to anywhere is imagined to have potential strategic importance and American infantrymen are at once visualized as marching along it to attack China; or it is planned with the intention of turning the country into an economic vassal of America by diverting its trade in a certain direction. At the least, our aid must aim to commit the country to a "reactionary" capitalistic system.

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We have no way of preventing propagation of these myths; but the more we meet local wishes, fulfill local hopes and give local populations a direct share in our undertakings, the less effective hostile propaganda will be. Here again, illogical as it may seem, we have the burden of proving our disinterestedness. There is not *necessarily* a conflict between what is good for somebody and what he wants. When what he wants is too large for him to digest, as has turned out to be the case with the Helmand project, we should be farsighted enough to refuse to give it. But it would seem possible for I.C.A. to discover a larger proportion of aid projects that qualify on both scores.

In a different class from projects great or small in individual countries are the mammoth enterprises undertaken internationally to develop a region of interest and potential profit to more than one state.

One such project in Asia has been thoroughly studied, heatedly discussed —and still hangs fire. Both Pakistan and India have a vital interest in the Indus River system but have been unable to agree on how to divide the waters. The World Bank, through Mr. Eugene Black, accepted as an impartial friend of both parties, has been working since 1954 for a plan by which India would reimburse Pakistan for the waters drawn from the main river's eastern tributaries, thereby enabling Pakistan to develop alternative sources of supply by building storage dams and link canals from the western rivers. Tedious haggling over the financial provisions has been complicated by claims and counter-claims growing out of the partition of what was once united British India and especially by the dispute over Kashmir (aggravated by Indian resentment at the American build-up of Pakistan's military strength). Construction, when it begins, will take some 15 years to complete and cost at least $700,000,000. About half this sum might be financed by the World Bank and the rest by its "second mortgage" subsidiary, the International Development Association, which is to make long-term loans, part in hard currencies, part in soft, at low interest rates. If agreement is reached at last, it will be striking confirmation of the essential role that disinterested international efforts can play in solving an otherwise baffling complex of political, financial and engineering problems. It would also augur the possibility that, prodded by Chinese hostility, India and Pakistan might settle their other disputes peacefully and close ranks. An Indian-Pakistani pact would, in turn, offer Afghanistan new

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security on her southern frontier and assuage the fears that have caused her to accept so much aid from the Soviet Union.

In Southeast Asia an enterprise of even greater magnitude aims to make the lower Mekong River a navigable international highway and provide power and water for industrial development and irrigation to the four riparian countries. The sources of the Mekong—one of the world's great rivers, longer than the Mississippi—are in the snowy recesses of Tibet. Leaving Yunnan, it flows through Laos, forms a frontier for 500 miles between Laos and Thailand, crosses Cambodia and finally debouches into the tropic South China Sea through a vast delta containing the principal rice districts of South Vietnam. Only south of the Chinese border can the immense potentials of the Mekong be exploited; but this stretch of the river is 1,600 miles in length and the four states through which it flows have a population of 40,000,000.

The economic transformation in view for these four states is prodigious, but it cannot begin to take shape for at least a decade or mature for much longer. At present the Special U.N. Fund under Mr. Paul Hoffman's direction is making surveys and drafting plans; when they are ready, the World Bank and I.D.A. are expected to supply funds to begin work. Though still in the planning stage the project is already having a salutary political effect, showing that even where national jealousies are endemic and very great obstacles to coöperation exist the technical approach may even so be effective. The preliminary surveys undertaken by the United Nations opened up such vistas of possible prosperity that in 1957 the four governments established a Committee for Coordination to coöperate with the U.N. teams of experts; and this Committee has been able to serve as a continuing liaison among the four capitals even when direct diplomatic relations have been strained to the utmost by border fighting and other troubles. Despite this really remarkable achievement, each government remains under intense political and social pressure to hasten economic improvement, and from time to time one or another is tempted to stage a diversion by protesting a neighbor's alleged outrageous activities (meanwhile, perhaps, itself indulging in similar goings-on). These alarms and discursions are the chief menace (next to Communist hostility, of course) to the program which holds the only hope of producing in the course of time the over-all betterment for which everyone clamors and of thus enabling the governments themselves to survive in their present form.

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The United States can contribute directly to the Mekong enterprise through the various I.C.A. missions and the U.N. Special Fund, as it is doing at present, and later on through the World Bank and I.D.A. It also can help indirectly. Our diplomatic representatives can be instructed to give notice in a quiet and matter-of-fact way that we are deadly serious when we say that the military and other assistance which we grant to friendly states must not be used by them—and must not release other funds and forces to be used by them—to provoke or menace their neighbors; and if border or other incidents occur, an abrupt even if temporary and entirely unpublicized cessation of the flow of American supplies can work wonders in liquidating them promptly and peacefully.

It may seem rather out of proportion to lay much stress at this point on the importance of stimulating cultural contacts among the peoples of South and Southeast Asia. Yet it is a fact that though they inhabit the same quarter of the globe they have much to learn about their common inheritance and that to make them conscious of it is one important way of bringing them closer together. With this in mind, we should not limit our cultural activities to arranging exhibitions of American art, tours of American musicians and dancers and demonstrations of American medical and educational techniques. Like the exchanges of educators and other leaders, these are all to the good. But we should go further and invent occasions for conferences, contests and exhibitions of various sorts which bring people together from both the countries that belong to SEATO and those that do not. Asians often say that the West stifled or at least perverted their native artistic and cultural development. We should demonstrate that we want specifically to encourage it; and it will be directly to our advantage if in so doing we increase understanding and a sense of kinship among the Asian peoples themselves by giving them new opportunities to learn how much in every sense they have in common.

IV

Democracy is a relative term everywhere, but as Mr. Dooley might have said, it is more relative in Asia. Let us not be too disturbed by this. In countries where perhaps nine-tenths of the people cannot read; where any experience they have had with self-government has usually been within the family, the village or the tribe; where villages live in isolation, separated by jungles, deserts, mountains or seas; where the average income of a family

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is something like $100 a year and that mostly in kind, not money; where the population grows by over two percent a year; where most countries have no trained civil service (one head of government mentioned this to me as the number one domestic problem in Southeast Asia, ranking with the external Chinese menace); where the social services of the state, itself new and inefficient, are rudimentary or nonexistent—in these conditions what we call democracy can develop only by slow stages. Even when the governing clique in the capital and the little knot of articulate intellectuals there are sincere in their admiration for representative government (and often they are) they must begin by creating rudimentary organs and build upwards cautiously, layer by layer.

In Southeast Asia what passes for democracy wears a different face in each country and the names given it by the leaders (who sometimes are dictators) differ too—"dynamic democracy," "guided democracy" and the rest. Each disguises very thinly the reality that an individual exercises the ultimate authority, whether through an appointive legislature or some other device. Yet on balance it still may represent progress for that particular community and leave the door open for progress in the future.

When a constitution is annulled or elected bodies are dismissed it usually is because they represented too advanced concepts for the social, economic and political structure of a society still in a formative stage. In our eyes the limitations imposed invalidate the régime's claim to be anything but autocratic; nevertheless it offers a pretense of being democratic and its structure may in fact be democratic in embryo. Even the pretense is hopeful, since it indicates in what direction popular aspirations, so far as they exist, are supposed to lie. The situation, and its promise, are not very different from that in a country which has never known anything about democracy and suddenly is asked to take a few first steps in that direction. In Nepal, a case in point, the first elections in history were held a year ago. The parliament elected is free to discuss and legislate; but any legislation it passes is subject to the unlimited veto of the King. We do not deride this as a mockery of democracy but praise King Mahendra's decision to create a framework within which his people can learn what elections are and the representatives they choose can learn the working of the legislative process.

If the man who takes over power from an elected government is an army officer this is not necessarily worse than if he were a

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civilian. Often the army is the only disciplined, educated and patriotic cadre. In at least one case, that of General Ne Win in Burma, the accession of a military man may perhaps have been the only way to save the structure of democratic government; no routine political leader had the capacity to exercise control and the General consented to be *deus ex machina* only if power were transferred to him by orderly and legal means.

The Western nations have learnt slowly and painfully how to make the democratic process work. It requires a higher degree of education and more tolerance, patience, sense of humor and experience than any other political system. Some Western nations have worked it so badly that after a succession of ineffectual governments it collapses in anarchy or is destroyed by a demagogue or zealot. Sometimes Western democracy has to be "reformed" under a strong leader, as in France. We need not expect tyros to do better. The fact that some Asian civilizations reach back into the deep past, before many European countries were organized and long before the discovery of the Americas, does not wipe out the handicap of having in most cases lived through the centuries as colonies. And even before the arrival of the Europeans the outstanding South Asian empires, magnificent in the arts and adept in despotic rule, had long since declined into lassitude, their capital cities in ruins on dry plains or engulfed in jungle. The reawakening peoples of these lands were impatient for independence, and now that they have it they are impatient for the material benefits they expected to accompany it as a matter of course. Their disappointment often turns them against the system of government which their leaders carried over too optimistically from the previous European régimes. When this happens, let us make lenient comparisons between what seems to us their sham democracy and the democratic ideal which we wish we ourselves could always live up to. The alien and sedition laws which our young government adopted in 1798 should remind us to what desperate expedients new countries resort in the effort to maintain order.

If we accept that there must be different definitions of democracy for nations in different stages of development we probably must also make allowance for their differing from us in their degrees of willingness to undertake international responsibilities. The West has been trying to apply to the problem of preventing war the experience it has gained from living for generations in self-governing societies with constitutional guarantees, courts of

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law, police forces and other essentials of a legally organized state. South and Southeast Asia have in general lacked that experience. Although national leaders there desired independence passionately and now aim above everything else to safeguard it, they do not share our views as to how that must be done. As emphasized here more than once, they have believed that the best way to maintain their national identity and independence is to avoid international responsibilities. The United States did that also, not only when it was new and weak but long after it had become mature and comparatively strong. Indeed, we were neutral from 1793, when our young republic first encountered the complex international problems created by the French Revolution and decided to avoid them by all means possible, until 124 years later when Woodrow Wilson's effort to keep us out of the First World War failed; and even then there was a brief return to faith in neutrality from 1919 when we rejected membership in the League of Nations until towards the end of Franklin D. Roosevelt's second term.

Like us, the new Asian states consider that civilization has made a real advance in climbing from a system in which strong nations dominate the weak to one avowedly based on the ideal of coöperation among nations wholly independent. On that basis they hastened to join the United Nations, founded on the equality of nations in essential rights. But although they signed the Charter they do not interpret it as obligating them to join in collective action to defeat aggression or indeed for many less drastic purposes. This attitude has contributed to the gradual transformation, some would say emasculation, of one set of U.N. functions.

Yet the nations which hold to neutrality as against accepting international responsibility comprise an immense segment of the world's population and control a weighty number of votes in the United Nations. This is a situation of fact and we must make the best we can of it. The world as a whole is not yet ready to deal with international crises by enforcing law, in the way that nations with traditions of law and with long experience in law enforcement considered and consider necessary. I have argued here that we shall do well as a practical matter to cultivate the underdeveloped nations as friendly neutrals rather than seek to enlist them as allies. There seems to be no practical objection to this on wider international grounds, given the attitude which most of these states have taken toward sharing the risks involved in creating an effective world organization.

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THE DECLINE AND RISE OF SOVIET ECONOMIC SCIENCE

By Wassily Leontief

ONE of the notable aspects of Soviet reality is the paradoxical coexistence of the old and the new, of the modern side by side with the old-fashioned. A visitor to Moscow cannot but be struck by the contrast between the 40-story skyscraper of the Hotel Ukraina and the pre-revolutionary log cabin with intricately carved window frames nestling practically within its long shadow. Contemporary Russian literature and art present a striking example of revolutionary, socialist content poured into Victorian forms. One of the most notable paradoxes of this kind was—until recently—the contrast between the Soviet economy and Soviet economics.

The Soviet economy, directed with determined ruthless skill, has been advancing for years at such a fast and steady pace that in total—if not per capita—national income, Russia is now second only to the United States; the output of certain of its key industries, such as machine tool building, for example, has even exceeded that of ours. By contrast, Soviet economics, that is, Soviet economic science, has remained static and essentially sterile over a period of more than 30 years—a huge, impassive and immovable monument to Marx—with scores of caretakers engaged in its upkeep, fresh flowers placed in slightly different arrangements at its feet from time to time, and lines of dutiful visitors guided past in never-ending streams.

The decline of economics in Soviet Russia dates back to the late 1920s, to the time of the inauguration of the original Five Year Plan. The first decade of the Communist régime—the years of civil war and famine and then of economic rehabilitation and "primitive accumulation" assisted by the partial restoration of private enterprise—was marked by lively economic discussion. It ranged from immediate issues of economic policy to the most general problems of economic theory. This was the time when the Communist, Basarov, expounded his mathematical theory of economic growth and Professor Kondratieff, director of the Moscow Business Cycle Institute, developed the statistical analysis of long and short waves of economic growth which has exerted considerable influence on Western theory of business cycles. (A

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few years later both of these men vanished without a trace.)

Looking back it is not difficult to explain the decline of economic science in the first planned socialist economy. Marx was a prophet of socialism, but he was a student of capitalism; to be more exact, he was a student of the first hundred years—vital and incredibly creative, but also ruthless and destructive—of modern, mechanized large-scale industry. Marxism, as an economic theory, is a theory of rampant private enterprise, not of the centrally guided economy. Whatever references Marx made to the economy of the socialist order were brief, quite general and extremely vague. Some of his most poisonous verbal darts were reserved for Lassalle, Proudhon and other contemporary social reformers who took delight in minute descriptions of production, distribution and consumption in ideal socialist or anarchist communes. He considered these men naïve and impractical and dubbed them "Utopists."

The Soviet economists of the Stalin era were no "Utopists" in any possible sense of that word; for sound practical reasons they devoted their undivided attention to paraphrasing and interpreting Marx and Lenin. The fact that capitalism—the subject of all these labors—had been by this time abolished in Russia in a sense simplified their assigned job. Meanwhile, the Communist leaders were engaged in the unprecedented task of transforming literally at breakneck speed a technologically backward, predominantly peasant country into an industrialized military power dedicated to the pursuit of further economic growth. They were their own economists.

The fundamental proposition which explains the high rate of Soviet economic development is simple enough. Nearly 200 years ago it had already been clearly stated by Adam Smith and in more homely language by Ben Franklin. To expand one's income fast, one must channel as large a part of it as possible—and then more—into productive capital investment. This means that consumption must be restricted; while thus holding down the living standard of the masses, one must at the same time keep them working hard. Marx, in his theory of capitalist accumulation, describes exactly such a process, except that he refers to it in pejorative terms: the owners of the means of production use their monopolistic position vis-à-vis the working classes to keep wage rates down and profits up. Low wages mean a low level of consumption. High profits—the high "rate of exploitation"—mean a high rate

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of accumulation, since the capitalists forever strive to increase their capital so as to be able to compete better with each other and also to employ more workers to exploit. This prescription was followed by Communists in Russia steadily over a period of 30 years. However, the unmistakable success of that ruthless experiment bears testimony not so much to the economic sophistication of the Soviet rulers as to their political perspicacity and determination.

So far as the Russian technique of economic planning is concerned, one can apply to it in paraphrase what was said about a talking horse: the remarkable thing about it is not what it says, but that it speaks at all. Western economists have often tried to discover "the principle" of the Soviet technique of planning. They never succeeded, since, up to now, there has been no such thing. The "Method of Balances," to which the Soviet writers themselves invariably refer, hardly deserves its high-sounding name. It simply requires that the over-all national economic plan be constructed in such a way that the total output of each kind of goods be equal to the quantity which all its users are supposed to receive. The method does not, however, say what information and what computational procedure can be used to achieve the simultaneous balancing of many thousands of different goods and services covered by a comprehensive blueprint of a national economy.

The immense scope of the problem becomes clear if one considers the fact that each item requires for its production several other items directly, and many more—as a matter of fact, all others—indirectly. Thus whenever the planner attempts to balance the supply and demand of any one particular item, by expanding its output or by reducing its consumption, he is bound to disturb the balance of many, and ultimately of all other, goods and services. Moreover, an efficient planner must compute more than a single over-all balance. Land can be tilled with horses or with tractors; electric energy can be generated by burning coal, oil or natural gas as well as by harnessing water power. All such alternatives can be used in innumerable combinations and each combination will require a different kind of over-all economic balance. However, some of these will serve the national objectives—whatever they may be—more effectively than others.

Soviet planning procedures, in practice, do not—or at least did not up to now—differ very much from those that were used dur-

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ing the war by our War Production Board, by the English Supply Ministries, and by their counterpart in Germany. The larger decisions are first made by balancing the requirements for selected high-priority objectives with the available amounts of the strategic resources, that is, the most important scarce ones. Next, the details of the plan are worked out through application of standard ratios based on past experience. Final adjustments are left to informal trial-and-error procedures of the actual month-by-month and week-by-week operations.

Soviet press reports over the years abound in examples of obvious miscalculations. For instance, too much ore is mined and not enough coke is made to produce the planned amount of steel; or insufficient quantities of spare parts are turned out to keep in good repair machinery installed in new plants. More difficult to detect, because it does not show up in a glaring imbalance between the supply and the demand of some specific item, but probably not less deleterious in its effect on the over-all efficiency of the system, is the failure to make correct choices among several possible alternatives. The failure to substitute gas for coal on the supply side of the national fuel balance, or too hurried a substitution, might mean an even larger potential loss of national income than that which is brought about by the more obvious kinds of miscalculations mentioned above.

To solve all these problems in a systematic way, the planning technician must be able to compute not only one balanced plan, but many, and then he must be able to compare the efficiency of all these alternative plans in attaining whatever the specific, over-all objective of the national economic policy might be. This is an assignment easy enough to envisage, but most difficult to accomplish; it is, moreover, a highly technical task which even a very shrewd politician and powerful dictator cannot perform by himself, any more than he can, by himself, build an atomic bomb or send a rocket to the moon. He can, however, decide that the solution of this problem is worth the cost involved in solving it; he can set the experts to work on it and give them all possible support. This is what actually happened in Russia two or three years ago in respect to the important problems of economic planning discussed above. The top leadership, with Khrushchev probably taking a hand in it, apparently decided that with the rapid increase in the size and complexity of the Soviet economy, rule-of-thumb planning procedures would do no longer and must be

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replaced as soon as possible by more efficient, scientific methods.

The high price the Russian rulers have shown themselves willing to pay is, in this instance, not so much material as, one might say, moral: as in the case of atomic power, the scientific basis of the new techniques is being borrowed wholesale from the West—to be more specific, from the United States. This time it is "bourgeois economics" rather than physics that is about to be used to serve Soviet aims. For Communists and Marxists to concede the superiority of Western science in this particular field must be especially painful from both the ideological and the propaganda points of view; but just because of this, the significance of the move must be considered to be particularly great. To avoid any possible misunderstanding, let it be emphasized that what the Soviets are about to adopt is Western economic science, not Western economic institutions. There is good reason to believe that this can actually be done. Those Western observers who say that this cannot be done and who believe that the use of interest on capital in planning calculations presages at least a partial restoration of the system of private enterprise misunderstand, I think, the internal logic of Soviet evolution.

II

The early mid-nineteenth century successors of Adam Smith—and Marx was one of them—were concerned mainly with problems of economic growth, that is, of increasing wealth and income and of the distribution of that increasing income among labor, capital and the landowning groups. Later, the focal point of theoretical inquiry shifted to problems of economic efficiency and has remained centered on these problems ever since. It is true that the catastrophe of the Great Depression dramatically raised the question of full employment, and the recurring smaller ups and downs in business conditions continue to keep it on the map. However, looking back at the Keynesian Revolution, with its paradoxical advocacy of spending for spending's sake and the implied fear of a rapid rise in the productivity of labor, one must recognize it for what it was: a long detour rather than a basic change in the general orientation of Western economics. The question of efficiency and of rational allocation of scarce resources dominates the field of advanced scientific inquiry again. It was restored to that central position, however, with a new and different emphasis.

The traditional approach to these problems was broad, abstract

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and purely deductive; the new post-Keynesian, postwar inquiry is concise, specific, factual and eminently practical. The so-called "neoclassical" school, which carried on the classical theoretical tradition between the two world wars, mainly expounded and elaborated the liberal free-trade theme of the "invisible hand." It demonstrated in great detail, occasionally even making use of mathematical language, the automatic efficiency of competitive pricing. It classified and reclassified various theoretically possible situations, particularly those in which free competition breaks down or in any case does not bring about the most efficient allocation of economic resources. The "neoclassical" economists made it very clear that efficiency is a relative concept, that an allocation most efficient for the achievement of one economic end might be quite inefficient from the point of view of another. Incidentally, they have also shown that in a free competitive economy the over-all economic goal is determined by a kind of universal suffrage in which everyone has a multiple vote proportional to his dollar income.

The postwar generation of American economists takes up where the neoclassical analysts left off. Discussion of general principles is extended into the solution of specific problems, hypothetical assumptions are replaced by actual observation and purely symbolic mathematics are carried down to numerical computations. The entire national economy is viewed by the modern theorist as a gigantic, automatic computing machine, the price system being interpreted as an ingenious computing aid. To test and to extend his understanding of the operation of this machine, the economist now often identifies the specific problem it is supposed to solve, determines through detailed, direct observation the basic numerical data which are supposed to go into the solution, performs the necessary computation and then compares the final answer obtained from it with the answer to the same question arrived at in real life by operation of the impersonal forces of free competition.

To give a simple example: coal is produced in several parts of the United States, the cost of production and the maximum possible annual output varying from place to place mainly because of differing geological conditions. It moves then by either rail, water or truck to consuming areas. The actual total output can be allocated in many different ways among the producing regions and the proper amounts can be carried to the consuming regions

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by many means along various routes. However, some of the possible arrangements must obviously be more economical than others in terms of total combined production and transportation costs. Traditional economic theory explains why—under certain simplifying assumptions—the free competitive pricing mechanism can be expected in this case, as in many others, to bring about the establishment of the cheapest possible production and transportation pattern. The modern analyst goes further. He collects detailed information on the actual cost of production in all the different coal mining regions and on the actual rail, water and truck rates from these regions to places of consumption; and then he determines by himself—using, if necessary, a modern high speed computer—the most efficient, *i.e.* the cheapest, of all the possible alternative production and transportation patterns.

The computational procedure the economist uses might be designed in imitation of the process of trial-and-error approximation that is supposed to operate in a free-exchange economy. Or he might decide to use one of the advanced textbook methods of numerical analysis. A comparison of this answer with the observed production and the transportation pattern of coal might show that the economist has, indeed, reached a satisfactory scientific explanation of the actual process. On the other hand, he might turn up a discrepancy which will indicate the direction of necessary improvement in the theoretical formulation of the problem, the computational routine or the nature of the factual data used. Since these elements are mutually interdependent, the modification in any one of them will usually require a corresponding adjustment in the other two. On the second or the third try, the result usually turns out to be more satisfactory. If nothing helps, the very assumption that costs are minimized in the economy might itself be questioned.

Such relatively simple questions as that of minimizing the combined production and transportation costs are ordinarily formulated as so-called linear programming problems and are solved through application of a computational procedure known as the Simplex method. Conceptually akin to linear programming is the so-called input-output analysis which, for example, has been effectively used in quantitative empirical analysis of the balance or the imbalance, as the case may be, between several hundreds of individual sectors of the United States economy. The application of this method requires a comprehensive statistical mapping of

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the structural relationship determining the flows of goods and services between all the sectors and a solution of large systems of mathematical equations based on the hundreds or thousands of figures contained in a typical input-output table. The Russians expect this method to be particularly helpful in the solution of their larger planning problems.

Under such names as "operations research," "logistics analysis" or "management science," the new techniques are now being successfully used by most large American corporations in the solution of production scheduling, inventory control, investment planning and many other of their internal problems which hitherto were met by routine application of conventional and mostly rather wasteful rules of thumb. But certain business circles in the United States have viewed with unconcealed alarm the application of these methods to the traditional problems of the economic system as a whole—the very purpose for which some of the more powerful of the new analytical devices were designed in the first place. No doubt this attitude reflects the fear that too close and too detailed an understanding of the structure of the economic machine and of its operation might encourage undesirable attempts to regulate its course.

III

The first cursory references in Russia to new developments in the West appeared some years ago in the typical polemical forays against "bourgeois economics" published from time to time in *Economic Problems* and similar Soviet journals. Gradually the polemical part of these surveys became less virulent and shorter while the factual description of the new methods became more systematic and longer. Oskar Lange, former Professor at the University of Chicago and now a prominent public figure and the leading economist in Poland, has apparently been instrumental in arousing a positive interest in linear programming and input-output economics among his high-placed Russian colleagues. The last edition of the "Textbook of Political Economy" published late in 1958 mentions a bourgeois science called Econometrics, some methods of which—it is significantly stated—might prove to be of interest to socialist economists and planners. Early in 1959 the "Studies on the Structure of the American Economy," a rather technical volume published six years ago in the United States by the author of this article and several collaborators,

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appeared in a Russian translation (which incidentally was edited by Professor A. A. Konus, the last surviving mathematical economist of the pre-revolutionary generation). Another straw in the wind was a popular pamphlet on problems of economic planning written by a prominent member of the research staff of the *Gosplan*—the central planning commission—and printed in several hundred thousand copies. It describes in great detail the use of the mathematical input-output method for balancing planned production and requirements. At the last two meetings of the International Statistical Institute, the official Soviet delegation made input-output analysis the subject of its principal scientific papers. Its leader used this opportunity to declare this to be a topic singularly well-suited for scientific exchange between East and West.

As soon as the baby was adopted, the question of its intellectual parentage was investigated with great diligence and it was found to be, after all, of respectable Soviet Russian ancestry. A search through old economic journals revealed that in 1925 a short article on the then newly compiled balance of the Russian national economy was published in one of these periodicals over my signature. (Actually, I wrote this paper when still a student at the University of Berlin; it was first published in Germany and then translated and published in Russia.) Another Soviet priority claim seems to be more substantial. In 1939 a young Leningrad mathematician, L. V. Kantorovich, published two papers in which he presented a general mathematical formulation of certain problems of production planning and transportation scheduling, which in fact did anticipate the conceptual framework of the linear programming theory developed a few years later by Koopmans and Dantzig in the United States. Kantorovich did not, however, devise an efficient computational solution of these problems; Dantzig did, thus opening the door to the practical, large-scale application of the linear programming approach. In any case, Kantorovich's original contribution found no response and recognition till the time when information about new developments in the West reached Moscow and the top decision was made to put them into the service of socialist planning. Professor Kantorovich is now a member of the Academy of Sciences and, according to recent newspaper reports, he even can allow himself, at its public sessions, to make disparaging remarks about "the meaningless discourse" of stalwart Marxist theorists.

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Once the crucial decision was made, scientific resources were rapidly mobilized to conquer the field. The details of what actually goes on are shrouded by a veil of secrecy, but it is known that many American articles and books on the subject have been translated into Russian and circulated "privately" among the specialists assigned the task of mastering the new methods. For example, though the Russian edition of "Studies on the Structure of the American Economy" was published in 1959, the translation of that book was actually completed and widely circulated as early as 1955 or 1956.

Among the scores of young economists and mathematicians whom I had an opportunity to meet during a brief visit to Moscow and Leningrad early in 1959, many showed through questions they asked and remarks they made that they had a good acquaintance, both theoretical and practical, with input-output research. Some of these belonged to the selected group of "aspirants" (corresponding to our young post-doctoral scholars) who at the time were completing a course of intensive training in methods of modern quantitative economics under the personal direction of Academicians Kantorovich and Nemchinov. (The latter, an economist and statistician, headed until recently the Section of Social and Philosophical Sciences of the Academy of Sciences and was also a member of the Academy's all-powerful Executive Board; a few months ago he was appointed Chairman of the Academy's Commission on the Study of the Productive Resources of the U.S.S.R.) This fall, they are being transferred from Moscow and Leningrad to the new Science City in Novosibirsk, the seat of the rapidly expanding Siberian branch of the Academy of Sciences. Equipped with large-scale computational facilities, this will apparently become the new center of advanced economic research.

It was interesting to note that young men with mathematical or engineering backgrounds and some of the older practical planners and economic administrators took easily to the new discipline, while those who as students had concentrated on regular economic courses were still prone to be beset by doubts. The use —in so-called dynamic allocation theory—of a positive rate of interest on invested capital, for instance, is accepted by the former as a logical necessity, while the latter ask questions which indicate considerable resistance to such un-Marxist thought. As a result of this, the manipulative aspects of the new methodology

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seem at the present time more advanced in the Soviet Union than the understanding and the exploration of its deeper fundamental levels. This aspect of the problem, however, is also being taken care of: mathematics has been made an obligatory subject in the economics departments of the Universities of Moscow and Leningrad and, in both, new chairs of Econometrics were recently established—but not yet filled, apparently because of lack of suitable candidates.

The massive support which the Soviet Government has given to the development of the natural sciences is widely known. The fact that it is now prepared to discard some of the central themes of traditional Communist lore in order to gain command of the promising new intellectual tools of modern social science indicates that it expects to receive an equally high return from their use.

It will take some time before the Soviet planners will be able to apply in practice the new techniques their economists are now acquiring in theory. Not only must the vast training program, launched only a few years ago, be advanced much further, but the activities of the huge and clumsy Central Statistical Office will have to be reorganized from top to bottom. The new methods of economic analysis can make effective use of a much larger volume of much more detailed statistical and other factual information than was considered practicable heretofore. But first the information must be made available. Lenin's slogan, "Socialism is electrification plus statistics," will once again be often quoted in the Soviet press.

There can be little doubt that in the years to come the introduction of scientific planning techniques will increase the over-all productivity of the Soviet economy, just as the adoption of new methods of scientific management by our own large corporations has raised the efficiency of their internal operations. A centrally planned economy depends on the efficiency—or the inefficiency—of managerial decision to a much greater extent than does the free-market economy, which benefits from the economizing functions of competitive pricing. So, the advantage that the Russians will derive from any improvement in such decision-making procedures is bound to be particularly great. Whether the increased productivity will be used to accelerate still further the high rate of their economic growth, to step up military preparations or, as the free world should hope, to raise their standard of living, one cannot predict.

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IV

In the present world-wide contest between the United States and the Soviet Union for the friendship of underdeveloped countries, the reorientation of Soviet economics will probably have an even more immediate effect. For better or worse, these have-not countries are not content to allow their fervently desired economic growth to take care of itself. They regulate their exports and imports, they encourage new industries, their governments finance and build not only dams and roads, but also steel, chemical and other kinds of plants. In short, most undeveloped countries plan; they also ask for help. Financial support and engineering advice they get both from the Russians and from us. But so far as help on methods of economic planning is concerned, neither side has thus far been able to offer them much. Our advice is long on general wisdom, but short on teachable and learnable techniques. It is the latter, however, that they want; wisdom is not easily transmitted and furthermore no self-respecting politician has even been known to admit the lack of it. The Russians could have been expected to teach how to plan, but for reasons explained above they were able only to refer to the "method of balances," which raises an important question but does not answer it. Until now, as technical advisors on development economics, the Russians have not done any better than we have.

Having adopted modern analytical and programming techniques for large-scale domestic application, the Russians are bound to offer them for export too, and the demand is great. Since the new approach to economics originated in the United States, one would think that in this line of intellectual competition we could hold our own. But as things stand now, this is not the case.

The scientific treatment of management and business problems is expanding rapidly in the United States. But, for reasons noted before, large-scale basic research aimed at the application of these newer methods to the analysis of the structure and the operation of the economic system as a whole has slowed down in recent years. As a matter of fact, in its crucial empirical phase, this fundamental work has now come to a complete standstill because of lack of financial and organizational support. Over 20 countries—not counting the Soviet Union and its satellites—are ahead of us in this field.

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TOWARD A SETTLEMENT IN ALGERIA

By Charles F. Gallagher

ALTHOUGH nothing can be completely certain in a problem so complex and emotion-bound as that of the Algerian revolution, it is now at least clear that the statement of President de Gaulle on September 16 and the events subsequent to it represented a major turning point in that struggle. The policy enunciated in the presidential declaration made mention for the first time, with reservations, of the possibility of self-determination, by which all Algerians would freely choose between the three alternatives of integration with France, some kind of association, or independence. The formal answer of the rebel government, which calls itself the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, accepted the offer on September 28, with conditions, and expressed willingness to negotiate on political issues without insisting upon the precondition of French agreement to Algeria's right to independence. A short time later approval of the French Government's policy in the National Assembly by a massive majority consecrated the first concrete move toward a settlement in Algeria in the five years since the revolution began. There is a very important meaning to this ensemble of undertakings which has not escaped any of the protagonists, from the toughest military chieftains among the rebels to the farthest-right *ultras* among the Europeans in Algeria and their supporters in metropolitan France.

It is that self-determination, with the option of secession, implies recognition that sovereignty in Algeria belongs to the people of Algeria and no longer derives from the French constitution or from the sloganized concept of an *Algérie française* within an indivisible republic. The revolution has won on this essential and supreme point: the right to withdraw from the French Republic in honorable conditions. This right had previously been denied Algeria while it was extended at the time of the September 1958 referendum to all other French overseas possessions; and historians may well conclude in retrospect that from the moment the Fifth Republic was established as a federal republic the seed for settlement in Algeria had been planted.

In order to understand the importance of this emotionally, how-

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ever, one need only recall the American Civil War and imagine the reaction if the North, in 1864, had agreed to the holding of a plebiscite in the Confederate States offering similar choices. If the unity of the republic was so cherished a concept in France as to cause considerable preoccupation over the legality of establishing the French Community in its present form, the unity of France and Algeria in recent years has taken on the quality of a sacred myth. The approval of the Assembly, expressed in part hesitantly and with ill grace, but withal by a heavy majority, thus acquires all the more meaning. The assent of the legislators was a prerequisite to asking the approval of the French electorate, by direct vote, in the event Algeria chooses independence—a possibility much more likely now than it was two months ago. A few speakers in the Assembly brought up the question of the constitutionality of the offer, and many more voices are bound to be raised against it between now and the time when it might take effect, but none of them can invalidate in the eyes of world opinion, or of the French and Algerian people themselves, this concept which, whatever happens, is from now on the integral element of the Franco-Algerian problem.

Recognition of the sovereign responsibility of the Algerians for their own future completes the de facto emergence of the idea of an Algerian nation, although serious difficulties subsist between both parties in technical details. The crucial point, in practical terms, is whether the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (G.P.R.A.) holds this sovereignty in trust. For the French it clearly does not, and the recognition of the principle of self-determination by General de Gaulle was accompanied by a categorical refusal to accord such a position to the rebel government. The answer of Ferhat Abbas, President of the G.P.R.A., carefully defined the nationalist position in these terms: "The Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, recognized today by many countries, is the depositary and guarantor of the interests of the Algerian people until they have expressed themselves freely. It directs and controls the resistance of the Algerian people and the freedom struggle of the army of national liberation."

The Algerians consider that their identity as a nation has been established in a number of ways: in history, previous to the colonial period; through the efforts of the people as a whole and the blood they have shed; by the military energy of the Algerian

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guerrilla army and the political energy of the National Liberation Front (F.L.N.); and not least by the proclamation of a government in September 1958, which has been recognized by 17 countries, several of them Asian members of the Communist bloc, but including all the Arab nations but one. The French point of view —that the taking up of arms by a group of malcontents does not enable them to constitute themselves a sovereign political entity —has much strength in law but it contains certain weaknesses. One is that questions of such transcendent importance as the birth of nations are decided in the end not by legalisms but by the dynamics of force and the "divine right" of rebellion *in extremis*. Another is that the recent history of France is an embarrassment to the French on at least two scores. The Free French movement was itself a rebel organization which overthrew the legally constituted power in France and considered itself toward the end of World War II in exactly the same position as the G.P.R.A. now does—as safeguarding the inalienable rights of the people it claimed to represent. Second, the irregular circumstances leading to the creation of the Fifth Republic, although now glossed over with a remarkable aplomb, remain a tarnishing birthmark whenever the finger of incorruptible legality is pointed, as it so often is, by those very men who scorned it on May 13, 1958.

It remains true, however, that the problem has been much narrowed down now that self-determination is accepted by both sides, however differently each may interpret it. It is no longer a question of whether there will be talks, but what kind of talks, on what level, when, and with whom in what capacity. And these are, considering how hopeless the Algerian question seemed a short while ago, relatively unimportant details in a broader picture of hope. They will gradually be worked out; the problem is slowly and surely on the way to being solved.

The vast changes which we see beginning to take place as the result of this turning-point will have deep repercussions in Algeria and in France, as well as in all North Africa and the Arab world, and even in the long run for the outcome of the independence movements everywhere in Africa. Some of the effects are already visible, as in the drying up of private funds for investment in Algeria under the terms of the Constantine Plan; others may be inferred from the direction of events within Algeria. It would probably be more fruitful to examine, with the reasonably sound historical and sociological data we have, some of these longer

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range implications, rather than to speculate vainly upon the unpredictable political manœuvres of the coming months.

II

Let us look first at Algeria itself. Regardless of the way in which it comes into being, Algeria will have a structure whose general outlines can be determined by reference to the previous social history of North Africa and to the more recent impact of the revolution. Algeria has been at most times in the past a region without a well-defined existence. It lay sandwiched in between the two principal foci of Islamic culture in North Africa, Fez and Tunis, not only spiritually but geographically as well, for the long, lateral mountain ranges which run through it tend to make it a corridor between these two centers. Its lack of ethnic cohesion was marked by a large, indigenous Berber element, principally in the mountains of the center and southeast, which has been refractory to much of Arab civilization, although not to Islam.

The makers of the revolution have been conscious of the past. Great pains are taken by the rebel government in the field of propaganda to insist that Algeria existed as a state before the French conquest in 1830. While there is incontestable legal proof of this in treaties signed between the city-state of Algiers and the European powers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, there was in fact a vast area of tribal independence and anarchy in the hinterland, behind coastal ports which themselves were under the nominal stewardship of the Ottoman Empire. It is of course this part of the pre-colonial period which the French emphasize when claiming that modern Algeria is their creation. The quarrel has lost much of its point, though, for while Algeria may not have existed in the sense of a modern state before 1830 it does now, and the revolution which has created Algeria is beating a dead horse.

Nevertheless it is permissible to assume that the Algerians' preoccupation with sanctifying their past will continue in the future, and this will probably mean a denigration of everything accomplished under French rule in favor of a glorification of a distant golden epoch. There is no more ardent patriotic fervor than that of the state which is developing an artificial myth of necessity. One would expect on the other hand a slight tempering of the myth because of the other factors mentioned above. The centrifugal pull of its neighbors, Morocco and Tunisia, the millenary prestige of their religious universities, the aura that surrounds the dynastic

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names of the Hafsids of Tunis and the Marinids of Fez are still potent influences. Whenever the subject drifts away from the revolution, and how Algeria has emancipated itself, to move onto the plane of traditional North African civilization, one has the impression that Algerians still defer to their neighbors whose past record is so much more imposing.

Thus Algeria came to modern history as something like the country cousin. Its colonial history placed it even further apart. Conquered in a bloody campaign lasting more than a decade, heavily settled by a European minority which by 1926 represented 15 percent of the population and held all economic and political power, assimilated and integrated by law to France, it underwent a drastic brainwashing of whatever traditional personality it once had. The absence of a respected traditional élite, of any sort of ruling dynasty or even figurehead to which an incipient nationalism could attach itself, has done much to shape the semi-anonymous, collective, impersonal and classless leadership of the National Liberation Front, and will doubtless be reflected in a new Algerian state.

The net result is that there has been created a *tabula rasa* which at least some of the revolutionary leaders have felt to be a blessing in disguise and upon which they have begun to shape a new Algeria designed by them. And if any single characteristic were to be isolated, among those which the rebel leaders have communicated to the people, it might be that of a tough self-confidence stemming from this return of the personality from the void. We were nothing, say many Algerians, and now we are ourselves, free to be anything we want. Almost every Algerian family has a male representative in the rebel army or its underground services, or in exile somewhere, and the sense of active participation in the making of the country touches nearly every household. The self-confidence is reinforced by a realization that, without minimizing the financial and military support Algeria has received from friendly countries, the people have won status largely by their own efforts; it is no accident that Algerians are so interested in Jugoslavia and Communist China. It was this feeling, that the offer of self-determination had finally been wrenched from a reluctant France only as a result of a successful, protracted military revolt, that led a minority of the leaders of the National Liberation Army (A.L.N.) to advise rejecting it and continuing an implacable struggle to the end.

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In sketching the mood of a future Algeria one must not forget that the revolution will leave behind a bitter country. A recent French estimate of the population showed that there were some 800,000 persons less than one would have expected on the basis of projections from the 1954 census. Some are in the *maquis,* others are refugees, but the majority are probably victims of a war which has already cost Algeria at the least 5 percent of its population—half a million dead. As every household is involved, so most of them have suffered casualties, and all have been subject to search, arbitrary arrest, preventive detention in concentration camps for unspecified periods, brutalities of all sorts and constant humiliation in endless petty ways. A reaction must be considered inevitable. Even after peace comes to Algeria, and despite the fact that the A.L.N. is on the whole a highly disciplined organization, we can expect to see many private scores settled, as they were in postwar Europe.

As to the European population in Algeria, in spite of the guarantees given by the rebel authorities, the psychological—even if not physical—feelings of insecurity of a minority no longer in a position of command will unquestionably lead to a large-scale withdrawal. This is shown in the experience of Morocco and Tunisia, where the hostility between the European and Muslim communities was nowhere near so profound as in Algeria but where about half the European population has left in the three years since independence. More than anything else, the relatively larger land holdings of the Europeans in Algeria, where the European 3 percent of the rural population has 31 percent of the land, have been, and would go on being, a source of friction. They are likely to evoke far more drastic solutions than the first laudable but insufficient steps toward redistribution now being taken under the provisions of the Constantine Plan.

Once a large, unassimilable minority departs (and the fact that this seems unavoidable rather than desirable should be stressed), there is another side to the coin, and a happier one. The French on the whole came off much better than the English in their intellectual marriage with the Arab world, all politics aside. This was true in the Levant states, in Egypt and even more so in North Africa. And of all the Arabs, the Algerians have received the most lasting imprint. The century-long association, the enforced francisization, have produced an Algerian élite which, while almost totally anti-French politically, is often culturally indistinguishable from the

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Gallic norm. Ferhat Abbas, with his French wife and his inability to speak good Arabic, is himself representative; so, too, are the works of modern Algerian literature, all written in French; the surprising use of French in military instruction courses within the A.L.N.; the dress, habits, outlook and Cartesian thought processes of most of the middle and higher-echelon militants of the revolution. This deep coating of French thought and life will not last indefinitely, one would suspect—in the manner in which Hispanic culture was grafted onto Latin America; Arab civilization is too self-centered and resistant for that. But for the next generation, while predictably frantic efforts are being made to mold the new Algerian personality in its own terms, it may serve as a bridge to the inflow of technical progress and humanistic culture in a society which will have much need of both. One might say that Algeria in this respect would be better off than any other country which has become free since World War II, except perhaps India.

III

In France itself the Algerian question has again proved an essential paradox of French politics to be true: the conservatives are often liberal, socialists carry out policies which the right would not dare attempt, and empires are less despotic in the main than republics. The last is a proposition which the Algerians, who were considered an "Arab kingdom" under the Second Empire and assimilated to France by the Third Republic, feel strongly. In more recent years one has seen Antoine Pinay as the architect of Moroccan independence, and it is now the arch-nationalist Debré who, as an instrument of President de Gaulle, is orchestrating the composition of an Algerian solution.

The acts of the President of the French Republic have been interpreted by his opponents—men who are all the more bitter because they fear that what they saw as final victory is now slipping away from them—as dictatorial Napoleonism. Granted a considerable degree of absolutist grace in the personality of the chief executive, it should not be forgotten that he took the pains to have his policy approved in advance by both the army and public opinion. His trip to Algeria late in August, after "Operation Jumelles" had been long enough under way to assess its results, was designed to convince the officer corps of the necessity for combining a liberal solution with the pacification efforts. And his junket through the north of France, just before the September 16

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statement, convinced him that the French people would support a forthright approach to the problem.

This trend in popular thought is of primary importance in gauging the chances of making such a settlement come off. The climate of opinion in France on this subject had always been difficult to measure with exactitude. This writer remembers attending a conference in Paris in the spring of 1958, just prior to the demise of the Fourth Republic, at which the intellectuals, government officials and journalists who were French participants agreed both that General de Gaulle would not return to power and that the ordinary Frenchman, as opposed to a small, over-politized élite, was little interested in Algeria. Perhaps the latter contention was always as false as the former proved to be, but however much public opinion in the past was behind all-out efforts to settle the Algerian problem by force, it seems now to have been considerably diluted. The new moderation has occurred in part owing to the economic stability of France. The evidences of a widely spreading middle-class prosperity are everywhere; and, although there is still a serious creeping inflation, even this once foreboding aspect of the economic picture serves further to concentrate the attention of the Frenchman-in-the-street on daily economic matters. Everyone seems to want the new refrigerator more than he wants to keep Algeria. Nor is this phenomenon unique to France; in countries which even two to three years ago were obsessed by politics, there is noticeable a general drift of thought toward what one is hopefully inclined to view as a more mature understanding of how serious are the economic problems facing them.

It would also seem that this maturity within France corresponds to a new moral awareness; reassured by the prestige which they feel General de Gaulle has restored to their country, many Frenchmen are now willing to see a glimmer of reason in the long, bitter battle which the Algerians have fought for freedom. Finally, one senses a complex feeling abroad in France in the fall of 1959, perhaps an amalgam of all these impressions, that Algeria no longer represents an issue of pride and emotion as it once did. It is clear that General de Gaulle sensed this with remarkable intuition soon after coming to power and long before it was recognized by most observers. It is this popular feeling—much more than the tepid, doubting approval of the army—which contains the best guarantee for a reasonably prompt settlement.

After this much optimism, a caution. In spite of everything

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which the new régime in France has accomplished in the domain of financial redressment, renovation of outworn institutions and psychological awakening, it was born out of the inability of its predecessor to solve the Algerian question; and it is on this issue, and this alone, that it will be judged. One is tempted by the analogy of the organism which dies itself after having assured the perpetuation of its species. It may well be that the Fifth Republic came into being for a limited time for this purpose, and, having provided for the future of France by eliminating what has been called the national cancer, will give way in turn to a successor.

There are serious reasons for suspecting that this may be the case. Whereas under the Fourth Republic it was axiomatic that any politician or cabinet which tried to make terms in Algeria was committing suicide, it now seems that the sacrifice demanded will be the highest that could be offered: that of the prestige of the man who already once saved France in her most poignant hours. The extraordinary national wave of abandon which transformed the power of decision to one man, and the complete impoverishment of the Assembly as a decision-making body, may be setting the stage for this. And this sacrifice may ultimately be salutary, for it is now clear to all—even, it must be supposed, to General de Gaulle—that for any other purpose than the over-riding one of obtaining an Algerian settlement the new constitution and the institutions it has established are not representative of the spirit of a vigorous and democratic state of the kind that France has been and could be again.

A further danger arises from the present nature of the French state. The Fifth Republic was born in violence, and those who brandished the sword in May 1958, without having to use it, do not lack the temptation to repeat the pattern of that success. The plot and counter-plot spy dramas, the intrigue and blackmail, the deception, bad faith and threat which are now part of French political life in the shadows, show the possibilities. The authority of a civilian government devoid of prestige is sustained by one man. A large and powerful army, thoroughly dedicated to what it honestly conceives to be its mission to pacify Algeria, is led by officers who are racked by a conflict between their immense personal loyalty to an almost God-like saviour and the gnawing suspicion that he is in this case fallible. When Marshal Juin, drawing on his great prestige as a *maréchal de France* and a member of the Academy, condemns the offer of self-determination as a "bet

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which will not win," he may merely seem to be a French MacArthur. But the supremacy of civil institutions in the United States was never questioned even at the most unpleasant moments, whereas it has been in France very recently and very seriously. And when General Ely declares that the French Army cannot leave Algeria within a humanly foreseeable time, and General Massu speaks of continuing the pacification as before, many Frenchmen, grounded in their classics, go so far as to see the clash in terms of the gathering shadows of Cassius, Antony and Brutus before Caesar.

It is not that a coup is imminent, or even likely. But there is always the possibility as long as a policy of moderation must cope with extremists who feel that they could profit from the neutralization or disappearance of the one man who can direct such a delicate operation. A deputy of the National Assembly says publicly that there is a death list with professional killers assigned to the job of execution. At the top of the list is the first enemy of the right-wing groups who have theoretically made up the list; meanwhile, the walls of Paris are defaced with signs saying "De Gaulle equals Mendès."

At the moment the genius of the Gaullist approach is that he has disarmed, as effectively as possible, all the internal adversaries of a reasonable solution—be they right-wing fanatics, Communists, diehard settlers who dream of the last century or the never-say-die group among the A.L.N. leaders. And the policy he has sketched out has even won the tentative approval of the American and Soviet Governments, both of which are now on record as favoring some kind of continuing, freely chosen tie between France and Algeria. This will not be without influence, for in Algeria, as in many other troubled spots in the world, the signs of an international *détente* are having their effect. Both sides are aware of how much less opportunity they have now for blackmailing one side or the other to support their most extreme pretensions.

There is a further aspect of the problem which deserves consideration: the development of the Sahara and the discovery of oil in quantity there. By a striking coincidence, as the Algerian revolution entered its sixth year on November 1, the first flow of oil from the Saharan fields arrived in Bougie, on the Mediterranean coast, through the just-completed pipeline. While enhancing the stakes in Algeria temporarily—but, more importantly, giving a much greater economic solidity to North Africa's long-term eco-

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nomic future—oil may not be so decisive a factor as is generally assumed. Technically Saharan oil is not altogether suited to the French consumption pattern; it lends itself more readily to resale to other countries, in a world now glutted with production. Thus control, while advantageous for France, is not the vital necessity it is often pictured. Furthermore, there is no example in recent history where a vibrant nationalism has been impeded by like questions of economic exploitation, nor, conversely, where the new nationalisms have not finally seen the advantage of mutually profitable arrangements. So it would seem that the birth of Algeria would take place regardless of how much oil is present, and that sufficient room is available to negotiate on practical issues surrounding it. If France, or the Common Market, or Europe requires the oil, then Algeria needs product-markets and labor-markets in those very areas; there is a natural quid pro quo at hand. And interim solutions, involving perhaps a condominium over the Sahara, in which all North Africa might share with France, are in the minds of many closest to the question.

Algeria is, it should be stated again and again, a political problem and it must be solved on a political level. For peoples who are still struggling for identity and emancipation political pressures are overwhelming. It is only after this elementary instinct is satisfied that it is possible to concentrate on their economic sores, or to go on from there to questions of the social orientation of the economy. The reluctance of the West, particularly in its dealings with the Arab world, to treat political problems as such has been its greatest single mistake. And in this lies the weakness of the Constantine Plan for raising living standards in Algeria; excellent though it is in principle, the Algerians must first have a sense of being themselves. It is useless to say that Algeria, without France, will be an economic disaster. The Algerians are quick to answer that they accept the risk, they are willing to undergo the sufferings, but that first things come first.

The road ahead is sure to be painful and arduous. One cannot predict how long it will last, six months or six years, but the general outline of the future can be seen. No matter how delayed or how tortuous or how limited are the negotiations at first, and even if they should be temporarily abandoned and the war continued, they will inevitably end in the application of the self-determination now recognized. If the choice is really free—and it will take a great deal of effort from everyone to ensure that extremists from

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neither side dominate the scene—then Algeria will declare itself free; if it is not, there may have to be other opportunities for choice. But the logic of history points in only one direction.

And will not everyone profit from an end of the sterile, deadly game now being played? The creative energy let loose in Algeria is sure to be enormous—dynamic and revolutionary, chaotic and violent in part, but real; and whatever else, it will make the new Algeria a very different country from the old. The rose is certain to bloom red where so many Caesars have bled. For France as well, the unloosing of the Algerian burden financially can only be a stimulus to its own amazing revival in recent years and a spur to its new European vocation; while no less rewarding will be the psychological release that comes through an honorable quittance of the colonial complex which has lingered so long and bitterly, from Syria and Lebanon, through Indochina, Tunisia and Morocco, through the formation of the Community, to settle upon Algeria. This final casting-off will have been the most painful. It has done enormous damage to both parties for the past five years. It has brought France to the breaking point, but in the end it is fair to say that Algeria has been the crucible which has provided France with her ultimate test and now, miraculously, offers a means for her salvation.

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STRATEGIC PLANNING AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS

By Samuel P. Huntington

FOR a decade or more statesmen and scholars have been unhappy about American methods of making decisions on strategic programs—that is, decisions on the over-all size of the military effort, the scope and character of military programs (continental defense, anti-submarine warfare), the composition of the military forces (force levels), and the number and nature of their weapons. The most common criticisms have been:

1. National security policy lacks unity and coherence. Decisions are made on an ad hoc basis, unguided by an over-all purpose.
2. National security policies are stated largely in terms of compromises and generalities. The real issues are not brought to the highest level for decision.
3. Delay and slowness characterize the policy-making process.
4. The principal organs of policy-making, particularly the National Security Council, are ineffective vehicles for the development of new ideas and approaches. They tend to routinize the old rather than stimulate the new.
5. Policy-making procedures tend to magnify the obstacles and difficulties facing any proposed course of action.
6. These deficiencies are primarily the product of government by committee, especially when the committee members must represent the interests of particular departments and services.

Few persons familiar with the processes by which strategic programs are determined would challenge the general accuracy of these allegations. The persistence of the criticism since World War II, moreover, suggests that the defects are not incidental phenomena easily remedied by exhortations to high-mindedness, assertions of executive authority, or changes in personnel or Administration. Instead, it suggests the necessity of viewing the defects in the context of the political system of which they are a part, and of analyzing the functions which they serve in that system and the underlying causes which have brought them into existence.

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II

In domestic legislation, it is often said, the Executive proposes and Congress disposes. Except when a presidential veto seems likely to be involved, the political processes of arousing support or opposition for bills are directed toward the Congress. In determining strategic programs, on the other hand, the effective power of decision rests not with Congress and its committees but with the President and his advisors.

Congressional incapacity to determine force levels and strategic programs is often attributed to the lack of proper information and technical competence. This is indeed a factor, but it is only a contributory one. Congressmen often tend to consider broad questions of general military policy as technical while at the same time they do not hesitate to probe thoroughly and to render judgments about highly specialized and detailed questions of military administration. The inability of Congress to act effectively on strategic programs derives primarily not from its technical failings but from its political ones.

The initiation and elimination of programs and the apportionment of resources among them are highly political decisions involving conflicting interests and groups. They can be made only by bodies in which all the conflicting interests can be brought in focus. The principal groups concerned with the determination of strategic programs are the armed services, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the State Department, the Treasury, the Budget Bureau, plus a few other governmental departments. The military programs have to be weighed against each other, against conflicting interpretations of the security threats and military requirements, against domestic needs and non-military foreign policy programs, and against probable tax revenues and the demands of fiscal policy. No congressional committee is competent to do this, not because it lacks the technical knowledge, but because it lacks the legal authority and political capability to bring together all these conflicting interests, balance off one against another, and arrive at some sort of compromise or decision. Congress cannot effectively determine strategic programs because the interests which are primarily concerned with those programs are not adequately represented in any single congressional body. The armed services, appropriations, finance, foreign relations, space and atomic energy committees are all, in one way or another,

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involved in the process. No one of them can have more than a partial view of the interests involved in the determination of any single major strategic program. Every congressional action in military affairs is to some extent *ex parte*.

Congressional bodies may become advocates of particular programs, but they lack sufficient political competence to determine an over-all program. After World War II, except when confronted by similar competing programs, Congress *never* vetoed directly a major strategic program, a force-level recommendation or a major weapons system proposed by the Administration in power. Nor did Congress ever achieve this result, with one partial exception (the Navy's second nuclear carrier), through the failure to appropriate funds recommended by the Executive. The relative inviolability of the military requests was striking when compared with those for domestic or foreign-aid appropriations. Almost regularly, of course, Congress reduced the *total* military request, but it virtually never did this in a manner which seriously affected a major strategic program. Quite properly, Congressmen generally feel that they are ill-equipped to be responsible for the security of the country, and they have, by and large, recognized and accepted the decisive role of the Executive in formulating strategic programs. "God help the American people," Senator Russell once remarked, "if Congress starts legislating military strategy."

The inability and unwillingness of Congress to choose and decide does not mean that congressional groups play no role in the formulation of strategic programs. On the contrary, with respect to strategy, Congress has, like Bagehot's queen, "the right to be consulted, the right to encourage, the right to warn." The most prominent congressional role is that of prodder or goad of the Executive on behalf of specific programs or activities. With the Executive as the decision-maker, Congress has become the lobbyist. Congressional groups engage in sustained campaigns of pressure and persuasion to produce the desired strategic decisions on the part of the Executive, just as in other areas the Administration uses pressure and persuasion to move its legislation through Congress.

In lobbying with the Executive, Congress employs three major techniques. First, congressional groups may attempt, through letters, speeches, investigations and threats of retaliation in other fields, to bring continuing pressure upon the Administration to

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construct certain types of weapons. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, for instance, has been an active lobby on behalf of nuclear weapons: its members played important roles in prompting executive decisions on the hydrogen bomb, the nuclear powered submarine, the intermediate-range ballistic missiles. On the other hand, no lobby ever scores 100 percent, and the Committee was somewhat less successful with the Polaris speed-up and the nuclear-powered airplane.

Second, congressional groups may establish force-level minimums for their favored services or appropriate more money for the services than the Administration requested. In these cases, Congress attempts to use its ancient powers of authorization and appropriation for the positive purpose of establishing *floors*, whereas these powers were designed originally for the negative purpose of establishing *ceilings* to prevent a tyrannical executive from maintaining military forces without the consent of the people. Such actions undoubtedly influence the Administration in planning future force levels, and in two cases involving the National Guard and the Marine Corps, the Administration formally complied with congressional wishes. In the final analysis, however, no way has yet been evolved of compelling an Administration to maintain forces it does not wish to maintain or to spend money it does not wish to spend.

Third, Congress can bring pressure upon the Executive through investigation and debate. Although it is generally held that Congress' power to investigate rests upon its power to legislate, in actual fact Congress investigates, in the grand manner, matters which it cannot legislate. The activities of Senators McCarthy and Kefauver are obvious examples, but more reputable and worthwhile ones are furnished by the great investigations of strategy: the 1949 inquiry into "Unification and Strategy," the 1951 MacArthur investigation, the 1956 Symington airpower hearings, and the Johnson missile investigation of 1957–1958. None of these directly produced legislation but they did compel the Administration to make a public defense of its policies, enabled Congress to bring pressure to bear on the Executive and helped to educate the attentive public on strategic issues.

III

Strategic programs are thus decided upon in the Executive rather than in Congress. The process of decision within the Exec-

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utive, however, bears many striking resemblances to the process of decision in Congress. It retains a peculiarly legislative flavor. Legislative and executive *processes* of policy-making do not necessarily correspond to the legislative and executive *branches* of government. A policy-making process is legislative in character to the extent that (1) the units participating in the process are relatively equal in power (and consequently must bargain with each other), (2) important disagreements exist concerning the goals of policy, and (3) there are many possible alternatives. A process is executive in character to the extent that (1) the participating units differ in power (*i.e.* are hierarchically arranged), (2) fundamental goals and values are not at issue, and (3) the range of possible choice is limited.

Strategic programs, like other major policies, are not the product of expert planners rationally determining the actions necessary to achieve desired goals. Rather, they are the product of controversy, negotiation and bargaining among different groups with different interests and perspectives. The conflicts between budgeteers and security spokesmen, between the defenders of military and non-military programs, among the four services, and among the partisans of massive retaliation, continental defense and limited war, are as real and as sharp as most conflicts of group interests in Congress. The location of the groups within the executive branch makes their differences no less difficult to resolve. The variety and importance of the interests, the intensity of the conflicting claims, the significance of the values at stake, all compel recourse to the complex processes of legislation. The inability of Congress to legislate strategic programs does not eliminate the necessity to proceed through a legislative process. It simply concentrates it in the executive branch.

To be sure, the specific techniques for innovating proposals, mobilizing support, distracting and dissuading opponents, and timing decisions may differ in the executive "legislative" process from those in the congressional "legislative" process. None the less, in its broad outlines the development of a major strategic program, such as continental air defense, lacks none of the phases involved in the passage of a major piece of domestic legislation through Congress. The need for the program is recognized by an executive agency or some skill group (nuclear physicists) or consulting group close to the executive branch. The agency or group develops policy proposals to deal with the problem and arouses

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support for them among other executive agencies, congressional committees and, possibly, some non-governmental groups. Opposition develops. Alternative solutions to the problem are proposed. Coalitions pro and con are organized. The proposals are referred from committee to committee. Consultants and advisory groups lend their prestige to one side or another. The policies are bargained over and compromised. Eventually a decision or, more accurately, an agreement is hammered out among the interested agencies, probably through the mechanisms of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council, and is approved by the President. The locus of decision is executive; the process of decision is primarily legislative.

The building of a consensus for a particular strategic program is as complex and subtle as it is for either domestic policy or foreign policy. At a minimum, within the Executive, it involves complicated interlocking patterns of vertical bargaining along the executive hierarchy and horizontal bargaining through a conciliar structure. In almost no executive hierarchy is the exercise of power all in one direction: the actual authority—even the influence—of administrative superiors over their subordinates is hedged around by a variety of inhibiting considerations. Underlying the hierarchy is a set of bargaining relationships, explicit or implicit. The dispersion of power in American society and the separation of powers in government tend to reinforce this tendency. Agencies and officials in subordinate positions often are substantially independent of their administrative superiors. At best the superior may be able to persuade; at worst he may be openly defied.

Vertical bargaining is exemplified in the efforts of the Administration to secure the concurrence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, individually and collectively, in its budgetary and force-level decisions. On the one hand, each Chief presses for what he believes is essential for his service; on the other, the Administration attempts to cut back and fit service demands into its strategic plan and budgetary goals. Each side has to balance the risks involved in alienating the other against the benefits gained in shaping the final decision. The interlarding of hierarchical and bargaining roles inevitably enhances the possibilities for ambiguity and confusion. As subordinates the Chiefs would be expected to accept but not necessarily to approve decisions made by their administrative superiors. "I'd be worried," Secretary Wilson once de-

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cleared, "if Ridgway didn't believe in the good old Army."[1] On the other hand, the semi-autonomous position of the Chiefs enhances the value of their approval to their superiors. An administrative decision derives legitimacy (as well as effectiveness) in part from its acceptance and support by the subordinate officials and agencies affected by it. Consequently, great efforts are made to secure the Chiefs' concurrence. "The pressure brought on me to make my military judgment conform to the views of higher authority," General Ridgway declared, "was sometimes subtly, sometimes crudely, applied."[2] The intensity of the pressure applied was tribute to the value of the approval sought.

While vertical bargaining plays a crucial role in strategic decision-making, horizontal bargaining is probably even more widespread and important. Theoretically, of course, authority to determine strategic programs rests with the President and the Secretary of Defense. Actually, the compromising and balancing of interests tends to focus about the two most important committees in the executive branch of the national government: the J.C.S. and the N.S.C. On the surface, it seems strange that two committees should play such important roles in the formulation of military policy and national security. These are areas where one might expect clear-cut lines of authority and executive decision-making. Within the executive branch, few committees of comparable stature exist in domestic areas of policy-making. The J.C.S. and the N.S.C. are significant, however, precisely because they do perform essentially legislative rather than executive functions. They have what Congress lacks: the political capability to legislate strategy. Just as agricultural policy is the product of conflict, bargaining and compromise among the interested groups represented in Congress, military strategy is the product of conflict, bargaining and compromise among the interested groups represented in the J.C.S. and the N.S.C. Hence, the same criticisms are now leveled at these committees which have long been leveled at Congress: logrolling prevails; over-all objectives get lost in the mechanism; a premium is put upon agreement rather than decision. Just as Congress often wrote tariff legislation by giving each industry the protection it wanted, the N.S.C. and the Joint Chiefs make decisions on weapons by giving each service

[1] Duncan Norton-Taylor, "The Wilson Pentagon," *Fortune,* December 1954, p. 94.
[2] General Matthew B. Ridgway, "My Battles in War and Peace," *The Saturday Evening Post,* January 21, 1956, p. 46.

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what it desires. The individual members of these bodies suffer the classic conflict known to members of all legislatures: on the one hand, they must represent the interests of their departments or constituencies; on the other, their decisions are expected to be in the national interest.

IV

In strategy, as elsewhere, effective policy requires some measure of both content and consensus. Strategic programs, like statutes or treaties, are both prescriptions for future action and ratifications of existing power relationships. A strategy which is so vague or contradictory that it provides no prescription for action is no strategy. So too, a strategy whose prescriptions are so unacceptable that they are ignored is no strategy. Consensus is a cost to each participant but a prerequisite of effective policy.

In strategy-making, as in congressional legislating, one means of avoiding disagreement is to postpone decision. The proliferation of committees serves the useful political end of facilitating and, in some cases, legitimizing the avoidance of decision. Issues can be referred from committee to committee, up and down the hierarchy. Normally the same service and departmental interests are represented on all the committees; agreement in one is just as unlikely as agreement in any other. Controversial decisions may also be removed entirely from the jurisdiction of the N.S.C. or the Joint Chiefs and devolved back upon the interested agencies; the "decision" is that each will pursue its own policy. Disagreement on major issues also may be avoided simply by devoting more time to minor ones. The J.C.S. "dips into matters it should avoid," Vannevar Bush complained in 1952, "it fails to bring well considered resolution to our most important military problems, and it fritters away its energy on minutiae."[3] The Joint Chiefs, however, were treading a classic legislative path. In almost identical terms, political scientists for years have accused Congress of refusing to grapple with major issues of public policy and of wasting time and energy on minor matters of administrative detail.

Where stringent limits are imposed from the outside, the decision-makers are especially prone to compromise. As the $14 and $13 billion ceilings firmly succeeded each other in the late 1940s, the tendency to divide the funds equally among the three services

[3] "Planning," speech at Mayo Clinic Auditorium, Rochester, Minnesota, September 26, 1952, p. 8.

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became more and more pronounced. On the other hand, if the limits permitted by superior executive authority are relatively undefined or broad, logrolling enables each agency to obtain what it considers most important. The result is "Operation Paperclip," in which Army, Navy and Air Force proposals are added together and called a joint plan. Duplication in weapons systems—Thor and Jupiter, Nike and Bomarc—is simply the price of harmony. It is hardly surprising that the J.C.S. should be referred to as "a trading post." This, after all, is the traditional legislative means of achieving agreement among conflicting interests. As one Congressman remarked to his colleagues:

> If you are concerned, you politicians, with getting unanimity of action, I refer you to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There is a classic example of unanimity of action on anything: You scratch my back and I will scratch yours. "Give me atomic carriers," says the Navy, "and you can have your B-52s in the Air Force." I do not know why General Taylor is going along, because I have never been able to find anything that the Army is getting out of the deal.[4]

The political and legislative character of the strategy-making process also casts a different light on the argument that the N.S.C. and J.C.S. have failed to initiate new policy proposals. As many observers of the domestic legislative process have pointed out, relatively few statutes actually originate within a legislative assembly. They are first developed by interest groups or executive agencies. It is therefore not surprising that relatively few strategic programs originally come to life in the committees or staffs of the N.S.C. or J.C.S. The latter necessarily serve as negotiating bodies; the responsibility for innovation lies with the participating agencies.

Just as much of the early criticism of Congress stemmed from a failure to appreciate the political roles of that body, so much of the criticism of the N.S.C. and J.C.S. stems from the application to these bodies of nonpolitical standards. At times in the past, it has been assumed that through investigation and debate all members of a legislative body should arrive at similar conclusions as to where the public interest lay. More recently, conflict within a legislature has been viewed as normal, and policy thought of as the result, not of a collective process of rational inquiry, but of a mutual process of political give and take. Congress is seldom criticized today because of conflicts and disagreements among its

[4] Rep. Daniel J. Flood, *Congressional Record* (85th Congress, 1st Session), May 27, 1957, p. 7733.

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members. To a considerable extent, however, the J.C.S. and the N.S.C. are judged by the former theory: in them disagreement is still considered inherently evil. As one naval officer wryly commented: "How curious it is that the Congress *debates,* the Supreme Court *deliberates,* but for some reason or other the Joint Chiefs of Staff just *bicker!*"[5]

Significantly, the Joint Chiefs have also been criticized for employing precisely those mechanisms designed for reaching agreement: delay, devolution, referral, platitudinous policies, compromise, logrolling. On the one hand, the Chiefs are criticized because they cannot resolve major issues; on the other hand, they are criticized because they do resolve them through the classic means of politics.

Much criticism of strategic decision-making has failed to appreciate the tenuous and limited character of hierarchical authority in American government. Reacting against the prevalence of horizontal bargaining, the critics have advocated the abolition of committees and the strengthening of executive controls. In brief periods of emergency, presidential coördination may partially replace the normal bargaining processes. But no presidential laying on of hands can accomplish this on a permanent basis. Decisions on strategic programs are simply too important to be fitted into a symmetrical and immaculate model of executive decision-making. Clarifications of the chain of command and legal assertions of formal authority may reduce bargaining, but they can never eliminate it. Each of the three reorganizations of the military establishment since 1947 has purported to give the Secretary of Defense full legal authority to control his department and yet each succeeding Secretary found his control circumscribed if not frustrated. The existence of counterparts to the N.S.C. and J.C.S. in virtually every other modern state suggests that the causes which have brought them into existence may be pervasive and inherent in the problems with which they deal.

The problem of legislating strategic programs is thus the dual one of producing both content and consensus. On the one hand, little is gained by assuming that effective policy can be achieved without compromise, or that the political problems of strategy-making can be eliminated by strengthening the executive chain of command. On the other hand, it is also impossible to accept

[5] Vice Admiral H. E. Orem, "Shall We Junk the Joint Chiefs of Staff?" *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,* February 1958, p. 57.

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what emerges from the bargaining processes as ipso facto in the national interest. Too often, this has blatantly not been the case, and national purposes have been lost in bureaucratic feuding and compromise. The road to reform begins with recognition of the inherently complex political and legislative character of strategic decision-making. The need is for methods which will, at best, contribute both to the substance and the acceptance of policy, or, failing that, at least contribute more to the improvement of one than to the impairment of the other.

V

When the strategy-making process is viewed as essentially legislative in nature, the critical points appear to be not the prevalence of bargaining but rather the weakness of legislative leadership and the limited scope of the strategic consensus.

In the traditional legislative process, interest groups and executive agencies originate proposals, the President integrates them into a coherent legislative program, Congress debates, amends and decides. In the strategy-making process, executive agencies and related groups originate proposals, the N.S.C., the J.C.S., the President and Secretary of Defense debate, amend and decide upon them. But who plays the role of the legislative leader? Who winnows out the various ideas in the light of an over-all set of priorities or grand strategy and integrates these proposals into general programs which can then be discussed, amended and ratified? In the decade after World War II no clear concept developed as to which official or agency had the responsibility for leading the J.C.S. and the N.S.C. in their deliberations. In actual practice, leadership tended to rest with the Chairman in the J.C.S. and with the Department of State in the N.S.C. However, the case was frequently made for expanding the N.S.C. staff in the Executive Office of the President and for strengthening the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Similarly, it was often urged that the Secretary of Defense be provided with a mixed civilian-military policy staff which would, at the least, give him an independent source of advice, and, at most, enable him to play a stronger role in making strategic decisions. Other suggestions[6] include the creation outside the executive hierarchy of a council of elder statesmen, a "supreme court" for foreign and military

[6] See Walter Millis, "The Constitution and the Common Defense." New York: The Fund for the Republic, 1959, p. 36–46.

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policy, or an "academy of political affairs" (modeled on the National Academy of Sciences) which could study national security problems, issue reports and advise the President directly.

It seems likely that either the leadership functions of the Secretary of State and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs will become more fully recognized and clarified, or the Special Assistant and Secretary of Defense will develop the staff facilities necessary to perform these functions, or new organs of policy recommendation will come into existence. Such developments would not only facilitate consensus but also would probably improve the content of strategic decisions. The form in which issues are presented for decision often drastically affects the nature of the decision. The problem in the Executive today resides not in the presence of bargaining but rather at the point at which bargaining begins. The development of more effective leadership organs in the N.S.C. and J.C.S. would permit bargaining to be more limited and focused. The starting point would become not three separate proposals advanced by three separate departments but rather one set of proposals advanced by the legislative leader. The requirements of consensus might still cause those proposals to be torn apart tooth and limb, but, at the very least, the clear visibility of the mutilation would have certain restraining effects. It has had them in Congress.

A related and perhaps more important problem concerns the relatively limited scope of the strategic consensus. The strategy-making process goes on largely within the Executive, and the consensus arrived at, if any, is primarily an executive one. As a result, it tends to be both tenuous and tentative. Although the effective power of decision rests with the executive branch, the possibility always exists that it may be upset by forces from the outside. Consequently the activity of the Administration is largely devoted to defending a policy which has been decided upon rather than advocating a policy which has yet to be adopted.

In the traditional legislative process, an issue is debated first within the Executive and then publicly within and about Congress. All the debate, however, contributes directly or indirectly to shaping the final product: to pushing the legislation through without change, amending it in one direction or another, or defeating it entirely. When the President signs the bill, the policy-making process is over, and the debate stops—or at least lessens

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—for a while. In strategy-making, debate among the various executive agencies and related groups also contributes directly to shaping the measure. Once the decision is made, this debate subsides, but as soon as the decision becomes known to non-executive agencies and groups, the public debate begins. The likelihood of such debate may have had its effects upon the executive policy-makers before the decision was reached, but their anticipation of public reaction to policy often is, at best, an informed hunch and, at worst, a rationalization that the public will not accept policies which they do not accept themselves. Public debate of a strategic decision may also affect its implementation and may influence subsequent decisions. Coming after the initial decision, however, the debate necessarily loses much of its force and value.

It is striking that both the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations, different as they are otherwise, have been regularly criticized for not exercising "leadership" in national security policy. In each case, it is alleged, the President has failed to take the initiative in bringing strategic issues to the people, in arousing support for foreign and military policy proposals, and in educating the public to its responsibilities in the nuclear age. Such criticism assumes that the President should play the same leadership role in strategic matters that he does in domestic legislation. In the latter, the President must be the source of energy for his program, and it is normally in his interest to dramatize the issue and to broaden the public concerned with it. The concept of presidential leadership is that of Theodore Roosevelt, Wilson, F.D.R. rallying support for a legislative program which he is urging upon a recalcitrant Congress.

In the strategy process, however, the President's role is very different, and the domestic model is inapplicable. Here, the President and his Administration have little reason to desire public debate and many reasons to fear it. The decision has been made; the policy is being implemented. The extension of the public concerned with the policy can only lead to pressure to change it in one respect or another and to the exploitation of the issues by the opposition. The primary role of the Administration has to be defensive: to protect the balance of interests, the policy equilibrium which has been laboriously reached within the Executive, against the impact of profane forces and interests outside the Executive. Mr. Cutler put the matter bluntly when he declared:

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There is another seamlessness in our complex world: the fabric of our national defense. Perhaps the most potent argument against public disclosure of secret projects or of short-falls (which inevitably always exist) in any one aspect of our national defense is that such disclosure builds up a Potomac propaganda war to rectify that defect or over-finance that project. But if you devote larger resources to one area of national defense, you are apt to imbalance the rest.[7]

Given the nature of the decision-making process, this concern is a natural one. The cold-war Presidents have evolved a variety of means to limit public interest in strategy, to minimize the concern of external groups with force levels and weapons, and, most particularly, to insulate and protect the executive balance from the disruption of outside interests. Hence the tendency of both Presidents and their Administrations to reassure the public, to pour on the "soothing syrup" which has so exasperated the Alsops and others, to limit the information available on American deficiencies and Soviet achievements, to discount these achievements and to minimize their significance, to preserve discipline and to suppress leaks, to discourage dissenting and disquieting testimony before congressional committees, and in general to maintain an air of calm assurance, an imperturbable façade. All these actions stem from a fear of the fragility of the executive consensus and of the irrationality and uncontrollability of the external political forces. These are the new "defensive" weapons of presidential leadership, as important to an Administration in the formulation of strategy as the old "offensive" techniques are in the promotion of domestic legislation in Congress.

A striking feature of the past dozen years has been the extent to which expressions of alarm at the decline of presidential leadership have occurred simultaneously with expressions of alarm at the growth of executive power. This apparent paradox simply reflects the fact that the increasing responsibility of the executive branch in making crucial decisions on strategic programs has undermined the ability of the President to lead. The more the President becomes, at least in theory, the judge, the less he can be the advocate. Yet, in practice, even his power to decide strategic issues is difficult to exercise. To be sure, the N.S.C. and the J.S.C. are theoretically only his advisors: no policy exists until he has approved it. But in part this is a myth to preserve the appearance of presidential decision-making. Surely the President does not over-ride united opinion among his top advisors much

[7] "The Seamless Web," *Harvard Alumni Bulletin*, June 4, 1955, p. 665.

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more often than he vetoes acts of Congress. The theory that the President makes the decisions, in short, serves as a cloak to shield the elaborate processes of executive legislation and bargaining through which the policies are actually hammered out. Consequently, the President may be less influential as a decision-maker than he is as a legislative leader. The latter function is personal to him. The former is one which he shares with a variety of other groups in the executive branch.

Whatever defects may exist in this situation cannot be removed by shifting the point of decision away from the executive branch. The tenuous character of the decisions and the defensive role of the Administration could be modified only by broadening the scope of discussion and concern in the early stages of the policy process—*before* key decisions are made. Once adequate legislative leadership emerges in the executive branch, the debate could focus on the proposals of this leadership, provided they were made public to the fullest extent possible. Greater publicity for and public participation in strategy-making at an earlier stage would tend to restrain some of the more gross forms of "horse trading" in the Executive, and should enhance the President's actual power of decision. At present, one way in which issues are brought to the top and forced upon the President for decision is through the lobbying activities of congressional committees. Broader and earlier public discussion of strategic programs would in all probability have a similar effect, and instead of interested guesses we would be provided with concrete evidence of what "the public will support." Certainly, discussion is more useful before decisions are made than afterwards. Broadening the scope of the policy consensus could well go hand in hand with improving the quality of the policy content.

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THE SECRET THAT TRAVELED TO POTSDAM

By Herbert Feis

July 1945: the war in Europe was over; but in prospect still was the long agony of battle against Japan. The experience at Okinawa was regarded as an indication of the ordeal that would have to be endured.

Truman, Stalin and Churchill had agreed to meet in mid-July in the vicinity of Berlin. TERMINAL was selected as an appropriate code designation for their conference. For its purposes were to dispose of the unsettled issues left by the European War and make a start upon the tasks of peace. Provisional lists of the matters to be discussed, charts of the work ahead, had been circulated by the governments.

But the Americans left for Potsdam with an exciting secret—which they kept out of their memos as well as off their tongues. They knew that soon the first test was to be made of the atomic weapon which had been long in conception and construction.[1]

Secretary of War Stimson, who bore the focal responsibility for the quivering decisions that would have to be faced at once if the test went well, was planning to go to Potsdam. The President agreed that he should be close at hand when the results were known. Moreover, as Stimson told Secretary of State Byrnes, he wanted to learn for himself more about the task assigned to the Army in the American Zone in Germany and in the four-power administration.

His thoughts about S-1 (as the atomic weapon was identified), like those of the President, circled around its possible use in the war against Japan rather than its bearing on the matters that were to be discussed in the conference at Potsdam. Its first great impact was upon the issuance of a last warning to Japan—the Potsdam Declaration—and the ending of the struggle in the Pacific. However, before entering into the lanes along which the work of the conference flowed, we ought to summon the stirring reports that reached Potsdam about the test in New Mexico just as the conference was starting. Having done that we can yield to the temptation to speculate about the way in which these may have affected the outcome of the conference. In that connection

[1] The material in this article is drawn from a forthcoming book by the author.

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we shall be obliged to note what was said to Stalin about the new weapon. As we tell of these events, we may find ourselves straggling from known facts—those conveyed by the reports from the scene of the explosion and in the minutes of the conference—to impressions and surmises.

II

The formal opening of the conference was put off from the 16th to the 17th of July because Stalin had suffered a slight heart attack. Truman used the liberated day to drive into Berlin from his quarters at Babelsburg. "In that two-hour drive," he later wrote, "I saw evidence of a great world tragedy. . . ." Upon his return Stimson hurried over to tell him and Byrnes of a message just in from George Harrison, who was acting as Chairman of the Interim Committee on S-1 while Stimson was away.[2] This was the first flash about the detonation of the bomb in Alamogordo. In code expression it read: "Operated on this morning. Diagnosis not yet complete but results seem satisfactory and already exceed expectations. Local press release necessary as interest extends great distance.[3] Doctor [General] Groves pleased. He returns [to Washington] tomorrow. I will keep you posted."[4]

Harrison did so in another short message that got to Stimson the next day or evening (the 17th). This read: "Doctor Groves has just returned most enthusiastic and confident that the little boy is as husky as his big brother. The light in his eyes discernible from here [Washington] to Highhold [Stimson's house on Long Island, 250 miles away] and I could have heard his screams from here to my farm [at Upperville, Virginia, 40 miles away]."[5]

[2] In writing later about the first report given him by Stimson of the results of the test, Truman seems to have been confused in his memory of detail. As recounted in "Memoirs," v. 1, "Year of Decisions" (New York: Doubleday, 1955), p. 415, "The historic message of the first explosion of an atomic bomb was flashed to me in a message from Secretary of War Stimson on the morning of July 16 . . . . Stimson flew to Potsdam the next day to see me and brought with him the full details of the test." But Stimson was in Babelsburg on the 16th and took the first message in person to Truman that same evening. The "full details" of the test, brought by special courier, were not received until a few days later.

[3] The flash and noise of the explosion seen and heard far away aroused excited curiosity. The Commanding Officer of the Alamogordo Army Air Base, General Ericson, gave the press a statement which said that the explosion had occurred in a remotely located ammunition magazine. The explanation seems to have been accepted calmly and without question. No mention either of the explosion or its cause is to be found in the issues of *The New York Times* or *Herald Tribune* of July 17, probably as a result of voluntary censorship.

[4] Potsdam Papers. Document No. 1311. *Editor's Note:* The Potsdam Papers, including the long memorandum beginning on the next page, have not yet been published, but will probably be brought out by the Department of State during the coming year.

[5] Potsdam Papers. Document No. 1312.

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Stimson at once discussed the latest news with Byrnes and passed it on to Churchill. The Secretary of War noted in his Diary that the Prime Minister had not heard of the great events from British officials in Washington, that he was much cheered up, and strongly against disclosing information about the weapon to the Russians. On the next day, the 18th, Stimson talked over with the President the import of Harrison's second message. In his Diary entry for that day he noted that the President seemed to him "highly delighted . . . [and] very greatly reinforced over the message from Harrison, and said he was very glad I had come to the meeting."[6]

On the 21st, just before noon, a courier put in Stimson's hands the special report which General Groves had prepared. He found it was ". . . an immensely powerful document, clearly and well written, and with supporting documents of the highest importance," and that "it gave a pretty full and eloquent report of the tremendous success of the test and revealed far greater destructive power than we expected in S-1."

Longish as is this report from the scene of the explosion, in order to appreciate its impress it should be read in full as it was by the recipients at Potsdam.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR (July 18, 1945)

Subject: The Test

1. This is not a concise, formal military report but an attempt to recite what I would have told you if you had been here on my return from New Mexico.

2. At 0530, 16 July 1945, in a remote section of the Alamogordo Air Base, New Mexico, the first full-scale test was made of the implosion type atomic fission bomb. For the first time in history there was a nuclear explosion. And what an explosion! . . . The bomb was not dropped from an airplane but was exploded on a platform on top of a 100-foot high steel tower.

[6] Here this historian runs into another instance of conflicting records of chronology which is left for other researchers to clear up. Stimson's Diary does not mention any general convocation of military and civilian heads to confer about the news either *on the 17th or 18th*. But Truman (*op. cit.*, p. 415) wrote that on the 17th Stimson brought with him "full details of the test" and that he called in at once Byrnes, Leahy, Marshall, Arnold and King to review our military strategy in the light of this revolutionary development. The Joint Chiefs did meet on the morning of the 17th, but not with the President.

In "Triumph and Tragedy" (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1953), p. 638–639, Churchill wrote that on the morning of the 18th ". . . a plane arrived with a full description of this tremendous event in the human story," and that the President invited him to confer "forthwith," Marshall and Leahy being present. But the report containing the "full description" was not put in Stimson's hands by courier until the 21st. However, that Churchill did have some sort of talk with Truman on the 18th is verified by the note bearing that date which he wrote for the War Cabinet, *ibid.*, p. 640–641.

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3. The test was successful beyond the most optimistic expectations of anyone. Based on the data which it has been possible to work up to date, I estimate the energy generated to be in excess of the equivalent of 15,000 to 20,000 tons of T.N.T.; and this is a conservative estimate. Data based on measurements which we have not yet been able to reconcile would make the energy release several times the conservative figure. There were tremendous blast effects. For a brief period there was a lighting effect within a radius of 20 miles equal to several suns in midday; a huge ball of fire was formed which lasted for several seconds. This ball mushroomed and rose to a height of over 10,000 feet before it dimmed. The light from the explosion was seen clearly at Albuquerque, Santa Fe, Silver City, El Paso and other points generally to about 180 miles away. The sound was heard to the same distance in a few instances but generally to about 100 miles. Only a few windows were broken although one was some 125 miles away. A massive cloud was formed which surged and billowed upward with tremendous power, reaching the substratosphere at an elevation of 41,000 feet, 36,000 feet above the ground, in about 5 minutes, breaking without interruption through a temperature inversion at 17,000 feet which most of the scientists thought would stop it. Two supplementary explosions occurred in the cloud shortly after the main explosion. The cloud contained several thousand tons of dust picked up from the ground and a considerable amount of iron in the gaseous form. Our present thought is that this iron ignited when it mixed with the oxygen in the air to cause these supplementary explosions. Huge concentrations of highly radioactive materials resulted from the fission and were contained in this cloud.

4. A crater from which all vegetation had vanished, with a diameter of 1,200 feet and a slight slope toward the center, was formed. In the center was a shallow bowl 130 feet in diameter and 6 feet in depth. The material within the crater was deeply pulverized dirt. The material within the outer circle is greenish and can be distinctly seen from as much as 5 miles away. The steel from the tower was evaporated. 1,500 feet away there was a 4-inch iron pipe 16 feet high set in concrete and strongly guyed. It disappeared completely.

5. One-half mile from the explosion there was a massive steel test cylinder weighing 220 tons. The base of the cylinder was solidly encased in concrete. Surrounding the cylinder was a strong steel tower 70 feet high, firmly anchored to concrete foundations. This tower is comparable to a steel building bay that would be found in a typical 15 or 20-story skyscraper or in warehouse construction. Forty tons of steel were used to fabricate the tower which was 70 feet high, the height of a six-story building. The cross bracing was much stronger than that normally used in ordinary steel construction. The absence of the solid walls of a building gave the blast a much less effective surface to push against. The blast tore the tower from its foundations, twisted it, ripped it apart and left it flat on the ground. The effects on the tower indicate that, at that distance, unshielded permanent steel and masonry buildings would have been destroyed . . . I no longer consider the Pentagon a safe shelter from such a bomb. Enclosed are a sketch showing the tower before the explosion and a telephotograph showing what it looked like afterwards. None of us had expected it to be damaged.

6. The cloud traveled to a great height first in the form of a ball, then

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mushroomed, then changed into a long trailing chimney-shaped column and finally was sent in several directions by the variable winds at the different elevations. It deposited its dust and radioactive materials over a wide area. It was followed and monitored by medical doctors and scientists with instruments to check its radioactive effects. While here and there the activity on the ground was fairly high, at no place did it reach a concentration which required evacuation of the population. Radioactive material in small quantities was located as much as 120 miles away. The measurements are being continued in order to have adequate data with which to protect the Government's interests in case of future claims. For a few hours I was none too comfortable about the situation.

7. For instance, as much as 200 miles away, observers were stationed to check on blast effects, property damage, radioactivity and reactions of the population. While complete reports have not yet been received, I know that no persons were injured nor was there any real property damage outside our Government area. As soon as all the voluminous data can be checked and correlated, full technical studies will be possible.

8. Our long range weather predictions had indicated that we could expect weather favorable for our tests beginning on the morning of the 17th and continuing for 4 days. This was almost a certainty if we were to believe our long range forecasters. The prediction for the morning of the 16th was not so certain but there was about an 80 percent chance of the conditions being suitable. During the night there were thunderstorms with lightning flashes all over the area. The test had been originally set for 0400 hours and all the night through, because of the bad weather, there were urgings from many of the scientists to postpone the test. Such a delay might well have had crippling results due to mechanical difficulties in our complicated test setup. Fortunately, we disregarded the urgings. We held firm and waited the night through hoping for suitable weather. We had to delay an hour and a half, to 0530, before we could fire. This was 30 minutes before sunrise.

9. Because of bad weather, our two B-29 observation airplanes were unable to take off as scheduled from Kirkland Field at Albuquerque and when they finally did get off, they found it impossible to get over the target because of the heavy clouds and the thunderstorms. Certain desired observations could not be made and while the people in the airplanes saw the explosion from a distance, they were not as close as they will be in action. We still have no reason to anticipate the loss of our plane in an actual operation although we cannot guarantee safety.

10. Just before 1100 the news stories from all over the state started to flow into the Albuquerque Associated Press. I then directed the issuance by the Commanding Officer, Alamogordo Air Base, of a news release as shown on the inclosure. With the assistance of the Office of Censorship we were able to limit the news stories to the approved release supplemented in the local papers by brief stories from the many eyewitnesses not connected with our project. One of these was a blind woman who saw the light.

11. Brigadier General Thomas F. Farrell was at the control shelter located 10,000 yards south of the point of explosion. His impressions are given below:

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Impressions of Brigadier General Thomas F. Farrell at control shelter 10,000 yards south of point of explosion:

"The scene inside the shelter was dramatic beyond words. In and around the shelter were some 20-odd people concerned with last minute arrangements prior to firing the shot. Included were: Dr. Oppenheimer, the Director who had borne the great scientific burden of developing the weapon from the raw materials made in Tennessee and Washington and a dozen of his key assistants —Dr. Kistiakowsky, who had developed the highly special explosives; Dr. Bainbridge, who supervised all the detailed arrangements for the test; Dr. Hubbard, the weather expert, and several others. Besides these, there were a handful of soldiers, two or three Army officers and one Naval officer. The shelter was cluttered with a great variety of instruments and radios.

"For some hectic two hours preceding the blast, General Groves stayed with the Director, walking with him and steadying his tense excitement. Every time the Director would be about to explode because of some untoward happening, General Groves would take him off and walk with him in the rain, counselling with him and reassuring him that everything would be all right. At twenty minutes before zero hour, General Groves left for his station at the Base Camp [some nine miles from the point of explosion], first because it provided a better observation point and second, because of our rule that he and I must not be together in situations where there is an element of danger, which existed at both points.

"Just after General Groves left, announcements began to be broadcast of the interval remaining before the blast. They were sent by radio to the other groups participating in and observing the test. As the time interval grew smaller and changed from minutes to seconds, the tension increased by leaps and bounds. Everyone in that room knew the awful potentialities of the thing that they thought was about to happen. The scientists felt that their figuring must be right and that the bomb had to go off but there was in everyone's mind a strong measure of doubt.[7] The feeling of many could be expressed by 'Lord, I believe; help Thou mine unbelief.' We were reaching into the unknown and we did not know what might come of it. It can be safely said that most of those present—Christian, Jew and atheist—were praying and praying harder than they had ever prayed before. If the shot were successful, it was a justification of the several years of intensive effort of tens of thousands of people—statesmen, scientists, engineers, manufacturers, soldiers and many others in every walk of life.

"In that brief instant in the remote New Mexico desert the tremendous effort of the brains and brawn of all the people came suddenly and startlingly to the fullest fruition. Dr. Oppenheimer, on whom had rested a very heavy burden, grew tenser as the last seconds ticked off. He scarcely breathed. He held on to a post to steady himself. For the last few seconds, he stared directly ahead and then when the announcer shouted 'Now!' and there came this tremendous burst of light followed shortly thereafter by the deep growling roar

[7] The components of the detonating mechanisms had been tested and proven. But the anticipated occurrence of the explosion was based on theoretical reckoning which had not yet been experimentally validated. So doubt remained as to whether some important element had not been overlooked or wrongly calculated.

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of the explosion, his face relaxed into an expression of tremendous relief. Several of the observers standing back of the shelter to watch the lighting effects were knocked flat by the blast.

"The tension in the room let up and all started congratulating each other. Everyone sensed 'This is it!' No matter what might happen now all knew that the impossible scientific job had been done. Atomic fission would no longer be hidden in the cloisters of the theoretical physicists' dreams. It was almost full grown at birth. It was a great new force to be used for good or for evil. There was a feeling in that shelter that those concerned with its nativity should dedicate their lives to the mission that it would always be used for good and never for evil.

"Dr. Kistiakowsky, the impulsive Russian, (Interpolation by Groves at this point, 'an American and Harvard professor for many years') threw his arms around Dr. Oppenheimer and embraced him with shouts of glee. Others were equally enthusiastic. All the pent-up emotions were released in those few minutes and all seemed to sense immediately that the explosion had far exceeded the most optimistic expectations and wildest hopes of the scientists. All seemed to feel that they had been present at the birth of a new age—The Age of Atomic Energy—and felt their profound responsibility to help in guiding into right channels the tremendous forces which had been unlocked for the first time in history.

"As to the present war, there was a feeling that no matter what else might happen, we now had the means to insure its speedy conclusion and save thousands of American lives. As to the future, there had been brought into being something big and something new that would prove to be immeasurably more important than the discovery of electricity or any of the other great discoveries which have so affected our existence.

"The effects could well be called unprecedented, magnificent, beautiful, stupendous and terrifying. No man-made phenomenon of such tremendous power had ever occurred before. The lighting effects beggared description. The whole country was lighted by a searing light with the intensity many times that of the midday sun. It was golden, purple, violet, gray and blue. It lighted every peak, crevasse and ridge of the nearby mountain range with a clarity and beauty that cannot be described but must be seen to be imagined. It was that beauty the great poets dream about but describe most poorly and inadequately. Thirty seconds after the explosion came first the air blast pressing hard against the people and things, to be followed almost immediately by the strong, sustained, awesome roar which warned of doomsday and made us feel that we puny things were blasphemous to dare tamper with the forces heretofore reserved to The Almighty. Words are inadequate tools for the job of acquainting those not present with the physical, mental and psychological effects. It had to be witnessed to be realized." (End of General Farrell's account.)

12. My [General Groves] impressions of the night's high points follow:

After about an hour's sleep I got up at 0100 and from that time on until about five I was with Dr. Oppenheimer constantly. Naturally he was very nervous, although his mind was working at its usual extraordinary efficiency. I devoted my entire attention to shielding him from the excited and generally

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faulty advice of his assistants who were more than disturbed by their excitement and the uncertain weather conditions. By 0330 we decided that we could probably fire at 0530. By 0400 the rain had stopped but the sky was heavily overcast. Our decision became firmer as time went on. During most of these hours the two of us journeyed from the control house out into the darkness to look at the stars and to assure each other that the one or two visible stars were becoming brighter. At 0510 I left Dr. Oppenheimer and returned to the main observation point which was 17,000 yards from the point of explosion. In accordance with our orders I found all personnel not otherwise occupied massed on a bit of high ground.

At about two minutes of the scheduled firing time all persons lay face down with their feet pointing towards the explosion. As the remaining time was called from the loud speaker from the 10,000 yard control station there was complete silence. Dr. Conant said he had never imagined seconds could be so long. Most of the individuals in accordance with orders shielded their eyes in one way or another. There was then this burst of light of a brilliance beyond any comparison. We all rolled over and looked through dark glasses at the ball of fire. About forty seconds later came the shock wave followed by the sound, neither of which seemed startling after our complete astonishment at the extraordinary lighting intensity. Dr. Conant reached over and we shook hands in mutual congratulations. Dr. Bush, who was on the other side of me, did likewise. The feeling of the entire assembly was similar to that described by General Farrell, with even the uninitiated feeling profound awe. Drs. Conant and Bush and myself were struck by an even stronger feeling that the faith of those who had been responsible for the initiation and the carrying on of this Herculean project had been justified. I personally thought of Blondin crossing Niagara Falls on his tightrope, only to me this tightrope had lasted for almost three years, and of my repeated confident-appearing assurances that such a thing was possible and that we would do it.

13. A large group of observers were stationed at a point about 27 miles north of the point of explosion. Attached is a memorandum written shortly after the explosion by Dr. E. O. Lawrence which may be of interest.

14. While General Farrell was waiting about midnight for a commercial airplane to Washington at Albuquerque—120 miles away from the site—he overheard several airport employees discussing their reactions to the blast. One said that he was out on the parking apron; it was quite dark; then the whole southern sky was lighted as though by a bright sun; the light lasted several seconds. Another remarked that if a few exploding bombs could have such an effect, it must be terrible to have them drop on a city.

15. My liaison officer at the Alamogordo Air Base, sixty miles away, made the following report:

"There was a blinding flash of light that lighted the entire northwestern sky. In the center of the flash, there appeared to be a huge billow of smoke. The original flash died down, there arose in the approximate center of where the original flash had occurred an enormous ball of what appeared to be fire and closely resembled a rising sun that was 3/4 above a mountain. The ball of fire lasted approximately fifteen seconds, then died down and the sky resumed an almost normal appearance.

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"Almost immediately, a third, but much smaller, flash and billow of smoke of a whitish-orange color appeared in the sky, again lighting the sky for approximately 4 seconds. At the time of the original flash, the field was lighted well enough so that a newspaper could easily have been read. The second and third flashes were of much lesser intensity.

"We were in a glass-enclosed control tower some 70 feet above the ground and felt no concussion or air compression. There was no noticeable earth tremor although reports overheard at the Field during the following 24 hours indicated that some believed that they had both heard the explosion and felt some earth tremor."

16. I have not written a separate report for General Marshall as I feel you will want to show this to him. I have informed the necessary people here of our results. Lord Halifax after discussion with Mr. Harrison and myself stated that he was not sending a full report to his government at this time. I informed him that I was sending this to you and that you might wish to show it to the proper British representatives.

17. We are all fully conscious that our real goal is still before us. The battle test is what counts in the war with Japan.

18. May I express my deep personal appreciation for your congratulatory cable to us and for the support and confidence which I have received from you ever since I have had this work under my charge.

19. I know that Colonel Kyle will guard these papers with his customary extraordinary care.

L. R. GROVES[8]

Stimson at once sought an engagement with the President. It was fixed for half-past three that afternoon. In the interval Stimson told Marshall of the main features of Groves' report. When he got to the "Little White House," he asked the President to call Byrnes in, and read the message in full to them. The President was, in the words of Stimson's Diary, "tremendously pepped up by it . . . and said that it gave him an entirely new feeling of confidence." Why the report was such an elixir will be clear to all those who have knowledge of the tussles that were going on around the conference table.

Stimson then hurried over to Churchill's quarters and gave him the typed memo from Groves. The Prime Minister could not read it through before he had to leave for the Fifth Plenary Session with Truman and Stalin. He asked Stimson to come again the following morning, when he would be free.

Before going over to see the Prime Minister that next forenoon (the 22nd) Stimson stopped by the "Little White House" to pick up a paper which he had left with the President the day before, summarizing his ideas about sharing knowledge of the new wea-

[8] Potsdam Papers. Document No. 1313.

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pon with the Russians, and the possibility of bringing the new force—atomic energy—under effective international control. As he was leaving he told Truman that Harrison had just assured him that a bomb would be ready for use against Japan early in August.

Then on to the residence of the Prime Minister he went, and stood by while the message from Groves was being read in full. On putting it down, Churchill, all animation, leaned forward in his chair, waved his cigar and said, "Stimson, what was gunpowder? Trivial. What was electricity? Meaningless. This atomic bomb is the second coming in wrath."[9]

III

The consequent questions of whether, when, how and how much to tell the Russians about the new weapon had perplexed the informed American officials ever since the scientists and engineers had forecast its being.

In 1943 at Hyde Park, Roosevelt and Churchill had entered into an agreement which stated that "(1) The suggestion that the world should be informed regarding its [S-1] control and use is not accepted. The matter should continue to be regarded as of the utmost secrecy; but when a 'bomb' is finally available, it might perhaps, after mature consideration, be used against the Japanese who should be warned that the bombardment will be repeated until they surrender."[10]

The Interim Committee, without knowing of this accord, had early in June agreed that the American Government ought not to reveal the existence of the weapon to Russia or anyone else until after it was proven in use against Japan. When reporting to the President on June 6 about the points of agreement reached in the Interim Committee, Stimson had stressed this conclusion. He had then said he was perplexed as to what might happen when the President met with Stalin and Churchill. Truman had remarked that the postponement of the conference until the middle of July would give the wanted time. The Secretary of War had not been wholly reassured. What if the tests were delayed?

Stimson had then summed up for the President the discussions that had been going on in and out of the Interim Committee on

[9] "Remembered Words," by Harvey H. Bundy, who was present at this talk with Churchill, in *The Atlantic Monthly*, March 1957.

[10] Potsdam Papers. Document No. 1314.

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future control of this new terrific force. The only suggestion, he said, which the Committee had advanced was that countries should promise to make public all the work they were doing in this field, and to form an international control group with full powers of inspection in all countries. Presciently, he remarked that he realized that this plan was imperfect and the Russians might not agree with it. If they did not, all we could do, he thought, was to accumulate enough fissionable material as insurance. In any case, he had reiterated his conviction that no disclosure ought to be made to anyone until an agreement on control was working effectively. Marshall had been of the same determined opinion.

Could the United States, the President wondered, get something of value in return for sharing information about atomic fission with the Soviet Union? Might we be able to get greater coöperation in arriving at accords in regard to Poland, Rumania, Jugoslavia, Manchuria, for example?

The Combined (U.S.-British) Policy Committee on July 4, two days before the American group left for Potsdam, had pondered over the same problem of what, if anything, to tell the Russians. The British and Canadian members (Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, liaison for the British Chiefs of Staff, and the Honorable C. D. Howe, Canadian Minister of Munitions) had gone along with Stimson's ideas of what had best be done. As recorded in the minutes of this discussion:

> The Chairman said he was thinking of an earlier period, *viz.* the forthcoming meeting with Stalin. His own opinion had been very much influenced by the probable use within a few weeks after the meeting. If nothing was said at this meeting about the T.A. weapon, its subsequent early use might have a serious effect on the relations of frankness between the three great Allies. He had therefore advised the President to watch the atmosphere at the meeting. If mutual frankness on other questions was found to be real and satisfactory, then the President might say that work was being done on the development of atomic fission for war purposes; that good progress had been made; and that an attempt to use a weapon would be made shortly, though it was not certain that it would succeed. If it did succeed, it would be necessary for a discussion to be held on the best method of handling the development in the interests of world peace and not for destruction. If Stalin pressed for immediate disclosure the President might say that he was not prepared to take the matter further at the present time. . . .[11]

All these questions had been left hanging in the air. There they

[11] Potsdam Papers. Document No. 619. The members of the Committee were Stimson, Wilson, Howe and Dr. Vannevar Bush. On this occasion there were also present the British Ambassador (the Earl of Halifax), Sir James Chadwick, General Groves and George Harrison, as well as the Joint Secretaries, Harvey H. Bundy and Roger Makins.

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had stayed until the President got to Potsdam and the news of the results of the test in New Mexico overtook him and Stimson and Byrnes. When they learned that it would soon be available for use against Japan, they had to make up their minds. The quest for the correct course led them into even more intense talk about how much to tell the Russians.

IV

All recognized that it would be sensible as well as proper to let Stalin know of the achievement. For of course he would learn of it as soon as the bomb was used against the Japanese—which would be in about a fortnight. But how much should he be told of its nature? Above all else, should we share the knowledge as to how the new weapon was made? On that question, as has been told, the ruling official opinion had been steady from the start: we must not do so until or unless an agreement should be reached for international inspection and control. The only notable challenge to this conclusion was that which had been offered by some of the scientists who were convinced that the Soviet Union could easily and quickly learn how to make the new weapon whether or not we told them what we knew. If that were true, they had argued that by sharing our knowledge we would be showing trust, and so win trust; while if we concealed what we knew, we would, by showing mistrust, stimulate their hostility, suspicion and rivalry.

Stimson meditated over this dilemma, fretted over it during sleepless hours of the night. For he had taught himself to live by the maxim that the way to win trust was to give it; and this clashed with the dark lessons of history about the ways of absolute dictatorship. The President took the view that it was common sense to wait until we were sure. Byrnes thought unguarded openness would bring advantage only to the Russians.

But at Potsdam these longer and more lasting aspects of the question were thrust into the background by thoughts of more immediate consequences. What would be the effect of opening the doors to knowledge about the weapon or of keeping them closed on the Soviet attitude in the disputatious talks on European questions that were going on? How might the Soviet decision whether or not to enter the Pacific War be affected? Or the timing of its entry? Or its attitude toward the situation in China?

When on July 18 Truman talked with Churchill about the new

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weapon they reviewed these quandaries. Truman's attitude and Churchill's response are recorded in a note the Prime Minister made for the War Cabinet:

> The President showed me telegrams about the recent experiment, and asked what I thought should be done about telling the Russians. He seemed determined to do this, but asked about the timing, and said he thought that the end of the Conference would be best. I replied that if he were resolved to tell it might well be better to hang it on the experiment, which was a new fact on which he and we had only just had knowledge. Therefore he would have a good answer to any question, "Why did you not tell us this before?" He seemed impressed with this idea, and will consider it.
>
> On behalf of His Majesty's Government, I did not resist his proposed disclosure of the simple fact that we have this weapon. He reiterated his resolve at all costs to refuse to divulge any particulars. . . .[12]

On thinking the matter over longer, Churchill developed a positive disposition to let the Russians know we had the new weapon. After Stimson talked with him again on the 22nd, the Secretary of War entered in his Diary, "He [Churchill] now not only was not worried about giving the Russians information on the matter, but was rather inclined to use it as an argument in our favor in the negotiations. The sentiment of the four of us [Stimson, Bundy, Churchill, Cherwell] was unanimous in thinking that it was advisable to tell the Russians at least that we were working on the subject and intended to use it if and when it was successfully finished."[13]

But Stimson's impulse to be more trustful and revealing was still checked by his ominous view of the system of dictatorship under which the Russians lived. His worry and sense of being on the side lines had found outlet in a memo which he had given to the President the day before. In this he had expressed the opinion that the basic difficulty in our relations with Russia was that there was no personal or political freedom in that country, that it was ruled by an arbitrary autocracy and that there could not be close and reliable relations between such a system and ours. Thus he had urged that we should try to get Stalin to take the lead in introducing freedoms into the Soviet Union; otherwise he feared that a new war was inevitable and that it would bring about the destruction of our civilization. The memo concluded:

> The foregoing has a vital bearing upon the control of the vast and revolutionary discovery of "X" [atomic energy] which is now confronting us. Upon

[12] Churchill, *op. cit.*, p. 640–641.
[13] Stimson-Churchill conversation, Potsdam Papers. Minutes, July 22, 1945.

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the successful control of that energy depends the future successful development or destruction of the modern civilized world. The Committee appointed by the War Department [the Interim Committee] which has been considering that control has pointed this out in no uncertain terms and has called for an international organization for that purpose. After careful reflection I am of the belief that *no* world organization containing as one of its dominant members a nation whose people are not possessed of free speech but whose governmental action is controlled by the autocratic machinery of a secret political police, cannot [can] give effective control of this new agency with its devastating possibilities.

I therefore believe that before we share our new discovery with Russia we should consider carefully whether we can do so safely under any system of control until Russia puts into effective action the proposed constitution which I have mentioned. If this is a necessary condition, we must go slowly in any disclosures or agreeing to any Russian participation whatsoever and constantly explore the question how our headstart in "X" and the Russian desire to participate can be used to bring us nearer to the removal of the basic difficulties which I have emphasized.[14]

In other words, even if our headstart was only temporary, could it not be used to influence the Soviet Union to make life safer for the world by converting itself into a constitutional democracy, in which citizens were free and rulers under restraint? How grand the purpose, how far away the chance! But to Stimson, as Elting Morison in his forthcoming biography of the Secretary of War has observed, "That these difficulties could, with care and time, be removed was not 'an idle dream.' "[15]

On the morning of the 24th Stimson showed Truman the most recent message from Harrison giving the probable date when all would be in order to use the bomb against Japan. That was being assembled in Tinian. The President was delighted and said that it gave him his cue for the issuance of the final warning to Japan to accept the terms we and the British were offering, as the only way to escape utter destruction. He wanted to issue this summons to surrender as soon as Chiang Kai-shek, who had been asked to approve the text, answered. At lunch, Truman talked over with Byrnes how Stalin might be told enough to invalidate any future reproach that information of military importance had been kept from him, but no more. They had agreed that it should be done in a rather offhand way.

That afternoon the Combined Chiefs of Staff had what was deemed a rewarding session with their Soviet associates. The

[14] Potsdam Papers. Document No. 1165.
[15] Morison manuscript.

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Plenary Session of the Heads of State was, however, rather unproductive and at moments discordant. Still Stalin had shown some disposition to heed Western wishes. The conferees rose from their places with amiable nods after approving the worksheet for their next meeting. As they were standing around in small groups waiting for their cars to come, the President, along with Bohlen, sauntered over to Stalin. His own later account of their very brief chat is as casual as his act was made to appear. It might even be called "humdrum."

> On July 24 I casually mentioned to Stalin that we had a new weapon of unusual destructive force. The Russian Premier showed no special interest. All he said was that he was glad to hear it and hoped we would make "good use of it against the Japanese."[16]

Both Churchill and Byrnes were observing the two intently. Churchill stood perhaps five yards away and watched with the closest attention to measure the effect of what the President was going to tell Stalin. His impression was the same though more enlivened by his dramatic imagination.

> . . . I can see it all as if it were yesterday. He seemed to be delighted. A new bomb! Of extraordinary power! Probably decisive on the whole Japanese war! What a bit of luck! This was my impression at the moment, and I was sure that he had no idea of the significance of what he was being told. . . .[17]

When he asked Truman how the talk had gone the President told him how Stalin had been pleased but not inquisitive. And when Byrnes asked him the same question the President answered that all Stalin had said was "that he was glad to hear of the bomb and he hoped we would use it."[18]

What had been feared had not come to pass. Stalin had not tried to find out what the nature of the new weapon was nor how it was made. He had not suggested that Soviet officers or technicians be allowed to examine or witness its use. But was this only because he did not realize the significance of what Truman was telling him? He was not dull in grasping the meaning of even the most passing remark, or incurious about any improvement in weapons. It did not occur to any of the American and British officials who were at Potsdam that Stalin might already have

[16] Truman, *op. cit.*, p. 416. As Truman later wrote to Professor Cate, one of the editors of the history of the Army Air Forces, "Premier Stalin smiled and thanked me for reporting the explosion to him, but I'm sure he did not understand its significance." Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate., eds., "The Army Air Forces in World War II." Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953, v. 5, p. 712.

[17] Churchill, *op. cit.*, p. 670.

[18] Byrnes, "Speaking Frankly." New York: Harper, 1947, p. 263.

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knowledge of the production and testing of the new weapon. Possibly, probably, he did not. But that is curious in the light of what has since been learned of the inside accounts of what was being done at Los Alamos that had been transmitted to the Soviet Government by its agents in New Mexico and elsewhere.

In any case, Truman's statement did not seem to either the American or British observers to have influenced the Russian attitude toward the situations that were being talked about at the conference. Nor can the historian going over the record of the conference discern signs that it did so. But this steadiness may have been dissimulation. Stalin was quite able to conceal any glimmer of the idea that the diplomatic or military balance between the West and the Soviet Union might be affected by the new weapon. Or it might have been due to his certainty that the American Government would not use it against the Soviet Union because of any current difference. Or it may have been that his technical advisers were already telling him that they could in due course repeat the production. These are some of the conjecturable, maybe imaginary, reasons for Stalin's response, for the way in which he matched Truman's casualness. But whether it was due to failure to grasp the significance of Truman's statement, or dissimulation, this student for one would be surprised if there are not in the Soviet archives orders which, if not issued long before July 24, were dispatched that night from Potsdam, urging the Soviet intelligence network to do its utmost to find out all it could about the new weapon, and asking the scientific sections of the military to report their surmises about its nature and methods of manufacture.

V

After his first quick and interrupted scanning of Groves' long and vivid report on the New Mexico bomb test which has been quoted, Churchill had said to Stimson that he had noticed during the session of the conference the afternoon before (the 21st) that the President was evidently much fortified by some news or event. He had seemed to this alert observer to be a changed person, in the way in which he had maintained his stand against the Russians in a most emphatic and decisive manner. And so, Churchill added, he too was a different man.

Some of the President's attendant staff had the same impression of new gusto and greater firmness. But alas, it is not detect-

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able in the dull monochrome tone of the American minutes of the conference. Nor can I discern that the change in mood or attitude or judgment lasted through the following days of the conference. Certainty that we would be able to defeat the Soviet Union in war did not cause Truman or his advisers, military or civilian, to be more demanding. It apparently did not lead them to anticipate that, after the proof in use against Japan of the great destructive power of the weapon, the Russians would be more yielding.

Nor was our wish to have Russian coöperation in the war against Japan dispelled. When, after the receipt of the Groves report, Stimson told Marshall that the President would like to know whether he [Marshall] still thought we needed the Russians in the Pacific War or whether we could get on without them, the answer was neither direct nor conclusive. Marshall said that the fact that the Russians were amassing large forces on the Manchurian frontier was already serving one of the purposes for which we wished them to come into the war—to cause the Japanese to keep their army in Manchuria. He also pointed out that even if we defeated the Japanese without or before Russian entry they could, if they so wished, march into Manchuria anyhow and take what they wanted. In sum Marshall gave Stimson the impression that since we had the atomic bomb, Russian aid was no longer really needed to conquer Japan or much wanted; but that it would bring the end quicker and with smaller loss of life; and since in any event the Soviet forces could secure control of Manchuria [and possibly Korea and the Kuriles] it was still expedient to solicit its entry.

The plans for coördinated operations of American and Soviet forces in the Pacific, which were during the next few days (July 24–26) agreed on by the American and Soviet Chiefs of Staff, sealed their joint intention tightly. Truman and Stalin liked the prospect and approved the accord. Churchill, whatever his qualms might have been, made no objection. He had already (on the 24th) concurred in the Final Report of the Combined (U.S.-British) Chiefs of Staff which included in the sections stating the basic understandings and policies for the prosecution of the war against Japan the provision: "Encourage Russian entry into the war against Japan. Provide such aid to her war-making capacity as may be necessary and practicable in connection therewith."

To sum up: the secret knowledge of the bomb did cause the

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Americans and British to be firm in their resistance to Soviet wishes that they thought excessive or perilous. It was a buttress for the policy of fairness and friendliness to which they were clinging. As succinctly expressed by Churchill in "Triumph and Tragedy," ". . . we should not need the Russians. . . . We had no need to ask favors of them." But either the Americans at Potsdam did not know how to use their command of the new weapon effectively as a threat, or chose not to use it in that way. Was not the American Government resting the whole structure of its policy on the conviction that situations and disputes were to be settled only by peaceful means and orderly procedures? The intention was to find ways to use the technical triumph in New Mexico for the service of the ideal principles which had been endorsed at San Francisco. Even if Russia could be frightened or coerced by the bomb to give in against its will on matters before the conference, would the West be well served if in consequence it turned against the United Nations? Such, in so far as I can gather the thoughts of those who guided American diplomatic and military decisions at Potsdam, was the trend of their sober reflections.

Thus the light of explosion "brighter than a thousand suns" filtered into the conference rooms at Potsdam only as a distant gleam. It was the fire, however, concealed in the final call for Japanese surrender that was issued from Potsdam. And its full glare was to become burningly visible over Hiroshima not many days later.

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JAPANESE SOCIALISM IN CRISIS

By Robert A. Scalapino

TODAY Japan can be called a one and one-half party state. The weak and divided Japanese Socialists cannot seriously challenge the massive Liberal-Democratic Party. In large measure, this has always been true. Even when the Japanese conservatives were divided, prior to 1955, they consistently polled close to two-thirds of the vote in national elections and a considerably higher percentage in most local contests. Until recently, however, the Japanese Socialist Party was filled with hope for the future. Its position was much stronger than in the prewar era; after a sharp setback in the 1949 election, the party had made moderate but steady gains. In spite of vexing internal problems and a period of open cleavage, it had edged upward in each successive election, both in percentage of votes and number of seats in the Diet. The increases were attributed largely to voting trends among the postwar generation and the recently emerged labor class. Some saw in these trends the approach of a Socialist era. At least Japan seemed to be moving in the direction of a genuine two-party system.

Any such trend, however, has been reversed. Optimism in Socialist ranks has been replaced by gloom. The Japanese Socialist Party has been stopped in its tracks and now faces another internal crisis of major proportions. New clouds first appeared in the election for the House of Representatives in May 1958, when the Socialist rate of growth declined, and a serious question was raised as to whether the party could ever attain power under its current organization, leadership and policies. This issue became more critical after the House of Councillor election of June 1959. While the Socialists managed to increase their membership in the upper house slightly, their percentage of the vote declined. Local elections also continued to go very badly for them. The party could not seem to rise above the tremendous barrier that separated it from some two-thirds of the Japanese voters.

Failure produced increasing self-criticism and vigorous internal debate. This exacerbated the personal and ideological cleavages long existing in the party. Finally a new explosion occurred. The immediate issue was the "Nishio problem;" the occasion was the party's general convention held in Tokyo last September. Certain

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militant groups within the dominant left-wing of the party demanded the ouster of the veteran right-wing leader, Suehiro Nishio, head of one of the seven factions composing the Socialist Party. The drive was spearheaded by the Socialist Party Youth Division; Sohyo, the powerful General Council of the Japanese Trade Unions; and such allies as the Wada and Matsumoto factions of the party. Nishio was charged with committing "anti-party action." Specifically he was accused of failure to support party policy on the issues of the Mutual Security Treaty and China.

For five stormy days, the Socialist convention fought over the Nishio issue to the exclusion of almost all other questions, though perhaps all other questions were in some measure contained in this issue. A recess was finally taken, and a month later the convention reconvened for two days. When the smoke of battle had cleared, the precarious unity established among Socialist factions in October 1955 had once again been broken. Although he had not been ousted, Nishio and his faction decided to walk out of the party in protest against its "anti-democratic" tendencies and "pro-Communist" elements. They established a Reconstruction Council which proclaimed its support for "democratic socialism," and promised to seek support from "the whole nation, not merely the labor unions and farmers' organizations." The other part of the Socialist right-wing, the Kawakami faction, decided to remain in the party, at least temporarily, but constituted itself an "internal opposition." It refused to accept positions on the Central Executive Committee except for the post of Secretary-General, already held by one of its members, Inejiro Asanuma.

Once again the Japanese Socialist Party appears to have moved to the left, but the situation is both fluid and complex. The left-wing itself is divided into numerous factions. The largest and most moderate group on the left is the faction headed by Mosaburo Suzuki, aging party chairman. His "main stream" faction faces strong opposition from some of the more doctrinaire leftist elements. In reality Socialist Party unity has rested for a considerable period upon an alliance of the "center" between the right-wing Kawakami and the left-wing Suzuki factions. In the past few months, these two groups have struggled desperately to preserve party unity. They successfully opposed the resolution ousting Nishio. And when the Kawakami group decided upon "internal opposition," the Suzuki group moved to take almost all of the

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Executive Committee posts to prevent any further right-wing slippage. Thus such militant left-wing factions as those of Wada and Matsumoto were not given representation on the new Committee although an ally, the Nomizo faction, received two appointments.

The Suzuki faction hopes to preserve the status quo by this means until next spring when it expects to call a special convention to consider "suitable party reorganization." Clearly the fate of the Japanese Socialist Party hangs in the balance. Is it doomed to a series of disastrous splinterings and long-range impotence, or will it discover some route to renovation? The answer to this question, together with the determination of basic Socialist ideology, will have a decisive effect upon the future of Japanese democracy.

The difficulties faced by Japanese Socialism are due to a variety of causes, some specifically related to the movement itself or to the society in which it operates, others revealing a common bond with Western Socialism and its contemporary dilemma. To explore the problems, let us begin by examining briefly the organization and leadership of the Japanese Socialist Party. While the Socialist slogan has long been "to the masses," these masses have usually been a mirage, seen dimly on the horizon, but rarely approached in the flesh. Like most Japanese organizations, the Socialist Party has been an exclusive, semi-closed association. Its foundations at the grass-roots level are extremely weak.

At the time of the 1958 elections, the party had only 60,000 members although it polled over 13,000,000 votes.[1] It was reported at the 1958 general convention of the party that there were 1,320 party branches, including some special district and factory branches, scattered among the 4,104 political subdivisions of Japan. Thus the party has an organization in less than one-third of the cities, towns and rural hamlets although such an organization requires only 30 members in the case of cities and 20 in the towns.

In 1957 the party adopted a cadre system in the hope of expanding its organization. The Central Executive Committee was authorized to appoint central and local organizers in order to recruit members and affiliated organizations. The Socialist Party accepts

[1] The statistics used in this article are from the following sources: Taguchi Fukuji, "A Discourse on the Japanese Socialist Party," *Chuo Koron*, September 1958; "Changes in the Political Situation and the Japanese Socialist Party," *Chuo Koron*, September 1959; Hisayoshi Takeo, "The Organizational Strength of Reformist Parties," *Shiso*, June 1959; and Shimazaki Yuzuru, "For the Advance of the Japanese Socialist Party," *Chuo Koron*, February 1959.

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as an affiliate any organization that supports the platform and policy of the party and where one-third or more of the officials are party members. By 1959 eight central organizers and 158 local organizers had been appointed. There are also provisions for district organizers to be appointed by the prefectural party federations. Eventually the party hopes to have five organizers in each prefecture.

Up to the present, however, this new system has not accomplished spectacular results, and other organizational plans are now being discussed. Party membership at the time of the 1959 convention was only 65,000, and the number of branches remained approximately the same. The Japanese people still look at the Socialist Party from the outside. And perhaps the most distressing fact is that the number of young cadre elements within the party appears to be declining.

The position of the Socialist Party in Japanese politics has sometimes been described by using the symbolism of the inverted pyramid. The party's greatest strength lies at the national level; currently it holds 237 Diet seats or about 30 percent of the total number. Its position at the prefectural level is much weaker; there are 482 Socialists in the prefectural assemblies, representing 18.5 percent of the total number. A further sharp decline takes place at the city and district level; here the Socialists have only 908 assemblymen or a mere 4.6 percent. Finally, the 666 town and rural hamlet assemblymen represent only .6 percent of the officials at this level. This is a reflection both upon the nature of Japanese society and the nature of the Socialist Party.

Japan is still a predominantly conservative society, and the rural population, constituting over 40 percent of the electorate, votes overwhelmingly for the Liberal-Democratic Party. The Socialists receive only about 15–20 percent of the rural vote. Why does the farmer vote so strongly conservative? Tradition provides only a partial answer. It is true that the agrarian vote in most societies tends to be conservative, that the flavor of hierarchy and obedience to authority is declining more slowly in rural than in urban Japan, and that the conservatives have a heritage of local organization which they have maintained in spite of social change. It is also important to note, however, that rural Japan has enjoyed unprecedented prosperity since World War II, and that the reforms most desperately needed were provided not by the Socialists but by the Occupation. The farmer may vote conservative be-

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cause he is relatively satisfied. In addition, he has no real alternative because the Socialist Party has been unable to formulate a program that would appeal to the rural voter, despite its awareness of the problem. One of the principal reasons, of course, is the dominance in the party of the labor unions.

Under the Japanese system of unionism, the single enterprise or plant is the basic unit of labor union organization. These enterprise unions are then federated into regional and national associations. Union candidates for the Diet may be sponsored at various levels, but in any case, the union (sometimes with help from management in the case of locally-sponsored candidates) contributes the campaign funds. Some indication of the importance of that support can be seen from the following statistics: in recent national elections, 73 percent of all candidates sponsored by Sohyo unions were elected; 68 percent of those sponsored by unions in Zenro, the moderate Japanese Trade Union Congress, were successful; and 84 percent of those jointly sponsored won. When one contrasts this record with the generally dismal results among the non-sponsored Socialist candidates, the rising power of the unions within the Japanese Socialist Party can be understood.

The importance of union sponsorship to Socialist candidates cannot be measured in terms of funds alone. The unions also represent the most logical source of organization. With the Socialist Party generally weak at local levels, only the union can provide the necessary facilities for campaigning in many areas. This is particularly true in the case of Sohyo, which contains many government workers' unions—such as the Railway Workers, Communications Workers, Postal Employees and Teachers—that provide national coverage.

Under these conditions the Japanese Socialist Party has increasingly become a one-pressure-group party. Over 50 percent of the party members are workers, most of them from organized labor. A constantly growing number of Socialist Diet members and party officials have risen via union channels. Naturally they are primarily responsible to their "constituencies," the union which put them in office and must keep them there. Thus the split between the two major labor federations and factionalism within these federations is faithfully reflected in the Socialist Party. This helps to explain why the party has recently seemed to move leftward when by all political rules it should be seeking rural and urban middle class votes through more moderate policies.

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Although ideological conflict within the Japanese Socialist movement is sharply modified by personality struggles, it is not rendered meaningless. Marxism continues to have a powerful hold on the left wing of the Socialist Party. The recent controversy over whether the party should be a "class party" or a "national party" symbolizes the deep ideological rifts that exist. The left-wing thesis has been expounded repeatedly by Itsuro Sakisaka, veteran Marxist and Professor at Kyushu University. This thesis rests upon a remarkably old-fashioned, classical Marxist approach, one that seems largely oblivious to major trends in the twentieth century. Sakisaka argues that since a capitalist society is composed of "two basic classes," the capitalists and the proletariat, it is only through a struggle between these two that "the fundamental contradictions in present-day society can be eliminated." Therefore, one must establish a class party to conduct this struggle. The "fundamental contradictions" will not be resolved if the Socialist Party attaches importance to the farmers and small entrepreneurs. It is possible to enter into an alliance with them "if the party has strong foundations among the workers." But only a working-class party can "truly represent" them. Hence the theory of a national party is useless.

Moderate Socialists both within and without the party have sharply challenged the class-warfare theory. They have taken their stand with democratic Socialism and the procedures that it requires. The cleavage between the right and left wings can be revealed by a number of crucial issues. Starting with the basic issue of tactics and strategy, it is not easy for the left wing to abandon the historic Marxist belief in revolution. Perhaps its current position might best be described as "parliamentarianism plus," a willingness to use parliamentary tactics but not to be totally bound by them, feeling some freedom to go beyond these tactics into fields of "direct action" even when this conflicts with the law. The right wing insists that one must abide by the rules of the parliamentary game if chaos or suppression is not to result. To straddle the fence between evolution and revolution is to undermine the democratic movement in Japan, they assert.

The content of a Socialist program is also under strenuous debate, a debate that clearly reveals the Marxist-social democratic divisions. Differences in domestic policy run on a continuum. If the two extremities of the party are compared, these differences seem sufficiently large to be considered differences in kind,

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both in policies and in terminology. On the left, the emphasis is upon the proletarian state, extensive nationalization and "smashing Fascist oppression." All of these themes are expressed in orthodox Marxist terms. On the right, the goals are popular democracy, a mixed economy with greatly increased social welfare measures, and additional protection for civil liberties and human rights. The underlying tone is that of Christian or Fabian Socialism. These differences are clearly displayed in reactions to current pressure groups also. The left stands for militant, ideological unions going beyond legality if necessary. They also seem anxious to give organized labor the preëminent role in the Socialist Party. The right not only favors a party more accurately reflecting the social balance of Japanese society, but also supports "realistic unionism" attuned to the basic problems of the workers rather than a union movement vying with the party in political activities. Attitudes toward other economic groups can be understood from this position: the left views "the capitalists" as arch-enemies, and sees the farmers and small entrepreneurs as at best appendages to the working class; the right also denounces "monopoly capitalism," but it is unwilling to think in the old, rigid class terms when contemplating party support.

The nature of this issue suggests some of the major problems faced by Japanese democracy. The gap between the two major parties in Japan today is enormous. A shift in power, while not likely under present circumstances, would amount to a revolution. The dominant wing of the Japanese Socialist Party is not fully committed to parliamentarianism, and the dominant wing of the Liberal-Democratic Party is not fully committed to democracy, at least from the standpoint of egalitarianism and social-economic justice. These facts produce mutual distrust. It is not easy to protect minority rights if the minority contemplates—even casually —the subversion of basic institutions. But in contrary fashion, it is more difficult to support majoritarianism if minority rights are not respected.

Perhaps in Japan this problem has been made more complex because of the fact that neither Japanese personal communications nor the decision-making process are adequate to the needs of a modern democratic state. It has been said by Masamichi Royama that the Japanese communicate without really communicating. This is to say that personal exchange in Japan can easily be ritualistic and only with great difficulty can it deal frankly and

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openly with the central issues at stake. The elaborate protocol involved in such contact serves as a screen, convenient or otherwise, against the transmission of thoughts. Moreover, historically, Japanese decision-making has involved consensus, and this remains the only truly accepted procedure. The parliamentary system depends, at least partially, upon majoritarianism, the moral validity of which is still in doubt in Japan. Thus Socialist distrust of conservative motives is compounded by their antagonism to conservative Diet tactics, an antagonism that contains a strong traditional component.

In foreign policy the left ranges from a position that appears friendly to the Communists to one that stands on a staunchly neutralist base in attempted emulation of the "Nehru line." The latter position is coupled with an intense interest in the concept of an Afro-Asian element in world affairs that would stand outside the two world camps. It should be noted, however, that even among the left-wing Socialists support for a popular front with the Communists is negligible. This is partly because the Japanese Communist Party is weak and unimportant, itself riddled with factionalism. It could scarcely be an important asset. Socialist policy also reflects the recognition that this party is labeled a Russian-dominated party in the Japanese mind, and the Soviet Union is not popular in Japan. Finally some of the left-wing Socialist leaders were once Communists; they are still considered "right-wing deviationists" by the Communists and attacked accordingly. The left-wing Socialists are naturally opposed to the alliance with the United States, and they are especially militant on such issues as American bases in Japan, Japanese rearmament and Okinawa. They will use every possible means to fight the conservative attempt to amend or remove Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution which would make unlimited rearmament possible.

The right-wing Socialist position on foreign policy also has a considerable range. Some would even consider a limited alliance with the United States. Most feel strong cultural and ideological ties with the West, and some regard an American military shield as desirable for Japan under present circumstances. There is little disposition, however, to favor any revision of the "anti-war" clause. Pacifism has deep roots in the Japanese Socialist movement and was reinforced by the devastation of the last war. Many right-wing Socialists, however, would accept the present limited rearmament for defense purposes only. Within the right wing also there

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are numerous exponents of non-alignment, and considerable sympathy exists for the foreign policy of India. Japanese economic and military vulnerability combine to give neutralism some appeal.

This review of policy differences within Japanese Socialism provides an indication of the continuing strength of Marxism in that movement. The left-wing Socialists, most of whom are strongly under Marxist influence, may now control close to 70 percent of the party. Since Marxism has greatly declined in most Socialist movements of the world, why does it remain strong in Japan? As noted earlier, the Japanese Socialist Party is largely a one-pressure-group party, but behind labor stands the intellectual, and the strength of Japanese Marxism is largely attributable to the intellectual class.

There can be little doubt that Japanese intellectuals have had a penchant for theory and a certain contempt for empiricism. This taste was fortified and possibly induced by the needs of the times. A desire on the part of the modern Japanese existed to catch up intellectually as well as technologically with the West. It could be argued that there was no time for empiricism—and no need. One had only to borrow the latest Western theory and thereby ride the wave of the future. The intellectual climate of modern Japan has also been strongly imbued with historicism. Once again the interest in catching up contributed to this fact. A comparison of the Japanese position with that of the West inevitably involved an assessment of past, present and future. Theory and historicism combined present a fertile soil for Marxism.

To this can be added another factor: by both definition and proclivity the role of the modern Japanese intellectual has been largely one of non-participation. In Japanese tradition the function of the scholar was to think, not to act; and only if he conformed to this function was he accorded proper recognition. In modern times, although there have been a number of exceptions, the Japanese intellectuals as a group have been social critics rather than policy scientists. This tendency was aided by the fact that Japanese politics in the prewar era were dominated by conservative policies and a nationalist ideology containing certain strongly irrational features. It is not surprising that the intellectual found Marxism an extremely useful tool of social criticism. Moreover, his essentially negative function reinforced his bent toward abstract theory. Experimentation in the real world of politics and empirical research was largely missing.

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In a broader sense this signals the crisis confronting Japanese Socialism today. The struggle between conservatism and Socialism in contemporary Japan is partly a struggle between a pragmatic, flexible approach and one that is increasingly rigid, abstract and apolitical. The Japanese Socialists run some risk of being considered by history as the real conservatives of this era, unable to evolve and frozen in impotence. Perhaps there is an element of exaggeration and distortion in this picture. The Liberal-Democrats also have basic problems, some similar, others different from those of the Socialists. There is, however, a suggestion in contemporary Japanese politics that continuity in power gives the conservatives an important advantage in adjusting to the changing requirements of power, and that continuity out of power heightens the Socialists' problem of moving from the world of the past into that of the present and future.

It is easy to say that the Japanese Socialists should become "more responsible," but how? Even apart from the grave problems implicit in their current leadership, organization and social foundations, how does a party become responsible without power, indeed, when it is almost without hope of power? If there is no legacy of policy to defend, irresponsibility is an omnipresent danger; the longer a party is separated from power, the greater the temptations are likely to become. And it must be realized that the Japanese Socialist Party has never truly been in power. It was hoped that when the party moved closer to power, it would also move closer to reality in an effort to hurdle the final gap. Now that it appears to be stagnating at the one-third mark, however, these hopes have faded, at least temporarily. The party cannot seem to break out of a closed circle: in order to attain responsibility, it must acquire power; but in order to acquire power, it must attain responsibility.

The purest, most classical Marxists in Asia today reside in Japan, not in Communist China. The Chinese Communist leaders have been forced into pragmatism by the requirements of power. But the Japanese Marxists have a greater "integrity;" seemingly oblivious to power, they continue their quest for doctrinal "truth," launching polemic attacks upon each other out of their tight little factional fortresses. To be sure, there are signs of a change. A younger generation of Japanese intellectuals is now emerging with much less interest in traditional thought. Many of these young scholars are studying some of the new methodologies and ideas

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current in the West. But the legacy of the past is still strong, especially in active political circles.

In the largest sense, however, the problem of Japanese Socialism appears to be connected with the problem of Socialism everywhere. Recently the British Socialists met to consider their recent defeat and to determine their future course. Some of the same issues plaguing the Japanese were clearly present. We are at a juncture in history when the "advanced" societies have accomplished, or are en route to accomplishing, many of the initial goals of democratic Socialism, albeit often under different designations. This in itself presents a significant challenge to the Socialist movement. Beyond that, however, an interesting question can be raised. Is it possible that progressive conservatives can conduct a "permanent revolution" with sufficient skill to keep Socialists out of power indefinitely? Needless to say, this would not be Trotsky's permanent revolution, but rather one in which the conservatives adjusted to the importance of the mass man, acknowledged and anticipated his most basic needs, and attuned organizational attention upon him with sufficient skill to put the democratic Socialists indefinitely on the defensive.

Perhaps such a "permanent revolution" is not possible, either in Japan or elsewhere. A sudden depression might easily reverse the picture—if it could not be modified by the government in power. Long continuity in power can lead to corruption, complacency or grievous errors, and thereby produce the mood for change. But there is just enough in the pattern of modern power and in socio-economic trends in the "advanced" world to suggest a new problem for democracy: the problem of the perennial minority. Democracy is in peril if one party knows only how to govern and the others only how to oppose.

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A somewhat rambling and anecdotal book, but containing much informative and witty discussion of diplomatic practice at the working level, based in part on Mr. Thayer's years in the U.S. Foreign Service.

DISARMAMENT: AN OUTLINE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. By ANTHONY NUTTING. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1959, 51 p. $1.40.

A concise summary of the abortive disarmament negotiations since 1945, by the British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs from 1954 to 1956.

NATO AND AMERICAN SECURITY. EDITED BY KLAUS KNORR. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959, 342 p. $6.00.

A number of very able authors have contributed papers to this symposium on NATO—its background, its strategy, function and problems, and its future.

NATO AND THE EUROPEAN UNION MOVEMENT. By M. MARGARET BALL. New York: Praeger (for the London Institute of World Affairs), 1959, 486 p. $8.00.

The chief purpose of this study, by a Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College, is to examine the interplay of regional organization in Western Europe with the Atlantic Community. Are these alternate or complementary forms of European organization?

THE WEST IN CRISIS. By JAMES P. WARBURG. Garden City: Doubleday, 1959, 192 p. $3.50.

In this book, his twenty-fifth, Mr. Warburg continues his vigorous critique of American and Western policy. He finds the chief danger not in the external threat but in internal weaknesses and failures. It is doubtful that the problem can be treated in these terms.

STRATEGY IN THE MISSILE AGE. By BERNARD BRODIE. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959, 423 p. $6.50.

In this admirably lucid and well-considered study, Mr. Brodie, a senior staff member of the RAND Corporation, discusses the enormous difficulties of devising strategies appropriate to the fantastic development in weaponry. His central theme is the requirements for effective and plausible deterrence and their bearing on such doctrines as massive retaliation, limited war, nuclear or otherwise, and the form of defense. Quite critical of a number of aspects of recent American policy, the book's general purpose is certainly constructive.

WORLD WITHOUT WAR. By J. D. BERNAL. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1959, 308 p. $5.00.

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Professor Bernal, a British physicist holding very controversial views, offers his program for advancing human welfare and avoiding nuclear war. While he says he has deliberately neglected the major political issues, he is persuaded "that the socialist system will in the end spread over the whole world."

MASSIVE RETALIATION. By Paul Peeters. Chicago: Regnery (in coöperation with Foundation for Foreign Affairs), 1959, 304 p. $5.00.

This work is less an analysis of strategic doctrine than a running attack on domestic critics—chiefly the "liberal intelligentsia"—of the foreign and defense policies of the Eisenhower Administration.

DEMOCRATIC MANIFESTO. By Ferdinand Peroutka. New York: Voyages Press, 1959, 181 p. $3.00.

In this brief essay Mr. Peroutka, a Czech journalist in exile, has created a remarkably eloquent, sensitive and penetrating "manifesto" for democracy in confronting the totalitarian challenge of our century.

SIX ALLIES AND A NEUTRAL. By Lloyd A. Free. Glencoe (Ill.): Free Press, 1959, 210 p. $5.00.

A study of "the psychological dynamics which influence the current international behavior (more particularly in the cold war context)" of India, the U.S., Great Britain, France, West Germany, Italy and Japan. It is based chiefly on an analysis of opinion surveys among parliamentarians in these countries. The conclusions, while statistically interesting, do not greatly increase our insight.

THE POWER OF SMALL STATES. By Annette Baker Fox. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959, 211 p. $5.50.

An interesting and original study directed to the question "How the governments of small and militarily weak states can resist the strong pressure of great powers even in crisis periods." The inquiry is based on the experiences of Turkey, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Spain in the Second World War.

CONTROLS FOR OUTER SPACE. By Philip C. Jessup and Howard J. Taubenfeld. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959, 379 p. $6.00.

This volume, the first of the Columbia University Studies in International Organization, undertakes the difficult job of defining and discussing the various economic, political and strategic issues that promise to emerge from man's advances into outer space. It seems evident that effective controls in this new sphere must be international. A section of the book is devoted to controls for the Antarctic, as a terrestrial analogy.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW. By Nagendra Singh. New York: Praeger (for the Indian Council of World Affairs), 1959, 267 p. $6.75.

An appraisal of the legality of thermonuclear weapons in the light of customary and conventional laws governing belligerency.

LAW IN DIPLOMACY. By Percy E. Corbett. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959, 290 p. $6.00.

A study, by an experienced scholar in international law, of the question "What role do legal reasoning and legal rules play in the diplomacy of nations?" The work is based largely on British, American and Soviet experience and practice.

INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW AND PRACTICE. By J. L. Simpson and Hazel Fox. New York: Praeger (for the David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies), 1959, 330 p. $8.00.

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A survey and appraisal of international tribunals, dealing with the settlement by judicial process of disputes between states or claims by the nationals of one state against another state.

THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE. By Morris Greenspan. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959, 724 p. $10.00.

This massive study undertakes "an accurate, comprehensive, and systematic statement of the international law of war on land as it exists today."

THE CRIME OF STATE. By Pieter N. Drost. Leyden: Sijthoff, 1959, 2 v. Florins 45.85.

In this broadly conceived study on the protection of human rights and peoples' rights in international law, the first volume, "Humanicide," is concerned with governmental crime against individual human rights; the second, "Genocide," deals with United Nations actions and legislation in this field.

DIPLOMACY IN A CHANGING WORLD. Edited by Stephen D. Kertesz and M. A. Fitzsimons. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959, 407 p. $7.50.

A symposium of essays on "the problems and resources of diplomacy in a world characterized by a radical departure from the past." The topics covered range from general issues of diplomacy and diplomatic practice to the diplomacy of various nations, large and small.

DIPLOMATIE UNSERER ZEIT. Edited by Karl Braunias and Gerald Stourzh. Graz (Austria): Verlag Styria, 1959, 330 p.

Lectures, in English, French and German, on diplomacy and the diplomatic profession, delivered at the 1958 International Seminar for Diplomats at Klessheim.

DOCTRINES DU NATIONALISME. By Jacques Ploncard d'Assac. Paris: Librairie Française, 1958, 350 p. Fr. 990.

Chapters on Drumont, Barrès, Bourget, Maurras, Pétain, Corradini, Mussolini, Hitler, Primo de Rivera, Ramiro Ledesma Ramos, Redondo and Salazar.

1914. By James Cameron. New York: Rinehart, 1959, 278 p. $3.95.

An impressionistic portrait of a year that was surely one of history's great watersheds.

SSSR I PROBLEMA RAZORUZHENIIA (MEZHDU PERVOI I VTOROI MIROVYMI VOINAMI). By V. M. Khaitsman. Moscow: Akademiia Nauk SSSR, Institut Mirovoi Ekonomiki i Mezhdunarodnykh Otnoshenii, 1959, 450 p. Rubles 18.80.

An extensive, and substantial, if altogether partisan Soviet interpretation of Soviet efforts to promote disarmament in the inter-war years. Includes a discussion of the literature on the subject.

AMERICAN REPORTERS ON THE WESTERN FRONT, 1914–1918. By Emmet Crozier. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959, 299 p. $6.50.

An affectionate, anecdotal account of the life and times of American correspondents in the First World War.

CHRISTIANITY, DEMOCRACY AND COMMUNISM. By John M. Graham. Edinburgh: Saint Andrew Press, 1958, 125 p. 12/6.

Reflections on the challenge of Communism and the response of Christian political realism, by a Scottish theologian who is also leader of the Labor Party in the Aberdeen City Council.

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A GOOD TIME TO BE ALIVE. By Edgar Ansel Mowrer. New York: Duell, 1959, 179 p. $3.50.

A collection of essays on American and world affairs by a prominent American journalist; hardly supporting the note struck in the title.

POWER, PUBLIC OPINION, AND DIPLOMACY. Edited by Lillian Parker Wallace and William C. Askew. Durham: Duke University Press, 1959, 421 p. $8.75.

A mélange of essays in honor of Eber Malcolm Carroll, but dealing with various topics of foreign affairs in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

WORLD JEWRY TODAY. Edited by S. Federbush. New York: Yoseloff, 1959, 747 p. $10.00.

A comprehensive directory of the world's Jewish communities.

BÜNDNISSICHERUNG ODER VERSTÄNDIGUNGSFRIEDEN. By Wolfgang Steglich. Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1958, 258 p. DM. 26.

A monograph on the background of the 1916 peace proposal of the Central Powers.

General: Economic, Social and Cultural

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH. By John M. Letiche. New York: Harper, 1959, 378 p. $6.00.

A technical study both of the history of the theory of balancing of international payments and of the application of theory to the relationship between economic growth and international equilibrium. The author strives to develop a more generalized theory to deal with these internal and external processes.

THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION. By Shepard B. Clough. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959, 540 p. $7.50.

In this ambitious and wide-ranging volume Professor Clough surveys the history of economic growth, as a substantial strand in man's effort to attain a higher level of civilization. Confined largely to the Western world, it proceeds from antiquity to the economic crises of the twentieth century.

REFLECTIONS ON BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES—MAINLY ECONOMIC. By E. Lipson. London: Pall Mall Press, 1959, 103 p. 12/6.

A concise but penetrating essay comparing the workings of the two economies in their respective social and historical settings.

THE FAILURE OF THE "NEW ECONOMICS": AN ANALYSIS OF THE KEYNESIAN FALLACIES. By Henry Hazlitt. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1959, 458 p. $7.50.

A root-and-branch criticism of Keynes' "General Theory."

SELECTED PAPERS. By Jan Tinbergen. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1959, 318 p. Guilders 30.

A selection and translation of a leading Dutch economist's articles relating to five principal fields—business cycle theory and policy, international economics, long-term economic development, distribution of income and economic systems.

THE EXECUTIVE OVERSEAS. By John Fayerweather. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1959, 195 p. $4.00.

Drawing principally on a study of American firms in Mexico, this book gives an interesting analysis of some of the problems that arise when men of different cul-

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tures and with different attitudes toward production, sales, finance and management try to work together in business.

The Second World War

COMMAND DECISIONS. New York: Harcourt, 1959, 481 p. $5.95.

A group of historians examine 20 major military decisions of the Second World War, from such general decisions as that to deal with Germany before Japan down to more localized decisions in the course of the campaigns. (Prepared by the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, under the general editorship of Kent Roberts Greenfield.)

THE FRENCH NAVY IN WORLD WAR II. By Rear Admiral Paul Auphan and Jacques Mordal. Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1959, 413 p. $6.00.

A comprehensive account of French naval activities. Admiral Auphan served as Chief of Naval Operations and Minister of the Navy in the first months of the Vichy régime. A translation of "La Marine Française Pendant la Seconde Guerre Mondiale" (Paris: Hachette, 1958, 521 p. Fr. 1800).

THE NINE DAYS OF DUNKIRK. By David Divine. New York: Norton, 1959, 308 p. $3.95.

An absorbing account of the retreat to Dunkirk and the astonishing achievement of bringing 338,000 men back safely to England.

INVASION '44. By John Frayn Turner. New York: Putnam, 1959, 248 p. $3.95.

An account of the Normandy landing, its planning and execution.

THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE: ORGANIZING FOR WAR. By Leo P. Brophy and George J. B. Fisher. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of Military History, 1959, 498 p. $4.00.

This is the first of three volumes on the activities of the Chemical Warfare Service, in the official history of the U.S. Army in World War II. It deals with the administrative development and military training.

DOKUMENTE ZUM UNTERNEHMEN "SEELÖWE." Compiled by Karl Klee. Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1959, 457 p. DM. 46.

Documents dealing with the German plans for a landing in England in 1940.

The United States

FROM THE MORGENTHAU DIARIES: YEARS OF CRISIS, 1928–1938. By John Morton Blum. Boston: Houghton, 1959, 583 p. $7.50.

This is the first of two volumes of a political biography, based on the extensive Morgenthau diaries. The model for the work was the Stimson-Bundy collaboration in "On Active Service in Peace and War." The book is a major contribution to the history of the New Deal years, especially in its wealth of material on financial and economic policy, though it lacks some of the garrulousness and gossip of the Ickes diary.

AN AMERICAN EPIC. VOLUME I. INTRODUCTION: THE RELIEF OF BELGIUM AND NORTHERN FRANCE, 1914–1930. By Herbert Hoover. Chicago: Regnery, 1959, 477 p. $6.50.

This is the first of three volumes dealing with a major accomplishment of American society—the provision of relief to other peoples in distress. As a person connected with this work for many years former President Hoover is well placed to

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recount this narrative, which, in form, is largely a documentary chronicle based in good part upon the files of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace.

PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, 1958. Washington: G.P.O., 1959, 954 p. $8.25.

The present volume, the third in the series, contains the public messages, speeches and statements of the President from January 1 to December 31, 1958.

IMAGE OF AMERICA. By R. L. Bruckberger. New York: Viking, 1959, 277 p. $4.50.

Father Bruckberger, a Dominican priest who has spent eight years in the United States, undertakes, with some interesting insights but also some historical lapses, to interpret American culture and society. Interestingly, he finds our tradition marked by a sense of moderation and pragmatic relativism that has saved the country from the fanaticism of total answers.

AS OTHERS SEE US: THE UNITED STATES THROUGH FOREIGN EYES. Edited by Franz M. Joseph. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959, 360 p. $6.00.

Twenty essays about the United States and the impression it has made upon them by observers from Europe, Asia, Africa and South America. The essays certainly tell as much about the authors' own countries as about the United States and presumably such an exchange of national images promotes international understanding. No voices from the Soviet sector.

POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY. By Adolf A. Berle, Jr. New York: Harcourt, 1959, 184 p. $3.75.

Long a student of American corporations, Mr. Berle scrutinizes and assesses their development in the decades since the appearance in 1932 of "The Modern Corporation and Private Property." As the title indicates, he finds the divorce between "ownership" and "control" to have increased, to the extent that the sources of power and responsibility have become extremely complex and involved.

THE COMMUNIST CHALLENGE TO AMERICAN BUSINESS. By Clarence B. Randall. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1959, 203 p. $3.50.

Chiefly an appeal to the American business community, by a former businessman and later public servant in the Eisenhower Administration, to be more aware of the parlous state of the world and to assume its necessary responsibilities.

MONOPOLISTICHESKII KAPITAL SSHA POSLE VTOROI MIROVOI VOINY. Moscow: Akademiia Nauk SSSR, Institut Mirovoi Ekonomiki i Mezhdunarodnykh Otnoshenii, 1958, 673 p. Rubles 27.70.

A study by a group of Soviet economists on the recent "development of monopolistic capital" in the United States and its iniquitous influence on American policies. Obviously a tendentious work but revealing much close study of the American scene.

THE AMERICAN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. By Max Beloff. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959, 213 p. $4.50.

Professor Beloff of Oxford, a man of many well-studied interests, provides in brief compass some quite penetrating insights, "from the point of view of non-Americans," on the American system of government.

AMERICAN TRADE WITH ASIA AND THE FAR EAST. Edited by Robert J. Barr. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press (for the Institute for Asian Studies), 1959, 317 p. $9.00.

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A symposium of essays dealing with the problems confronting United States trade with Asia and the Far East (chiefly outside the Communist area of control).

THE COMING POLITICAL BREAKTHROUGH. By Chester Bowles. New York: Harper, 1959, 209 p. $3.75.

Looking forward to the 1960 elections, Mr. Bowles, writing explicitly as a Democrat, discusses the various problems, domestic and foreign, that face the nation, and the direction in which he believes appropriate answers are to be sought.

WALTER LIPPMANN AND HIS TIMES. Edited by Marquis Childs and James Reston. New York: Harcourt, 1959, 246 p. $3.95.

In celebration of his seventieth birthday 12 of his friends have written essays on or about Walter Lippmann's life and works.

THE ROOSEVELT REVOLUTION. By Mario Einaudi. New York: Harcourt, 1959, 372 p. $5.95.

The author, Professor of Government at Cornell, appraises the impact of the New Deal as a lasting influence on American life. Admiring President Roosevelt, Mr. Einaudi vigorously defends his policies against both conservative and leftist critics.

AFFECTIONATELY, F.D.R. By James Roosevelt and Sidney Shalett. New York: Harcourt, 1959, 394 p. $5.75.

An intimate and loving family portrait by the late President's eldest son.

THE TRUMAN-MACARTHUR CONTROVERSY AND THE KOREAN WAR. By John W. Spanier. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1959, 311 p. $6.50.

In this study, a doctoral dissertation, the author is chiefly concerned with the problem of civil-military relations under conditions of war and of the dangers implicit in a belief in the separability of military and non-military factors.

Western Europe

FRANCE, TROUBLED ALLY. By Edgar S. Furniss, Jr. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1960, 512 p. $5.75.

In this study, written under a research fellowship of the Council on Foreign Relations, Professor Furniss develops two major themes—the dependence of French foreign policy upon domestic demands and problems, and the marked continuity of foreign policy between the Fourth and Fifth Republics. Despite the accession of de Gaulle, the author does not believe that France can effectively carry the responsibilities of a world power though it can, and must, play an indispensable role in the European community.

HISTOIRE POLITIQUE DE LA TROISIÈME RÉPUBLIQUE. TOME TROISIÈME: L'APRÈS-GUERRE (1919–1924). By Édouard Bonnefous. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1959, 463 p. Fr. 1900.

This third volume in a major history of the Third Republic covers events from the end of the First World War to the fall of the Poincaré government and the elections of 1924.

HISTOIRE DE LA LIBÉRATION DE LA FRANCE. By Robert Aron. Paris: Fayard, 1959, 779 p. Fr. 1950.

M. Aron, author of a history of Vichy, here presents a substantial and important sequel to his earlier work and deals with events in France from June 1944 to May 1945. In both studies he has demonstrated unusual ability to maintain balance and objectivity in the midst of exceedingly controversial topics.

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LA NOUVELLE CONSTITUTION ET LE RÉGIME POLITIQUE DE LA FRANCE. By Jean Chatelain. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1959, 461 p. Fr. 1350.

A general survey of the 1958 French Constitution and its setting in contemporary French politics and political institutions.

LA LORRAINE SIDÉRURGIQUE. By Claude Prêcheur. Paris: S.A.B.R.I., 1959, 2 v. Fr. 9000.

A massive survey of the iron industries in Lorraine.

DUTCH FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1815. By Amry Vandenbosch. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1959, 318 p. Guilders 25.50.

An interesting study in "small power politics." About two-thirds of the work is devoted to the twentieth century.

THE NORDIC COUNCIL AND CO-OPERATION IN SCANDINAVIA. By Frantz Wendt. Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1959, 247 p.

A useful, concise survey of cultural, economic, legal and political coöperation among the Scandinavian states. The author is Secretary General to the Danish Delegation of the Nordic Council.

HJEMOVER. By Trygve Lie. Oslo: Tiden, 1958, 230 p.

These wartime memoirs of Mr. Lie, who was Foreign Minister in Norway's government-in-exile from 1940 to 1945, include an interesting episode of Soviet territorial demands and F.D.R.'s tentative support thereof.

PLANNING IN NORWAY: 1947–1956. By Petter Jakob Bjerve. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1959, 383 p. Guilders 35.

A study of the postwar Norwegian economic plans and projections and a comparison of these plans with the actual outcome. In his appraisal the author goes into such questions as the utility of such national budgeting and the degree of success in achieving postwar economic goals.

GERMANY REJOINS THE POWERS. By Karl W. Deutsch and Lewis J. Edinger. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959, 320 p. $6.50.

A study of the composition and behavior of the new élite groups that are influential in making foreign policy in the German Federal Republic. A good deal of attention is paid to problems of methodology in this area of the behavioral sciences.

DIE DEUTSCHE LANDWIRTSCHAFT IM GEMEINSAMEN MARKT. By Fritz Baade. Baden-Baden: Lutzeyer, 1958, 209 p. DM. 19.80.

An analysis of German agriculture and its prospects in the setting of the European Economic Community.

DOCUMENTS ON THE STATUS OF BERLIN, 1944–1959. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1959, 239 p.

DOKUMENTE ZUR BERLIN-FRAGE, 1944–1959. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1959, 434 p.

DOKUMENTE ZUR BERLIN-FRAGE, JANUAR BIS MAI 1959. Frankfurt/Main: Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, 1959, 49 p.

A very useful collection of documents dealing with the Berlin question since the end of World War II.

AUTHORITY AND ORGANIZATION IN GERMAN MANAGEMENT. By Heinz Hartmann. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959, 318 p. $6.00.

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A revealing analysis of the internal organization of industrial enterprise in West Germany, with particular emphasis on the far-reaching authority exerted by the German *Unternehmer*.

DIE WEIMARER REPUBLIK UND DAS OSTLOCARNO-PROBLEM: 1919–1934. By Christian Höltje. Würzburg: Holzner, 1958, 306 p. DM. 24.

A German dissertation on the fruitless effort of France, Poland and Czechoslovakia to achieve guarantees regarding Germany's eastern frontier similar to those gained at Locarno for the western. At no point were the Weimar statesmen prepared to make this concession.

DIE TRÄGER DER RAPALLO-POLITIK. By Herbert Helbig. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck, 1958, 214 p. DM. 16.80.

Three essays on Germany's Russian policy in the 1920s, dealing with the background to the Rapallo agreement, the Brockdorff-Rantzau mission to Moscow and the question of military alliance as against a neutrality pact.

MUT ZU EINER NEUEN POLITIK. By Hermann Rauschning. Berlin: Vogt, 1959, 247 p. DM. 15.80.

In this latest prescription Herr Rauschning vigorously attacks the Western orientation of the Federal Republic, argues that Germany's place is in a disengaged middle, and tends to disregard features of Soviet policy that might hinder his program or make it ruinous.

MEMOIRS: TEN YEARS AND TWENTY DAYS. By Admiral Karl Doenitz. Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1959, 500 p. $6.00.

This translation of "Zehn Jahre und Zwanzig Tage" (noted here July 1959) deals both with the Admiral's activities as Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy and with his brief period as head of state after Hitler's death.

LAND IM STROM DER ZEIT: ÖSTERREICH GESTERN, HEUTE, MORGEN. By Friedrich Heer. Vienna: Herold, 1958, 387 p. Schillings 148.

Essays and articles, chiefly in the realm of cultural history, dealing with Austria's past and present.

SÜDTIROL: VERSPRECHEN UND WIRKLICHKEIT. Edited by Wolfgang Pfaundler. Vienna: Frick, 1958, 511 p. Schillings 250.

An extensive irredentist collection of articles, documents, etc.

OSTBRANDENBURG UNTER POLNISCHER VERWALTUNG. By Richard Breyer. Frankfurt/Main: Metzner, 1959, 167 p. DM. 9.60.

The fourth volume in the series "Ostdeutschland unter Fremder Verwaltung 1945–1955."

ÖSTERREICH ZWISCHEN RUSSLAND UND SERBIEN. By Hans Uebersberger. Cologne: Böhlau, 1958, 332 p. DM. 24.

This study is chiefly concerned with Austrian-Serbian relations between 1908 and 1914 and, more interestingly, with the organization of the Sarajevo assassination. Austria is seen as the victim rather than the villain of the piece.

ITALY: A MODERN HISTORY. By Denis Mack Smith. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1959, 508 p. $7.50.

This volume in the "History of the Modern World" series is a skillful survey and interpretation of the course of Italian history since Cavour. The basic fragility of this new state and its parliamentary apparatus is well presented and explains much of the collapse into Fascism and even the degree of postwar political sterility.

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POPE JOHN XXIII. By Zsolt Aradi and Others. New York: Farrar, Straus, 1959, 325 p. $4.95.

A collaborative biography, hardly authoritative but devoting a good deal of attention to Angelo Roncalli's diplomatic activities.

BADOGLIO RISPONDE. By Vanna Vailati. Milan: Rizzoli, 1958, 344 p. L. 1800.

The author of a biography of Badoglio here defends him against critics of his actions and decisions in both the First and Second World Wars.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

THE PROPHET UNARMED: TROTSKY, 1921–1929. By Isaac Deutscher. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959, 490 p. $9.50.

In this second volume of his major biography of Trotsky, Mr. Deutscher, a brilliant and informed writer, follows his protagonist's plunge from the heights of power in the Civil War to his banishment in 1929. While Mr. Deutscher is sympathetic to Trotsky, and indeed writes within the general frame of Marxist premises, the book has many valuable insights and demonstrates a mastery of the sources.

PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY. By Wladyslaw W. Kulski. Chicago: Regnery (in coöperation with Foundation for Foreign Affairs), 1959, 662 p. $12.50.

"Since Soviet foreign policy is a highly important factor in the formulation of policies by other nations, it might be useful to examine it, in toto, as it has matured since the 1917 revolution." In pursuit of this examination, which involves both Soviet doctrine and Soviet practice, Professor Kulski gives a cogent exposition of Soviet objectives in foreign policy, with particular emphasis on underdeveloped and colonial areas—the greatest current targets of opportunity.

ISTORIIA KOMMUNISTICHESKOI PARTII SOVETSKOGO SOIUZA. By B. N. Ponomarev and Others. Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1959, 742 p.

This new official history of the Soviet Communist Party, replacing the earlier "Short Course" of the Stalin era, carries the history of the movement and organization from the nineteenth century up to the Twenty-First Party Congress.

ATOMIC ENERGY IN THE SOVIET UNION. By Arnold Kramish. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959, 232 p. $4.75.

An effort to present, on the rather scanty evidence available, a technical and political analysis of the Soviet atomic energy program: the relatively advanced level of research achieved before the war, the marked slackening of work during the war years and the very rapid subsequent developments.

INSIDE THE KHRUSHCHEV ERA. By Giuseppe Boffa. New York: Marzani, 1959, 226 p. $5.00.

An Italian Communist journalist reports on the Soviet Union between 1953 and 1958. Obviously a favorable appraisal, but not without some interesting and occasionally critical insights.

THE SOVIET UNION BETWEEN THE 19th AND 20th PARTY CONGRESSES, 1952–1956. By G. D. Embree. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1959, 365 p. Guilders 22.80.

An effort, on the basis of admittedly inadequate public evidence, to bring out the principal lines of political, diplomatic and economic development in the tangled

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history of the years following Stalin's death. Chiefly of use in bringing together and organizing a great deal of scattered information.

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE MUSLIM WORLD: 1917–1958. By Ivar Spector. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1959, 328 p. $5.00.

This work, earlier versions of which have appeared in mimeographed editions, is a study, based largely on Soviet sources, of the Muslim world as a field of marked Soviet and Communist interest.

AMERICAN RESEARCH ON RUSSIA. Edited by Harold H. Fisher. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1959, 240 p. $5.00.

Essays by a number of specialists reviewing postwar American research on Russia and indicating topics where further research seems called for. The fields covered are history, economy, political science, philosophy and religion, social relations, science, geography, literature, linguistics, music and architecture.

SOVIET AFFAIRS: NUMBER TWO. Edited by David Footman. New York: Praeger, 1959, 154 p. $3.50.

This sixth volume of St. Antony's Papers comprises: "The Kronstadt Rising," by George Katkov; "Nestor Makhno," by David Footman; and "Operations in Transcaspia 1918–1919 and the 26 Commissars Case," by C. H. Ellis.

IN THE NAME OF CONSCIENCE. By Nikolai Khokhlov. New York: McKay, 1959, 365 p. $4.50.

These memoirs of a Soviet intelligence officer who defected in 1954 have that disconcerting quality of total recall common to many writers in this genre.

THE SECRET WORLD. By Peter Deriabin and Frank Gibney. Garden City: Doubleday, 1959, 334 p. $4.50.

A former Soviet secret police officer, who bolted in 1954, and a staff writer on *Life* have collaborated in writing this interesting picture of the Soviet police, intelligence and surveillance systems.

5000 SOWJETKÖPFE. Edited by Hans Koch. Cologne: Deutsche Industrieverlag, 1959, 862 p. DM. 25.50.

A who's who of the Soviet leadership.

DIE INTERNATIONALE. By Günther Nollau. Cologne: Verlag für Politik und Wirtschaft, 1959, 343 p. DM. 15.80.

A substantial and serious history of "proletarian internationalism," centering on the Comintern, but including discussions of the First and Second Internationals, and of the more shadowy Cominform and events since Stalin's death.

DIE SOWJETISIERUNG OST-MITTELEUROPAS. Edited by Ernst Birke and Rudolf Neumann. Frankfurt/Main: Metzner, 1959, 398 p. DM. 24.

Studies by several authors on the Communist seizure of power and the subsequent Sovietization of the Baltic States, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Danube and Balkan region, and eastern Germany.

DER AUSSENHANDEL IN DEN OSTBLOCKSTAATEN. By Theodor Hermes. Hamburg: Cram, 1958, 177 p. DM. 9.50.

This brief work contains some useful information on the organization and operation of foreign trade in the Soviet bloc.

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LAW IN EASTERN EUROPE. III: THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW OF THE SOVIET UNION. Edited by Z. Szirmai. Leyden: Sijthoff, 1959, 157 p. Florins 23.75. (New York: Lounz, distributor, $6.75.)

The 1958 and 1959 Russian texts, with English translation, notes and introduction.

THE FROZEN REVOLUTION. POLAND: A STUDY IN COMMUNIST DECAY. By Frank Gibney. New York: Farrar, Straus, 1959, 269 p. $4.75.

An exceptionally good report, by an American journalist, on the rather tense and uncertain equilibrium of Gomulka's Poland since 1956.

POLAND IN THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT 1939–1945. VOLUME II: FALL 1941–SPRING 1944. Compiled and Edited by Waclaw Jedrzejewicz. New York: Józef Piłsudski Institute of America, 1959, 607 p. $10.00.

A collection of material, bearing on Poland between the fall of 1941 and the spring of 1944, drawn from British Parliamentary debates. (Volume I appeared in 1946.)

THE UNDEFEATED. By George Paloczi-Horvath. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1959, 305 p. $4.50.

An interesting and on the whole well-written autobiography of a Hungarian journalist, who joined the Communist Party for a time, spent some years in prison, and left in the revolution of 1956.

THIRTEEN DAYS THAT SHOOK THE KREMLIN. By Tibor Meray. New York: Praeger, 1959, 290 p. $5.00.

In this account of the 1956 Hungarian revolution the central figure is, appropriately, Imre Nagy. While this story can hardly fail to be interesting, the book could have been better and one wishes that the author, a Hungarian journalist with much first-hand experience, had resisted the temptation to write so fictionally.

THE COMMUNIST SUBVERSION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1938–1948. By Josef Korbel. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959, 258 p. $5.00.

As the author says, this is the narrative of dreary events—the stages by which the Czechoslovakia of Benes, the proponent of accommodation and coexistence, was taken over by the Communist Party.

RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF A TOTALITARIAN STATE. By V. Chalupa. Leyden: Stenfert Kroese, 1959, 294 p. Florins 15.

This study, a volume in the Library of the Czechoslovak Foreign Institute in Exile, has two main parts—a general examination of the dynamics of Communist totalitarianism and a case study of the communization of Czechoslovakia.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

THE BRITISH BUDGETARY SYSTEM. By Sir Herbert Brittain. New York: Macmillan, 1959, 320 p. $5.75.

A detailed and comprehensive exposition.

NEW FABIAN COLONIAL ESSAYS. Edited by Arthur Creech Jones. New York: Praeger, 1959, 270 p. $5.00.

These 11 essays on colonial and Commonwealth questions are chiefly concerned with finding a proper stance for a Socialist policy.

EKONOMIKA I POLITIKA ANGLII POSLE VTOROI MIROVOI VOINY. Moscow: Akademiia Nauk SSSR, Institut Mirovoi Ekonomiki i Mezhdunarodnykh Otnoshenii, 1958, 663 p. Rubles 27.25.

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A collective study by a number of Soviet specialists, interpreting and criticizing the development of Britain's economy and politics—domestic, foreign and Commonwealth—since the Second World War.

ORDE WINGATE. By Christopher Sykes. Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1959, 575 p. $6.00.

This is an excellent and well-balanced study of the brilliant if eccentric British officer and his activities in Palestine, Ethiopia and Burma.

CANADIANS IN THE MAKING: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF CANADA. By Arthur R. M. Lower. New York: Longmans, 1959, 475 p. $7.50.

An ambitious effort, undertaken with vigor, bite and some exaggeration, to interpret the growth of the Canadian nation as a whole. The author, one of Canada's senior men of letters, is Douglas Professor of Canadian History at Queen's University.

CONTEMPORARY CANADA. By Miriam Chapin. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959, 332 p. $7.00.

The author of several works on Canadian questions, Mrs. Chapin here offers a general appraisal of contemporary Canada and its efforts to establish its internal and external identity.

THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC IMPACT ON CANADA. By Hugh G. J. Aitken and Others. Durham: Duke University Press (for the Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center), 1959, 176 p. $4.50.

A series of papers examining Canadian-American economic relations with particular emphasis on the impact of American policies, investment, agriculture and labor upon Canada.

THE WELFARE STATE IN NEW ZEALAND. By J. B. Condliffe. London: Allen and Unwin, 1959, 396 p. 35/. (New York: Macmillan, $8.00.)

The title does not do justice to the scope of this book, which is a substantial economic history of New Zealand since the First World War.

The Middle East

MIDDLE EAST PERSPECTIVE. By R. C. Mowat. New York: Pitman, 1959, 279 p. $4.50.

A brief but comprehensive survey of recent events in the Middle East. The author, an English historian, is currently at University College, Ibadan, Nigeria.

MIDDLE EASTERN CAPITALISM. By A. J. Meyer. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959, 161 p. $3.75.

In these nine lively and informal essays Mr. Meyer, now Associate Director of the Harvard Center for Middle Eastern Studies, reflects on entrepreneurship, economic planning, Cyprus "copra-boat" economy, Turkish land reform and related topics.

THE MIDDLE EAST: A HISTORY. By Sydney Nettleton Fisher. New York: Knopf, 1959, 650 p. $8.95.

A comprehensive general history from the beginnings of Islam to the present. The author is Professor of History at Ohio State University.

MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS: NUMBER ONE. New York: Praeger, 1959, 139 p. $3.50.

This fourth volume of St. Antony's Papers contains seven brief essays on various Middle Eastern problems in the past and present.

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A POLITICAL STUDY OF THE ARAB-JEWISH CONFLICT: THE ARAB REFUGEE PROBLEM (A CASE STUDY). By Rony E. Gabbay. Geneva: Droz, 1959, 611 p. Swiss Fr. 50.

A detailed study of the components of the Arab-Jewish conflict. At the end the author offers some policy suggestions for the Western powers.

ISLAM AND THE ARABS. By Rom Landau. New York: Macmillan, 1959, 298 p. $4.95.

A general survey designed for the non-specialist.

THE HASHEMITE KINGS. By James Morris. New York: Pantheon, 1959, 208 p. $4.50.

A lively history, by a brilliant young British writer and correspondent, of the singularly ill-starred Hashemite dynasty—"a caravan of martyrs," as King Hussein described his family.

JORDAN: A STATE OF TENSION. By Benjamin Shwadran. New York: Council for Middle Eastern Affairs Press, 1959, 436 p. $7.00.

A survey of the last 50 years in Transjordan, with some fairly strong views on the subject of Nasserism and its threat to the Middle East.

TURKEY'S POLITICS. By Kemal H. Karpat. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959, 522 p. $7.50.

This study, dealing chiefly with the debates and activities of the years 1946–1950, treats a subject of singular importance—the effort to create a democratic multi-party system on the heels of a dictatorship and one-party monopoly. Although the author concedes some backsliding in the years that followed, he feels that certain basic gains have been made and can be permanent.

SAUDI ARABIA: ITS PEOPLE, ITS SOCIETY, ITS CULTURE. By George A. Lipsky and Others. New Haven: Human Relations Area Files Press, 1959, 366 p. $7.00. (New York: Taplinger, distributors.)

A useful handbook, one of the series "Survey of World Cultures," prepared under the auspices of the Human Relations Area Files.

THE PERSIAN GULF STATES. By Sir Rupert Hay. Washington: Middle East Institute, 1959, 160 p. $3.75.

The author, for a number of years British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, provides a concise description of the Sheikdoms along the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman.

South and Southeast Asia

GOVERNMENTS AND POLITICS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA. Edited by George McTurnan Kahin. Ithaca: Cornell University Press (for the Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University), 1959, 531 p. $6.50.

A massive handbook covering Thailand, Burma, Indonesia, Malaya and Singapore, Vietnam and the Philippines.

TOO MANY ASIANS. By John Robbins. Garden City: Doubleday, 1959, 214 p. $3.95.

An effort to analyze the population problem of Asia and to suggest certain courses of action, though the author admits to finding "no neat, precise answers." The picture, though broadly familiar, does not cease to be very alarming.

SOCIALISM IN SOUTHERN ASIA. By Saul Rose. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1959, 278 p. $4.80.

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A study, by country, of the state of health of Socialist movements and parties (not Communist or National Socialist) in South and Southeast Asia.

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By Donald Wasson

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